DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

CANADA

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT

ORAE EXTRA-MURAL PAPER NO. 16

TRENDS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

by

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Prepared under DND Contract No.: 14SU.0141003

OTTAWA, CANADA AUGUST 1981

ABSTRACT

This study seeks to assess trends in low intensity conflict by reference to six case studies involving countries which are currently experiencing some form of political violence at a sub-state, rather than an inter-state, level. The cases analyzed were Italy, South Africa, Puerto Rico, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, and Cuba. Among the selection criteria for the case studies were included regional distribution, conflict forms, political and social environments, rural and urban settings, insurgent motivations, and conflict status. The study includes a historical review of the principal conflict forms that have emerged since 1945. A concluding section assesses those trends that recur among most or all of the cases (while recognizing the separate and individual nature of each struggle) with a view to projecting the likely patterns of low intensity conflict.

RÉSUMÉ

L'étude suivante vise à évaluer les tendances qui se manifestent dans les conflits de faible intensité en se fondant sur six études de cas qui touchent des pays aux prises avec des conflits politiques internes plutôt qu'avec des conflits entre états. Les cas analysés sont ceux de l'Italie, de l'Afrique du Sud, de Porto Rico, de l'Afghanistan, de l'Irlande du Nord et de Cuba. Parmi les critères de sélection qui ont servi pour ces études de cas, mentionnons: la répartition régionale, les formes de conflits, les milieux politiques et sociaux, le milieu rural et urbain, les motivations des insurgés et la nature du conflit. L'étude comprend un aperçu historique des principaux conflits qui ont éclaté dans ces pays depuis 1945. Dans la conclusion, on évalue les événements qui se reproduisent dans la plupart des cas, sinon dans chacun d'eux (tout en reconnaissant la nature de chaque conflit, pris séparément) dans le but de déterminer les tendances possibles des conflits de faible intensité.

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TRENDS IN LOW
INTENSITY CONFLICT

An Analysis of Trends in Low Intensity Conflict
Based on Case Studies of Six Conflict Situations

prepared by

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INTRODUCTION

Conceptual Framework

The phenomenon of low intensity conflict, a characteristic of the last thirty-five years, is not a new one. Indeed, it has been prevalent in the past when the state system has been unstable. Hence, we may expect it to prevail until the world system is less turbulent. This introduction offers some bench marks in the present period of conflict that commenced in 1945 and provides the conceptual framework for the specific studies that follow it.

* * * * *

A period of accelerating imperial disintegration began in 1945. The British divested themselves of their empire, more or less willingly and at their own pace. The French, less purposeful in that respect, were caught in prolonged struggles in Indo-China and Algeria. The Dutch, defeated by the Japanese and occupied by the Germans, quickly lost their Indonesian possessions to nationalists after the war. The Belgians left the Congo under pressure. The Portuguese held on to the bitter end in Africa; with the Spanish, they were the first of the imperial powers and also the last.

Except in Latin America, today's state systems have been shaped by the experiences of the Europeans, their erstwhile colonies and their client states in the recent period of imperial decline and fall. Furthermore, although the process of withdrawal is virtually over now, the language and attitudes formed during it still pervade international relations. However, judging by the policies, the rhetoric and the literature of the Soviets, the US, the Europeans and the Third World that now includes so many ex-colonial territories, each has its own conception of what it has inherited from the imperial era and how that era will affect the post-colonial one which they have entered.

A reason for the divergence of view is that imperial withdrawal, which gave birth to successor states all over the world, coincided with the emergence of the super powers which saw themselves as successor states on a world scale. In consequence of this second, and simultaneous upheaval, a Cold War took shape in a new bi-polar power system. The considerations of the polar powers, engaged in what they conceive to be a world struggle, infected the actions and conceptions of states primarily concerned with imperial withdrawal and national liberation. The Cold War, in overlapping the imperial withdrawal, caused the concerns of one to confuse policy-making in the other. The confusion has been greater in US policy-making for, whereas Lenin's theory about imperialism and capitalism has allowed the Soviets to pose unequivocally as the champion of the forces of liberation, the US, although ideologically opposed to colonialism, has found that its interests lay, in some respects although not in all, in supporting forms of neo-colonialism.

The conflict between the super powers started in Europe where the iron curtain was established to separate the states in the Soviet system from those that were Western, or neutral like Austria and Finland. Turbulence accompanying the alignment of this front, in Czechoslovakia and Germany particularly, was of low intensity although the front was secured by conventional and nuclear forces. But with China "lost", turbulence spread to the East when war began in Korea. Subsequently, two quite different modes of conflict, one potentially or actually high-intensity and bipolar, as in Europe and Korea, and the other low-intensity and colonial, as in French Indo-China, merged during the American phase of the war in Indo-China. Equivocal about what had happened in Europe, and with their eyes still fixed on the bipolar struggle that had started there, the Americans tried to establish a cordon sanitaire in the East against communism. Naturally, they were unwilling, in doing so, to allow their communist protagonist, who regarded himself as being engaged first in a colonial and then a post-colonial struggle, to reach his goal of establishing a sovereign state in succession to the French regime. In the Middle East a perennial fault system long regarded as sensitive in the imperial era, erupted into a front between the peripheral and containing Westerners, on one side, and the Soviet Union on the other. There, too, the indigenous peoples were engaged in an internal, post-colonial struggle of great complexity into which they were more or less reluctant to admit outsiders.

The differing goals and experiences of the actors in these simultaneous plays account for some of the confusion that prevails not only in Western policy but in Soviet too about the present scene. The world is filled with unstable states representing the detritus of two quite separate historical periods. First, there are the states created from pre-1945 colonies; then the autonomous clients and satellites of the super powers whose strategic resources and position are considered essential to one or other system. Many of these states have suffered occupation in the past and they were the victims of power-play in the imperial era. In quite a different category are the states in Latin

America that became independent in the nineteenth century but which have not been "reconstructed" since 1945 and have not shared in the Western reform experience.

The principal concern of all these states is to establish and maintain their influence, precarious integrity and sovereignty within a system of states with which they share common interests. Their success in doing so depends mainly on their political stability and economical health. In seeking stability, the assistance of the polar powers may be necessary to these states even if it appears unattractive to them. For the East-West struggle has, at times, appeared to be a new version of the old imperialism. A consideration for unreconstructed states, and those that have not stabilized after reconstruction, is that they are under pressure from the forces that derive their ideology from the wars of liberation; one that has much in common with Marxist or Marxist-Leninist ideology. Consequently, unreconstructed governments tend to be drawn into the East-West struggle by turning for help to the US against internal "progressive" forces with leftist affiliations.

Since the form of conflict that has arisen in these states in the post-colonial period has been more often non-international than international, it has had the appearance of internal struggles to which the rule of non-intervention ought to be applicable. However, the language in which that rule is expressed is that of the stable, imperial era and that of Europe. It may be successfully invoked by Poland, even, but the forces that assail unreconstructed states in Latin America, for instance, are using the language derived from the colonial wars of liberation. Ex-colonial "liberated" states use that language as a link with their heroic past. "Liberation" forces, in the post-colonial era fighting unreconstructed but indigenous "fascist", "feudal", "racist" and "colonialist" regimes find it equally useful. Even terrorist groups with no pretensions to be considered liberators and with no respectable political platforms use the language of liberation. It has become the lingua franca of conflict which provides a means of communication between diverse groups and is a badge of membership. However, it has also been the language of Marxist-Leninism, although those who use it are not necessarily Marxist-Leninists. And while language and thought processes and methodology are closely related, we would suggest that the message and the media need to be distinguished. We argue that the historical movement that started with the withdrawal from empire, and has now flowed on to overtake the other categories of unstable states, is more permanent than the polar ideological struggle by which it is coloured. The latter is an effort to impose order in a disorderly world, as was imperialism for all but its final stages. This is not to discount the bipolar struggle as an important and at times menacing event in its own right, only to place in better perspective its influence on other conflicts.

In accepting the modes and inheritance of the imperial era, rather than those of the nouveau and ephemeral bipolar imperial struggle, as parent and guide in the present, we point out the diversity of the experience that has been inherited from it. Each of the conflicts that accompanied the transfer of colonial power to a "reconstructed" state was sui generis, although bipolar ideology would suggest that a shorter or longer set of predictable objective and subjective conditions were common to all of them. For instance, the racial, religious, physical and economic factors that were decisive during the Malayan Emergency, were not equally significant in Kenya, Palestine, Aden or Northern Ireland. And although the French Army distilled its experience in Indo-China and applied what it had learned in Algeria it failed there; for the political and moral environments were different and both had changed in France in the meanwhile. More important, world opinion, aired in the forum of the United Nations and in the Western media, had developed since the early fifties. Not to labour a point, each conflict was peculiar, and the side that had the clearer aim and had better studied the peculiarities of its own situation in time and space was the more successful. Ideology proved to be an impediment in the assessment rather than a useful tool if, by ideology, we mean one bought off the peg and derived from a different time and different place.

Of course, it is in the nature of the human mind to simplify complex situations by offering generalizations in the form of generic descriptions and ideological categories. Nearer to the scene, the participants are less able and less inclined to do so. They tend to quarrel with those whom they regard as removed from reality, and with those on the scene engaged in different aspects of the common task. Plunging into their own share of the labour they have little regard for other members of the team. The division of labour finds the military concentrating on its operations and seeking to reduce the undefined problem to one that is soluble by military means alone. The politicians sniff the winds of change and trim their sails to every gust, simply to keep the ship moving. Quarrelsome insurgents manoeuvre for the power struggle that will follow liberation but make errors in the short run that prolong the struggle. Each finds it difficult to comprehend how a particular battle serves the war, and to grasp the essentials of a winning strategy, let alone to apply it in a particular situation. When the war is won the victor, and Mao was an example, is at pains to show that every battle served the war and that a consistent and coherent strategy marked every step along the way. The end was inevitable, he assures posterity, the result is irreversible and the saga shall be heroic evermore. The post-victory rhetoric accompanying the purges of comrades mark the victors as revolutionaries yet; the victims are counter revolutionaries. By definition they are denied a part in the episode and are not heroes. The philosophy is conservative, but that must be concealed by the language that is used.

A historical period may appear to be a world conspiracy if the techniques that the actors borrow from one another are used as evidence for the conspiracy and taken as the substance of it too. There are four reasons why repetitive events in the age of McLuhan have been accepted in this way. First, Marxist-Leninist writing is accepted as a confession. Secondly, the actors can ride on the crest of a historical wave that is independent of them (and not necessarily following the Marxist-Leninist line) but is a movement, nevertheless. Thirdly, the media by which events are communicated world-wide trivialise them in direct proportion to the size of their audiences. Fourthly, and obviously, there is a learning process; and political opinion, based on its perception of past events is affecting the course of present ones. In this last respect, particularly, Algeria was a seminal colonial struggle.

The outcome in Algeria was decided by political rather than military or even ideological factors. On one side, victory was a triumph of will; on the other, defeat has been attributed, perhaps wrongly, to a failure of it. The manipulation of public opinion by effective symbolism and by organizing and harnessing national feeling behind the leadership were the all-important factors inside Algeria.

However, it was the way world opinion in the United Nations and French public opinion were influenced that was really decisive. In that respect Algeria is an example of the "asset-to-liability shift" in French opinion which was appreciated by Charles de Gaulle and was reflected in his actions.

The Algerians had a good product which they marketed outside Algeria at exactly the right time. The rallying cry which elicited an immediate response from the hearts of many representatives at the UN was simply "Algeria for the Algerians". The principle of self-determination, prescribed by an American for the cure of European ills in 1918, was successfully invoked in a colonial struggle. More than that, the French colonial authorities were described as aggressors and identified as the occupying power in the language of Nuremberg and of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, although Algeria was a department of France. At the end of 1960, the UN "Declaration against Colonialism" "stigmatised as unlawful the normal activities of colonial powers in meeting, as was their wont, armed insurgency by armed suppression". What had been regarded as a non-international war, in which the laws of war were restricted to humanitarian matters and their supervision by outsiders required the co-operation of the government, became in Third World and Soviet bloc eyes, a national war against an occupying power no less than was the French Resistance to British Commonwealth and American eyes when it fought the Germans. At the end of another decade and a half, the Geneva Protocols of 1977 extended those of 1949, which had envisaged European resistance as its inspiration, to include:

> "armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination and alien

> occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination ..."

Inasmuch as the tally of still "unliberated" countries in the colonial sense, has shrunk to nearly nil, it may be imagined that this article was inserted for the protection, and even encouragement, of Corsicans against France, Quebecers against Canada, the Ukraine against Russia and Palestinians against Israel. That supposition is wrong. For the Protocol specifically excludes rebellions and civil wars within Third World and marxist states that already exist. And that is not surprising when no rebellion can be legitimate against an existing and *ipso facto*, reconstructed, socialist people's republic. Sovereign states can still regard such rebellions as non-international, although the wording above lends itself to a different interpretation where the state is unreconstructed. But, as the most recent authority on the subject comments, "a strong doctrine of sovereignty stalks through these Protocols like a riot squad". And it should be noted that the North Vietnamese attempt to use Just War theory to exclude "aggressors" from the right to receive humane treatment, even in international wars, was rejected as an extreme ideological position even by internationalists.

The drift of opinion about how low intensity conflict in the period after the colonial wars of liberation has been judged is indicated by the progressive declarations of 1949, 1960 and 1977. Conflicts within states whose governments can be stigmatized as illegitimate, such as South Africa, Israel, and the "unreconstructed" military regimes of Latin America, may be interpreted as "international". For the expressions "colonial domination", "alien occupation" and "racist regime", can be turned to account by interventionists. Also, the thin end of the humanitarian wedge can be used by interventionists on behalf of suffering indigenous activists and to excuse the help that they may receive from outside. The language of liberation, coined in an earlier period, is now used by both sides in the new one. Rebels are variously termed counter-revolutionaries, agents of imperialism, terrorists, progressive forces and democratic forces with little precision. The methods that each side uses are also borrowed from the past. Yet the fundamental condition that existed in the prototype, the presence of an alien colonial power, is generally absent now, and the nationalist cry once used by Algerians has to be synthetic. An indigenous regime must be shown to be a puppet of minority or foreign interests and to be supported by class enemies. To acquire the support of liberal opinion in Western countries the rebels must appear to behave humanely, to support civil rights and to be part of a broad democratic front against a repressive regime. Preferably they should appear to be ill-armed and entirely indigenous.

Historical analysis points to three main categories of low-intensity conflict that are present in 1981. In the first are those, formerly considered non-international conflicts, such as are occurring in Latin America, where an earlier colonial regime has left unreconstructed successor regimes. The fundamental cause of unrest is that the states concerned have been by-passed by the democratic changes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and that their economy is colonial and dependent on foreigners long after that is perceived to be acceptable. All their problems will be attributed to that condition, rightly or wrongly.

In a second category are the obstinate problems remaining from the colonial era, or even earlier, that are not soluble by a war of national liberation. The problems facing Israel, South Africa and Ireland fall within these terms. They each concern a whole region at most and two sovereign states at least. They attract the polar powers and become international concerns, some with the potential to be international conflicts. The third category contains conflicts which are likely to be perennial and which do not necessarily have anything to do with either the bipolar struggle or the demise of imperialism. They arise out of the failure of a regime to live up to the expectations of its people, particularly in the economic field. They are not peculiar to the age and may occur in unreconstructed or reconstructed states and in western-style democracies. They may be important now, because we live in a period when worldwide recession coincides with the appearance of structural faults in the Eastern and Western economic methodology.

To these historically-rooted categories may be added the familiar social ingredients of conflict: political ideology, nationalism, and religion. Just as the earlier categories overlap, so these flow across all three and sometimes create conflict categories of their own. Ideological warfare underlies the bipolar struggle and colours many internal conflicts, either by commitment or in imitation. It sometimes manifests itself in terrorism. In that form it may be considered either as an interim stage, a symptom of a world conspiracy, or merely a modern phenomenon without permanent significance. Nationalism was a principal driving force in the anti-colonial period and remains potent, especially when denied.

The conflict inside Poland may be seen as a reaction to the regime's economic failures, but Polish nationalism is an additional and powerful factor, one that tends to place the government on the same side as the strikers, while ideology pulls them the other way. Religion was important in the early stages of the Iranian revolution. When Iraq invaded, religion tended to make way for nationalism. At some later stage, ideology may come to the fore. Religion in Poland is a force for evolution away from Marxist-Leninism while in much of Latin America it is a force for revolution towards that ideology.

Useful though the analytical tools provided by Lenin, Michael Elliott-Bateman and Samuel Huntington may be, and they are offered in the next section, we would suggest that the weight that should be given to their criteria should be determined by historical not normative factors, and that it is the differences rather than the similarities between cases that are important. South Africa and Northern Ireland have inherited their problems from a colonial past stretching back to the 17th century, and are alike only in that both adhere tenaciously to the philosophy of an earlier age. Cuba, a former Latin American colonial territory has been reconstructed after a war of liberation against an indigenous regime. Perhaps the revolutionary regime is now failing to deliver what it has promised? Italy inherits some of its problems from the nineteenth century when it became a national state. For the shortness of its history as a state makes Italians think of themselves as Florentines or Venetians first. Roman governments have proved inefficient and there is scope for terrorism with a threadbare political doctrine relying mainly on criticism. Afghanistan, the most recent addition to the Soviet ring of satellites, is experiencing a war of liberation with religious and nationalistic motivation and the memory of a heroic past spent fighting the British and the Russians. Puerto Rico, which may be regarded as a colony of the United States, may be absorbed as a state, continue to suffer from terrorism, or possibly both.

* * * * *

Causative Factors of Rebellion

According to V. I. Lenin, the "revolutionary situation" required five elements:

A. Objective Conditions

1. When the ruling classes cannot maintain their rule in an unchanged form;
2. When the suffering of the oppressed classes has become more than usually acute;
3. When the masses are drawn by their suffering and the weakness of their oppressors into increased rebellious activities.

B. Subjective Condition

4. The ability of the revolutionary class to carry out revolutionary mass actions strong enough to break (or to undermine) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, surrenders power voluntarily. It has to be toppled.

C. Ideological Condition

5. Since the masses, by definition, are weak only the Communist Party, as the vanguard of the proletariat, can bring about the subjective condition by organizing a universal political struggle by all opposition strata for the struggle and for the Party.

History has shown that this analysis, linked to the potent revolutionary doctrine of Marxist-Leninism, has often been proved correct. Yet it is neither a complete nor an infallible theory. Class struggle is not the sole motive for revolution: nationalism, racism and religion might claim superior status. And just as Lenin developed his theories from the lessons of pre-Marxist history, and later harnessed bourgeois nationalism to the bandwagon of socialism, so the fascists of the 1930s, the anti-colonial revolutionaries of the '50s, and the 1979 supporters of the Ayatollah borrowed from communist technique, including the "broad front" ploy. The assertion that only a communist party can lead the rebellion is clearly untrue, and relates more to method than to condition. In terms of method, however, Lenin's insistence on the role of political organization is correct. Perhaps the most important facet of Lenin's analysis is his "reductionist" approach to revolution - that is, the reducing, or rooting, of revolution in the society, or in the economy, or in "history". Marxist-Leninists continue to insist on the primacy of the political over the military elements, and stress the need for a mass base, and the avoidance of premature uprisings.

After the Chinese revolution, Mao Tse-tung made three changes to Lenin's theory, thus creating the doctrine of "people's war". First, he elevated the struggle against imperialism in the colonial territories to a level of historical significance in its own right, not simply a blow struck at the European imperialists through their "weakest link", as seen by Lenin. Mao sought in this way to make the desire for self-determination part of communism's appeal. Second, after the decimation of his party by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927, Mao was never again willing to subordinate the interests of the security of the national communist party to the demands of the nationalist movement. Although accepting the advantages of the broad front, he always insisted that the party build its own army and keep it under party control. Third, Mao's retention of a communist military force led to his supporting peasant mobilization. Aware from his early reverses that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun", he was drawn to the necessity of revolutionary armed struggle and to the fact that guerrilla armies need a mobilized and sustaining population behind, or rather around them, the essence of "people's war" is that the communists, in the role of anti-imperialists, should promote the mobilization and organization of peasants in lands subject to imperial rule, leading to guerrilla warfare and finally to regular warfare. Tactical alliances with noncommunist nationalists are permissible in order to promote the struggle and gain legitimacy, but the final intention is to defeat both the imperialists and the nationalists, who are exposed as imperialist lackeys. Although this Maoist doctrine has had a profound influence on insurgency movements, the fall of Lin Piao in 1971 and the largely successful Soviet circumvention of Chinese influence in the Third World have for the time being diminished its importance.

"People's war" did not challenge the reductionist theory which roots the rebellion in objective conditions in the territory destined for revolution. After Fidel Castro overthrew the weak regime of Batista in Cuba, however, his relatively easy victory was immortalized in myth and in revolutionary theory which did pose a challenge to Lenin's description of a "revolutionary situation". Castro's lieutenant, Che Guevara, wrote:

> "In our Latin American situation, we believe that the Cuban Revolution made three fundamental contributions to the mechanics of revolutionary movements in the Americas. First, the people's forces can win a war against the enemy. Second, one need not always wait for the existence of all conditions favouring revolution; the insurrectionary nucleus can create them. Third, in underdeveloped Latin America, the arena of the armed struggle should be fundamentally the country."
> (Quoted John Gerassi, ed, Venceremos! The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara (New York, 1968).)

Guevara had fallen into the Marxist heresy of subjectivism - substituting one's own will, ideas or preferences for the "objective realities". He also exaggerated the power of "people's forces" and the role of the military as opposed to the political struggle, ignored the need for a united front and overlooked the urban proletariat.

Guevara's death in Bolivia in 1967 undermined faith in his rural theories and Latin American revolution slowly drifted to the cities, taking the form of terrorism. This too offended Marxist-Leninist principles, since it relied for its hope of success on the mobilizing dynamic of violent action rather than on patient political preparation. The Soviet Union applied pressures on Cuba which by 1968 began to bring Castro round to their way of thinking. By 1970 Cuban-inspired insurgencies in Latin America were being abandoned by Havana on Moscow's orders, and the Guevarist "foco" strategy was falling out of favour. The insurgencies which began in Central America in the late 1970s bear the hallmarks of orthodox Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory, being urban-based, politically strong, broad front and timed to coincide with a United States commitment to Human Rights that was certain to disrupt the ruling classes' ability to maintain their rule in an unchanged form. Nevertheless, in the folklore of revolution, the writings of Guevara and of the ideologue Debray retain an influence and an attraction that may be out of proportion to their true utility.

These Marxist and post-marxian theories have provided useful analyses of the causative effects of revolution. But they suffer one major flaw as scholarly work, which arises from their being part of a body of thought which uses the theory for its own ends, and which defends every word as holy writ, for ideological reasons. As well as excluding from its doctrine every noncommunist revolutionary theory, the Marxist-Leninists promote their doctrine as a weapon in their struggle. As such, it is in part propaganda. Michael Elliott-Bateman has provided an apolitical set of conditions for revolution. He does not divide these into "objective" and "subjective" groups, and his list is far more detailed and longer than Lenin's. In this summary of his views, the Leninist group headings are superimposed, to provide a bridge between the two systems:

A. Objective Conditions

I. For Revolutionary Potential

1. The normal evolutionary processes of society have been stemmed or diverted over a long period;
2. A self-perpetuating hierarchy has retained control of the government *apparat* for a sufficient time for a gap to appear between their style of control and the realities of social life;
3. Considerable changes have taken place in the economic base of society causing similar changes in social grouping;
4. Emerging social and cultural forces cannot find economic and political expression within the established order;
5. There is a decline in the effectiveness of the administration and in particular a decline in the organs of political control;
6. Extraordinary events occur which highlight weaknesses in the ability of the institutions of a State to cope with internal or external crises.

II. For a Revolutionary Situation

7. Fear of deprivation and rising expectations which combine to heighten class contradictions;
8. Community conflict;
9. Failure of a system of government;
10. Failure of political initiative and control;
11. Breakdown of control and administrative agencies;
12. Breakdown of essential services;
13. Break in social groupings;
14. Cultural Upsurge.

B. Subjective Conditions

I. Organizational

15. Leadership;
16. Grass-root infrastructure;
17. High-level intelligence organization;
18. Legal front organization;
19. High-grade propaganda system;
20. A politicized military force;
21. An "educational" system;
22. International connections;

II. Popular Support

23. Social analysis leading to a social map;
24. The cadre feedback system;
25. Emergence of the "living" political programme;
26. Duality of patient persuasion and selective terrorism;
27. Dedicated commitment of the leaders and cadres at all levels to the culture, social and economic needs of the people.

III. Geopolitical

28. Size of country;
29. Relationship to the sphere of competing powers;
30. Terrain favouring insurgents;
31. Base area.

(See Michael Elliot-Batemen, John Ellis & Tom Bowden, Revolt to Revolution (Manchester, 1974).)

Samuel Huntington defines revolution as a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society in its political institutions, social structures, leadership and government activity and policies. Huntington sees revolution as the ultimate expression of the modernizing outlook, the belief that it is within the power of man to control and to change his environment and that he has not only the ability but also the right to do so. He presumes that revolutions occur in the following conditions:

A. Objective Conditions

1. Political institutions are incapable of providing channels for the participation of new social forces in politics and of new elites in government;
2. There is a desire among social forces, currently excluded from politics to participate therein, this desire normally arising from the group's feeling that it needs certain symbolic or material gains which it can achieve only by pressing its demands in the political sphere;

B. Subjective Conditions

3. A revolutionary alliance must exist between many alienated groups, including both urban and rural;

Huntington sees the urban middle-class intelligentsia as the most constantly revolutionary group in modernizing societies, and the lumpenproletariat of the cities and the peasants of the countryside as necessary allies. The difficulties of achieving such an alliance account for the rarity of revolutions. He also notes that:

4. The Alliance may be created through nationalism, and the catalyst is often a foreign enemy;

Huntington endorses the Marxist-Leninist belief in the importance of organization and the primacy of politics over economics or military action, and sees in Leninism the sole formula which has succeeded in carrying revolutions through to their final conclusions - fundamental change in institutions, social structures, leadership and policies. The final condition, therefore, is:

5. A political organization independent of social forces and yet manipulating them to secure its ends. The party must appeal to all groups in the population.

(Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale, 1968).)

These conditions for full-scale revolution may not all be present, yet there may be a high level of political violence nevertheless. This confused situation is perhaps typical of Western nations today, and of many Third World countries. If there is nationalist, ethnic, communal, religious or ideological dispute, the parties concerned may challenge one another. If one of the parties to such a dispute is in control of the government, the appearance if not the reality of a revolutionary situation may materialise. New Left ideology tends to reject the Leninist insistence on party organization and discipline: it has therefore been more effective in creating violence than in directing it to useful political ends. Those whose ideological or other ambitions lack popular support sometimes turn to violence in frustration, in the hope that the government counter-measures will mobilize the masses behind their cause. Terrorist campaigns are sometimes so motivated. What has been termed "vigilante terror" - the backlash to maintain or restore existing or fallen institutions - may occur in reaction to radical activities, and sometimes beleaguered governments will turn blind eyes. The full combination of revolutionary conditions discussed above do not need to be present for this type of violence to flourish, although sometimes they are present in some measure. One of the more difficult tasks of conflict analysis is to identify the truly revolutionary situation amongst the mass of sub-revolutionary or merely unruly situations. This is made more challenging still by the unique features of each and every case, which limit the application and usefulness of any system of measurement.

Most analysts agree that the prospects of political violence, if not revolution, are enhanced if fostered within a community steeped in a violent tradition, one which accepts as normal a level of violence high in relation to other nations, which has a tradition of resolving grievances by violent means, and whose culture glorifies such violence. Whereas harsh governments may suppress dissent and discourage low-level violence, they tend in the end to be more vulnerable to full-scale revolution than are liberal democracies. The latter seem to have to pay for their relative immunity to revolution by suffering higher degrees of casual violence, although their real defence lies in the ability of the political structure to accommodate change. Within these two extremes we see states that apply moderate levels of repression which serve only to increase resentment, without being severe enough to crush resistance. Theodore Draper has introduced another element which other scholars have ignored. "We are accustomed to class analysis," he writes, "but we have yet to devote enough thought to a 'generational' struggle that cuts across classes and even wins converts from the younger generation of the class marked out for destruction."

Alexis de Tocqueville's contribution is perhaps the most frequently quoted in the West. "Experience teaches us that, generally speaking, the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways. Only consummate statecraft can enable a king to save his throne when, after a long spell of oppressive rule, he sets out to improve the lot of his subjects. Patiently endured so long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men's minds."

Finally we should note that between the full-scale revolution that aims at overthrowing the regime and reshaping society and the lesser and sometimes apparently mindless violence that stalks the streets lies a midway form. It occurs when the insurgent leaders see no prospect of being able to match the military strength of the government, even with a fully mobilized population. Victory, if it is to be won at all, must come by indirect means. Government forces have to be outflanked, and this has to be accomplished by what has been termed the "asset-to-liability shift" which may cause a government to abandon the struggle even though its forces remain more or less intact.

The method requires a change of mind on the part of government from an initial determination to resist to an eventual willingness to compromise. Since this change is not to occur at the point of a bayonet, it may flow from a revised perception of values and priorities. It would seem that something which at the outset was regarded as an asset worth fighting for has become a liability to be dropped. The something might be a policy, a territory, or the right to govern. The role of revolutionary violence in such a strategy is akin to propaganda of the deed: it works on the minds of the enemy - often, a distant controlling force - to bring about the shift in attitudes which may enable the insurgents to win their victory. Many of the anti-colonial struggles of the 1950s and '60s worked in this way and some analysts would say that the North Vietnamese removed the American presence in the South by the same method.

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STUDY NO 1: ITALY

Aim

The objective of this study is to determine whether a liberal democracy can defend itself against a systematic ideological terrorist campaign without becoming a police state.

Parameters: while not ignoring right-wing activity, this study will focus principally on terrorism from the left which in recent years has proved the most serious challenge to the state.

Data

Status: Liberal democratic republic since 1946 with a bicameral legislature. President is an elected official with powers equivalent to a constitutional monarch. Multi-party system which relies heavily on coalitions to form governments. Provincial and local governments have degree of autonomy and political influence, but limited administrative power.

Population: 57,100,000 (1980)

Main Cities:	Rome (Capital)	2,884,000 (1977)
	Milan	1,705,000
	Naples	1,224,000
	Turin	1,191,000
	Genoa	801,000
	Palermo	673,000

In addition, there are 41 other cities with populations of between 100,000 and 500,000.

Estimated GNP: $317 billion (US 1979).

Economic: Industrial economy. Manufacturing and mining provide about one-third of GNP and absorb about one-third of labour force. 15% of labour force are in agriculture, but provide only 8% of GNP. Exports are principally manufactured goods (electrical, machinery, motor vehicles), chemicals, textiles and clothes, iron and steel. Crude oil accounted for about one-fifth of imports in 1976, a large part being refined for export. Rapid economic growth in the 1950s was followed by a recession in the mid-1960s. The '70s were characterised by fluctuation: stagnation followed by inflationary boom, recession induced by the oil crisis. Period since 1976 dominated by stagnation. State controls most major enterprises (by 1975 public expenditure accounted for 50% of GNP) but growth of state involvement in the economy has been accompanied by a progressive imbalance between expenditure, revenue and productive capabilities. Most industry is concentrated in the North; the south remains underdeveloped.

Language: Italian.

Religion: Roman Catholic (99%).

Geography: Total land area: 301,225 sq km. The Italian peninsula projects into the Mediterranean Sea with the Adriatic Sea to the East. The peninsula is dominated by the Appenine Mountains with most of the cities, arable land and transportation links lying on either side of the mountain range. In the north, Italy shares borders with France to the West, Switzerland and Austria to the North, and Yugoslavia to the East. Territory includes a number of islands, the main ones being Sardinia and Sicily.

Historical Background

Although possessed of a rich history that extends back many centuries, Italy consisted of independent rival kingdoms and city states from the collapse of the Roman Empire until the mid-19th Century. Thus, the concept of an Italian nation-state is relatively new and Italy does not have a deeply-ingrained democratic political tradition. From 1922-1943 Benito Mussolini ruled Italy as a fascist dictator and the extreme right remains politically strong to this day. After several years under Allied occupation and tutelage, the modern Italian state emerged. The first modern democratic government was formed in 1946 and the constitution became law in 1948.

The roots of the current problems lie in two areas, which will be discussed in detail elsewhere: the economic crisis of the late 1960s - a product of the inflationary economy of the 1950s and the economic instability which followed; and the radicalisation of Italian politics, particularly amongst workers and students. The trends came together explosively in what became known as the "hot autumn" of 1969, out of which the current terrorist problem was born.

Chronology of Recent Conflict-Related Events

Autumn 1969 - Political/economic crisis - militant unions combined forces in widespread strikes. Renato Curcio (to be founder of Red Brigades) joined Metropolitan Political Collective (CPM) in Milan.

October 1970 - Split in CPM. Curcio and hard-liners broke away to form Red Brigades to carry out "armed struggle."

1971 - First attack on a commercial establishment.

1972 - First kidnapping of an industrialist.

1973 - Compromise between Christian Democratic Party (CD) and Italian Communist Party (PCI), brought the PCI into the decision-making process. Terrorism began consistent annual increase. Emergence of Autonomia movement.

1974 - "Armed Proletarian Nuclei" emerged as radical political movement within prisons.

1975 - Annual rate of terrorist incidents passed 1,000 mark. Government passed laws widening police powers of search and arrest.

1976 - Emergence of "Front Line" movement.

1977 - Year of escalation - more than 1,500 incidents of terrorism. Emergence of neo-fascist Armed Revolutionary Nuclei. Government instituted reforms of security services and extended their powers to deal with terrorism.

March-May 1978 - Kidnapping and assassination of Christian Democratic leader, Aldo Moro.

January 1979 - Split in Red Brigades over tactics and ideology.

February 1979 - Curcio sentenced to 12 years in prison for terrorist activities. Sentence later extended by 10 years for conviction on further charges.

April 1979 - Arrest of Autonomia founder, radical Professor Antonio Negri, on suspicion of involvement in Moro case.

December 1979 - Terrorist incidents exceeded 2,500 for the year. Government created central anti-terrorist office, adopted new anti-terrorist laws and appointed General Dalla Chiesa to head all security operations in northern Italy.

February 1980 - Arrest of Red Brigade leader who subsequently cooperated with security forces, leading to more arrests.

July 1980 - Neo-fascists bombed railway station in Bologna, killing 80 people.

December 1980 - Red Brigades kidnapped leading Italian judge and held him for a month. Security forces assaulted a jail and rescued prison guards held hostage by imprisoned terrorists. Rate of terrorist activity declined in 1980 for the first time in seven years - to less than half the rate of 1979.

January 1981 - Terrorists assassinated Dalla Chiesa's deputy.

Organizations Involved in Conflict

1. Political Groupings

a) Parliamentary Parties - Real power in the Italian political system resides not in the government but in the political parties, of which there are many. Parties are highly organized with strict discipline and control over individual members, who are chosen by the organs of the party. The electorate tends to vote for the ideas represented by a party rather than for a particular candidate. Consequently, the candidate, once elected, does not identify with a particular locality. The CD and PCI generally take about 70% of the vote, but because the PCI has been largely excluded from government, the CD has been forced into coalitions with the other parties, principally the socialists.

Of all the parliamentary parties the Christian Democrats are the most important. They have governed Italy since 1946, usually in coalitions in which they were the dominant party. The CD have served as a centrist, interclass party which, although corrupt, paternalistic, clientistic and rigidly anti-communist, has allowed the Italian political system to continue in the democratic mode with a reasonable record on human rights and upward mobility of lower class groups. Initially a party which represented only the wealthiest and most influential interests, the CD evolved by the 1960s out of total dependence on those classes, to the point where the party was prepared to concede to the working classes a representative role in government. At the same time the Socialists, initially almost as radical as the PCI, were prepared to abandon their revolutionary aims and accept democratic methods without reservation.

This led to the historic "Opening to the Left" - the CD/PSI (Italian Socialist Party) coalition (1962-66), which has had a profound impact on Italian politics and economics since the mid-1960s.

The current Italian government, the fortieth since 1946, is headed by the Christian Democrats under the leadership of Arnaldo Forlani. It came into being in October 1980, two weeks after the collapse of the previous government, a CD coalition headed by Francesco Cossiga. Other parties in the coalition are the PSI, led by Bettino Craxi, the Social Democrats and the Republicans. The present coalition is fragile, owing to a number of political issues which divide it. The CD party was badly tarnished in November and December by allegations of involvement in an oil tax fraud. The Minister of Industry and Commerce was forced to resign, although he was cleared in a subsequent inquiry. The kidnapping of Judge Giovanni D'Urso in December very nearly toppled the government, first over disagreement about tactics for handling the crisis (CD favoured a tough line and the PSI negotiations), and secondly, over the government's announcement, at PSI insistence, of the closing of a top-security prison - in the middle of the kidnap crisis. Although the closing had been intended for some time, and was welcomed by civil libertarians, the timing of the announcement made it appear to be a concession to the terrorists who had been demanding the closure. Finally, the government reacted slowly and ineffectively to the earthquake in southern Italy, which struck at the end of November.

The PSI is clearly now a force to be reckoned with. It is now the third largest party, behind the CD and the PCI. Craxi seems to be determined to become Italy's first non-CD prime minister. After a house cleaning of the PSI's central committee in October he gained the full backing of his party. The D'Urso crisis demonstrated just how influential the socialists are, and they could be strengthened further by a merger with the Social Democrats, a rumoured possibility.

The CD have also to contend with the PCI. After the 1976 elections, when it received more than 34% of the vote, the PCI was included in the governing majority, but not in government. This apparent contradiction means that the party was consulted about government plans and supported certain measures, but was excluded from the cabinet. The relationship soured and after losing ground in the 1979 elections the PCI went into opposition where it remains today. The largest communist party in Western Europe, the PCI is also the one trying hardest to distance itself from Moscow. It has been outspoken in its criticism of Soviet imperialism and violations of human rights. The Party leader, Enrico Berlinguer, did not attend the 26th CPSU Congress recently held in Moscow. Internally, the party is divided on ideology and tactics. The liberal wing is trying to shed much of the Leninist ideological baggage and is committed to the democratic process. But the hard-liners, represented in the central committee by the party's deputy chief, remain committed to support of the Soviet Union and to retaining the PCI's distinct image and attitude as a party dedicated to radical social change. They are, however, a minority. After losing working class support in 1978-79, it appears to have regained it in 1980, through supporting worker militancy. The PCI is also strong below national level: it governs ten regional capitals, 38 of the 40 provincial capitals and many smaller cities and towns. Fear of the PCI's real motives has kept it out of cabinet thus far, but the party's strength means that at some point they are likely to be included in a governing coalition.

Italy also has the largest neo-fascist movement in Europe, the Italian Social Movement (MSI), led by Giorgio Almirante. Although dwarfed by the PCI, it has nearly half a million members and receives about two million votes in elections. Although the MSI is a legal party, it is known to have ties to right wing extremist groups and Almirante's personal commitment to fascist values has kept the MSI out of government. The MSI received 5% of the vote in the 1976 elections; as of 1980 the party had 30 representatives in the 630 seat chamber of deputies, and 15 in the 315 seat senate. It is the fourth largest party in Italy.

b) Extra-Parliamentary Opposition - The Autonomia (Organized Autonomy). The Autonomia is a loose association of leftist groups, most of which sympathise with the violent ideology of the left-wing terrorist groups. It consists largely of students, former students, professors, intellectuals and emerged out of the radicalism of the universities in the 1960s. Those who joined were largely disillusioned with the PCI's commitment to constitutional methods. The first movement was called Worker Power, which had some 4,000 members and 1,000 militant activists by the early 1970s and was led by a Marxist Professor, Antonio Negri. By 1973, opposing lines of thought had developed within the movement and Worker Power dissolved during that summer. Some of the militants went underground and joined the Red Brigades. The others under Negri's leadership stayed above ground, forming themselves into loosely connected groups of students and workers called Autonomia who would "go among the people" to create mass support for a future revolution. Between 1974 and 1977 Autonomia branches sprang up across Northern and central Italy, membership probably reaching 100,000. Autonomia sub-groups run two "underground" radio stations which apparently have a wide audience. One branch, known as Worker Autonomy, became gradually involved in more violent activity, moving from confrontation in factories to street action - instigating disorders during strikes and demonstrations, and urging the commission of crimes and urban guerrilla activities including the use of firebombs. At the same time, it organized itself into rival power structures within factories as well as infiltrating existing trade unions.

The police arrested Negri in April 1979, accusing him not only of complicity in the Moro case, but also of masterminding the leftist terrorist campaign. The authorities claim, but so far have not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt, that the dissolution of Worker

Power in 1973 was a clever charade, that in fact Autonomia and the Red Brigades are respectively the political and military arms of the same movement, directed by Negri. The issue remains unresolved at present.

2. Security Forces

These consist principally of para-military forces. The armed forces do not become involved in internal security operations. The security forces are as follows:

a) Carabinieri - a military-style force of some 84,500 men, organized as a single mechanised brigade with 13 infantry battalions, an airborne battalion, two cavalry squadrons and supporting services. Distributed geographically in three Divisions and 600 subordinate commands. There are some 5,000 stations across Italy. The First Division commanded by General Carlo Dalla Chiesa, covers northern Italy, the area where terrorism is most widespread. The Carabinieri operates under the Defense Ministry for logistics and training, but is answerable to the Ministry of the Interior for police operations and to the Minister of Justice for surveillance and intelligence matters. The headquarters has a research section which monitors and analyses trends in terrorism, group organization and ideological patterns. It is equipped with automatic weapons, armoured cars, armoured personnel carriers, 53 helicopters and a few M-47 tanks.

b) Public Security Guard - the regular national police force, consisting of 71,500 men in sixteen motorised and four rescue battalions. Responsible to the Ministry of the Interior. Equipped with automatic weapons, a small number of armoured cars, aircraft and helicopters. They are supported by about 250,000 local police who carry out traffic duties and guard some buildings but who are not equipped or trained for major law enforcement tasks.

c) Finance Guard - about 45,000, equipped with helicopters and patrol boats. This force is responsible for border control and anti-smuggling operations, but can be used for other police duties.

d) Squadra Anti-Commando - a team of thirty or more specialists in hostage rescue assaults, formed several years ago from the Carabinieri. Apart from this, nothing more is known publically about them.

e) Intelligence Services - recently reformed and reorganized (1977) into two services: SISMI - military intelligence and security; SISDE - internal intelligence and security. Earlier versions of these services had been implicated in right-wing plots, so the new services have been placed under strict government supervision. No figures on strength available although they are believed to be under-staffed. Their areas of responsibility overlap to some extent and their powers have been criticized - more will be said later.

f) Command and Control - a committee within the Ministry of the Interior was established to coordinate the security forces in the anti-terrorist campaign. The commanders of the Carabinieri, Public Security Guard and Finance Guard are the statutory members. An anti-terrorist command, called Ucigos, has been established in Rome. It can summon help from anti-terrorist squads stationed in local police commands. As noted above, there is a parliamentary oversight committee to supervise intelligence operations.

3. Opposition Forces

a) Red Brigades (BR) - Marxist-Leninist movement, ideologically tending towards Stalinism. Committed to destruction of the democratic capitalist state, the Red Brigades aim to render Italy ungovernable through violence, producing political paralysis and economic chaos - a climate of collapse which would permit the BR and their sympathisers to seize power.

The BR emerged in 1970 from a split in the Metropolitan Political Collective, a radical group in Milan consisting of former Catholic sociology students and disillusioned former members of the PCI's youth organization from northern Italy. Until recently the BR were the most formidable of all the Italian terrorist groups. But ideological splits and police successes have weakened the movement considerably. Although it is believed to have as many as 6,000 "activists", grouped in "columns" of cells, each with 3-5 members, in all the major cities, the actual number of gunmen - those willing to carry out terrorist actions - is probably quite small. As of November 1980, 322 alleged members of the BR were in prison and police were seeking only 39 more.

b) Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP) - Marxist-Leninist movement similar to the Red Brigades. It grew out of the turmoil, overcrowding and radical politicisation in Italian prisons between 1969 and 1974. In this sense its origins were similar to those of the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States, although on a much larger scale. Initially, the NAP attacked the MSI neo-fascist party, but since then has concentrated on the prison system and correctional services. Considerably smaller than the BR the NAP has also suffered from a number of structural weaknesses. Consequently, since 1975 the group has suffered numerous setbacks and has not shown the kind of regenerative power of the BR. No exact figures on NAP membership are available, but it does not appear to have shared the kind of widespread political support and infrastructure enjoyed by the BR. In November 1980 the police reported that 155 members of NAP were under arrest and only five more were being sought.

c) Front Line (PL) - Marxist-Leninist movement that developed in 1976, allied with BR. Combines urban terrorism, directed against targets similar to those of BR, with political agitation amongst the population. As opposed to BR's totally underground organization, PL prefers to operate semi-clandestinely. PL members lead double lives - as respectable citizens who hold regular jobs and clean police records while carrying out covert terrorist activity. The PL is organized in "fire groups", structurally different from the BR columns and cells but capable of conducting similar activities. At the lower echelons leadership is not vested permanently in any one individual but is exercised on operations by whoever is capable of doing so. Furthermore, the PL is not constrained by the rigid territorial boundaries assigned to BR columns. Nor does it always operate under its own name. Although 180 PL members are under arrest, 46 are still at large and the organizational structure is believed to be virtually intact.

d) Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR) - Neo-Fascist movement which surfaced in 1977. The most active right wing group in recent years. Ideologically anti-Communist, the NAR tends to attack targets it regards as associated with Communism and leftist trends in politics or responsible for the decline in authority of family, state and church. Long-term strategy, however, remains unclear. It may be that the neo-fascists hope to provoke retaliation by the left which will eventually bring a firm crackdown by a more authoritarian regime. Although no details are available on membership or organization, the police have about 90 right-wing terrorists (not all NAR) in custody and several hundred more are believed to be at large.

There has been a proliferation of smaller, left and right-wing terrorist groups who engage in intermittent violence, concurrent but not necessarily in conjunction with the actions of the larger groups. Actual number of organizations is uncertain (1978 estimate: 147) and no details are available on membership or organization. The list includes the following:

Armed Communist Cells
Anti-Fascist Proletarian Nucleus

Armed Proletarian Power

Armed Proletarians for Communism

Black Order (neo-fascist)

Combatants for Communism

Communist Fighting Unity

Popular Revolutionary Movement (neo-fascist)

Proletarian Combat Squads

Proletarian Committee of Subversion for Better Justice

Proletarian Internationalism

Proletarian Justice

Red Guerrilla

Revolutionary Action

Savage Cats (or Wildcats)

Factors Affecting the Conflict

1. Sources of Conflict

a) The Political System - chronically weak, unstable, corruption-ridden. The two houses of parliament have equal powers, a cumbersome arrangement which leaves parliament open to stalemate and enhances the powers of the political parties, who achieve results through their alliances and patronage structures. Elections, normally held every five years, are based on a complicated system of proportional representation which, although it reflects accurately the number of votes cast for a particular party, does not establish the kind of links normally found in a constituency system between a particular locality and a member representing it. As noted earlier, the electorate tends to vote for the party rather than the candidate. This kind of "block" power, unchecked by the kind of restraints on individual members normally associated with the British-model system of responsible government, leaves parliament open to widespread corruption and abuse of position, particularly in so far as one party (CD) has been in power for 35 years. But given the proliferation of parties and the potential for stalemate, even the CD have found it necessary to form governing coalitions, which are usually weak and limit the government's ability to act. This has resulted in forty governments since the war, a situation further aggravated by the fact that the constitution makes no provision for a rapid transfer of power from one government to the next.

b) Social/Economic Problems - the South of Italy, traditionally rural and the poorest part of the country, suffered greatly from the war and, despite major efforts at redevelopment, had not recovered by the 1970s. The result was a migration from south to north: ten million people between 1945 and 1975. This brought, or created, a host of problems.

Provincial and local governments were unprepared for this influx and lacked the power and financial means to relieve the strain on housing, transportation, health and social services. Squalid industrial slums and suburbs generated crime and delinquency, a development resented by an emerging privileged class of northerners. A sense of inferiority rendered the immigrants vulnerable to extremist exploitation. The combination of the relatively undisciplined but frequently militant class of southern workers who flooded the ranks of the unskilled and semi-skilled labour force, and the politically-sophisticated, well-organized and disciplined northern working class proved volatile indeed - as was amply demonstrated in the autumn of 1969. However, with the urban population expanding faster than the economy's ability to absorb it, not all of the immigrants went into the working class, many going into the "shadow economy" - marginal businesses, black-marketeering, petty and organized crime. Out of reach of organized labour, mass parties and the benefits of urban bourgeois society, this group may have provided some of the leaders and many of the "soldiers" of the political radical fringe of left and right in the 1970s.

The Italian economy, moreover, has been in a state of crisis since the early 1960s. The economic boom of the 1950s - the greatest in the Twentieth Century in Italy - generated excessive consumption leading to a recession in the early 1960s. Since that time the economy has been in a state of flux. By 1965 more than a million were unemployed. As noted earlier, the state began playing a much greater role in the economy in the 1960s, but not necessarily in an efficient manner. The civil service, for example, grew out of all proportion to its productivity and the country's needs. Never overhauled after the war and riddled with corruption, it became a haven for southern immigrants who too often used their positions merely to find similar jobs for relatives and friends, instead of providing service to the public. Despite growth of state involvement in the economy the low profitability of the manufacturing sector (both public and private) - owing to real wage increases and declining productivity - made it difficult to raise capital for reinvestment and modernization. The increase in oil prices since 1973 only aggravated the situation, characterized by stagnation since 1976.

This would have been bad enough by itself, but the "Opening to the Left" - the Centre/Left coalition of the mid-1960s - raised expectations which could not be met, first, because the bulk of the working class were still allied with the PCI rather than with the Socialists, and secondly, because the internal contradictions of the coalition limited the government's ability to carry out reforms, broaden its base and administer existing programs. The coalition ended in 1966, when Italy entered a period of converging political and economic crisis which boiled over in the "hot autumn" of 1969. Frustration was expressed in the first coordinated strike action by Italy's three largest unions, respectively dominated by different political factions: CD; Communist/Socialist; and Socialist/Social-Democrat/Republican. This economic crisis coincided with widespread political unrest among students.

c) Student Radicalism - A product of several trends, the first of which has been the growth in university enrollment. Serving more than one million students under an open enrollment scheme second only in scale to the United States, the universities had "burst at the seams" with more students than could be taught properly or absorbed by a contracting economy. Secondly, like many of the European universities, particularly in West Germany, Marxists had come to dominate the social sciences in Italian universities in the 1960s. They preached a kind of "historical optimism" - the idea that revolution is beautiful while remaining completely ignorant of the reality of revolutionary war. As the global youth "counter-culture" spread, anti-capitalist, anti-American values became fashionable in schools, universities and the media. This leftist trend was further enhanced by the third factor, the crisis in the Catholic faith. The secularization of Italy in the 1960s and the liberalization of Catholicism under the influence of Pope John XXIII cut Italian youth free from a traditional value system and many found it necessary to seek an alternate faith. Guided by a strong sense of moralism and mission against non-believers, those who wished "to realize the other world in this one" turned to radical politics instead of the PCI, which was committed to working within the system. The revolutionary ideology of the new left provided a "rigorous militancy, a simple faith and the pleasure of obedience" in a way that the Church and the PCI no longer would.

2. Methods of Conflict

a) The Security Forces - Since the responsibility for combatting terrorism has fallen entirely within the jurisdiction of the intelligence and law enforcement agencies, anti-terrorist methods have consisted principally of legal reforms and intelligence work. The Italian government has extended gradually and reluctantly the powers of the security forces to act against terrorism. The first modification of the law, passed in 1975, widened police powers of arrest, search and use of firearms. This was later approved in a popular referendum. In February 1977 the cabinet approved five decrees which provided for: immediate trial for persons arrested for carrying arms; confiscation of premises where arms or explosives are found; speedier trials; increased prison staff and stricter control of prison furlough; and streamlined judicial functions. These laws were strengthened further in June 1977 with decrees that allowed: wiretap of felony suspects up to fifteen days without notification of the judiciary; search without warrant; detention without charge for 24 hours; and interrogation (for information, but not for courtroom evidence) without defense counsel present. These latter decrees are subject to review by parliament.

The 1977 decrees were not implemented until after the Moro case. At that time, a law was also passed giving police access to judicial secrets relating to terrorist suspects. Then, in December 1979, the government extended police and judicial powers further: the killing of policemen, judges, lawyers and union leaders was made punishable by mandatory life imprisonment. Terrorists who have injured people - by kneecapping, for example - would receive double the normal jail term. Suspects awaiting trial would not be allowed out on bail, and the pre-arraignment detention period was extended to 48 hours, with possible extension by magistrate for a further two days. To counter-balance that rule, the Minister of the Interior must read out in parliament every three months, a list of people held during the interval under the 48 hour rule. People paying more than 20 million Lire into a new bank account will have to provide proof of identity so that police can investigate transfers of suspicious sums of money. Wiretap laws were relaxed further. The police were permitted to provide special treatment for cooperative terrorists and to undertake house searches in areas where terrorists are believed to be hiding. Finally, the government extended from four to twelve years the maximum time that a person may be held without trial.

During the 1977-79 period the government also undertook to reform and modernize the police system. The Carabinieri received a pay increase and parliament voted $117 million to modernize the Public Security Guard. More policemen were organized into "neighbourhood" forces, patrolling a regular, familiar beat. Other modifications to the security force structure were discussed in the previous section of this study. They bear mentioning again in passing because, in combination with the legal measures described above, they provided the means for the police to get on top of the terrorist situation. The whole security force effort since the mid-1970s has been towards improving their intelligence base. The real strength of the Red Brigades and their like-minded groups lay in their security. If that could be broken - and it could be broken only by good intelligence work - then the security forces could interrupt the upward spiral of violence. Intelligence, nonetheless, takes time to build on itself and to show results. By the end of 1980, however, it was clear that the reforms, reorganization and extended powers had paid off: not only was the upward trend halted - the security forces were able to reverse it in dramatic terms. After seven years of continuous increase, the level of violence fell by more than 50%.

b) The Terrorists - The terrorist violence in Italy has been so widespread, conducted by so many different groups, that it is difficult to generalize about terrorist methods. Techniques, weapons, targets, have all been diverse and very little is known publically about internal doctrine and planning within these groups. Observations on strategy and tactics, then, are tentative. As noted earlier the Red Brigades seem to be aiming to produce a climate of collapse leading to a revolutionary seizure of power. To this end they use highly "personalised" terrorism, violence directed against specific individuals who are directly or indirectly part of the state structure. This includes government officials, members of political parties, members of the security forces and the judiciary, moderate academics and journalists, and businessmen. The NAP, although it concentrated on the prison system and correctional services, also attacked many of the same targets as the BR, but tended to use bombs rather than firearms. PL terrorism emulated that of the BR. The neo-fascist NAR has carried out assassinations, but usually relies on bombing. The relatively indiscriminate use of explosives has long been characteristic of the Italian extreme right - the bombing of the Bologna Railway Station in August 1980 being a case in point.

Of these groups, only the Red Brigades have been sufficiently active for a long enough period to allow an outside observer to identify a clear operational pattern. Vittorfranco Pisano, in his 1980 study of the BR, concludes that they have been through four phases. The first, confined to Milan through the 1969-72 period, served as the training phase for the "historic nucleus" of BR - Renato Curcio and his immediate associates. During this time BR engaged in clandestine distribution of revolutionary propaganda in factories and light sabotage to the private property of businessmen, conservatives and right wing activists. They also carried out rudimentary industrial sabotage and sporadic attacks on offices of the MSI. The second phase, 1972 to mid 1974, was characterized by, first, expansion of BR activity through Italy's industrial triangle - Milan, Turin, Genoa - and secondly, a more systematic approach to terrorism. The BR perfected its kidnapping techniques during this period and learned how to exploit attendant media coverage.

During the third phase - September 1974 to January 1976, the "historic nucleus" was either killed or captured, to be replaced by the "second generation". The "kneecapping" technique emerged at this time. The fourth phase, which lasted until the Spring of 1980 saw BR activities expand to cover the rest of Italy. Deliberate murder was undertaken frequently and kneecapping became a nearly daily occurrence. To Pisano's picture this analyst would add a fifth phase, currently underway, which has seen a rapid decline in the rate of BR operations since the middle of 1980. Although the frequency has fallen off, the BR have demonstrated, nonetheless, that they can still strike effectively at important targets - witness the assassination of Dalla Chiesa's deputy on New Year's Eve - and have lost none of their flair for manipulating the media to gain publicity (the D'Urso kidnapping being a case in point).

Indeed, the BR have raised the technique, referred to as "Propaganda of the Deed", to a fine art. That was amply demonstrated by the kidnapping of Aldo Moro in 1978. By striking at the elder statesman of Italian politics they grabbed the attention of the country and of the world. The deed done, they then skilfully played upon that captured attention by turning the abduction into a media event. They released nine communiqués during the 54 day crisis and on two occasions supplied the media with photographs of the politician - with the BR banner in the background. Moro was permitted to write to several family members, friends and political figures and the BR stayed in telephone contact with the Moro family in order to maintain pressure on the government negotiators. The daring and the political magnitude of their action attracted media attention, which indirectly publicized the Red Brigades as a force rather greater in power and influence than it was in fact. Clearly, the BR hoped the D'Urso kidnapping would have the same effect, but it fell short. D'Urso, important though he was to the legal profession, was relatively unknown to the Italian public. Moreover, the manner of his taking was in stark contrast to the Moro abduction: the latter was kidnapped in broad daylight in a large, well-planned operation involving the killing of his escorts. D'Urso simply vanished on a dark evening from a quiet street near his home. Most of the prominent Italian newspapers refused to print the propaganda message that the BR said was an essential condition for D'Urso's safe release. The fact that a few did print it, that the kidnapping/propaganda campaign was accompanied by a prison uprising of BR members and supporters, and that the government announced its intention to close a top-security prison, allowed the BR to claim a propaganda victory, however hollow.

3. Strengths and Weaknesses

a) The Security Forces - After the reforms of the mid-1970s, the extension of legal powers and several years of concerted investigative work, the principal strength of the security forces lies in their improved intelligence-gathering techniques. The data base built over several years is finally paying off in terms of arrests and a consequent decline in the level of violence. These trends, in turn, are likely to raise the morale of the security forces and to improve public confidence in them, leading to greater public cooperation in the apprehension of offenders. The security forces now have the tools they require to hold terrorism in check.

The principal weaknesses are two-fold. First, although police ability to identify and arrest offenders has improved considerably, the ability of the courts to handle cases has not. As of the end of November 1980 there were some eight million cases before the courts. The large number of minor cases have to be postponed so major ones can be prosecuted. Consequently, 80% of all identified crime goes unpunished, a factor which reduces the credibility of law enforcement and concurrently, the deterrent effect of arrest. The problem is largely one of lack of judicial reform. Less than 1% of government spending is devoted to the judiciary and the PCI, probably quite rightly, has accused the CD of blocking legal reforms, because such reforms might uncover scandals implicating the CD party, already known to be corruption-and patronage-ridden. Terrorists, moreover, have made matters even more difficult by intimidating judges, other members of the legal profession, witnesses and juries. Many have been wounded or assassinated. Not surprisingly, for a long time judges were inclined to hand down lenient sentences on convicted terrorists. It was frustration with the legal process that caused the police to ask for wider powers which, however effective, could be turned into liabilities.

This second weakness is essentially political/ psychological, and it is, for the present, hypothetical. There does not appear to be evidence that the police have in any way abused their extensive powers. Some of them may be allowed to lapse. When, during the autumn, the Interior Minister read out the list of people held under the 48 hour rule, there were only sixteen names on the list. But in this type of conflict, appearances account for a great deal and the appearance of authoritarianism could be turned against the government if terrorists chose to make an issue of it.

It is, in fact, surprising that they have not done so thus far. The slightest overstepping of legal boundaries (which are ill-defined in any case) could provide the terrorists with all the political ammunition they would require to demand the dismantling of the security structure which poses such a threat to their existence. If Italy is to retain both the form and the substance of a liberal democracy, the government would do well, during this relative lull, to review the emergency legislation, with a view to retaining only those measures absolutely vital to the security of the state. Anything in excess is simply a weapon waiting to be picked up by the opposition for use against the government.

The secondary weakness is the endemic instability of the political system. The apparent lack of direction and leadership leaves the impression of a power vacuum waiting to be filled. Apart from making the task of the terrorists much easier, especially when their propaganda focuses on government weakness and corruption, it leaves the door open for "the man on horseback" who, promising to end all of Italy's ills, might put an end to democracy as well. A worst-case scenario might include the following: a resurgence of terrorism on a large scale by regrouped terrorists of left and right; apparent inability of the security forces to cope with it; concurrent political and economic crisis; the collapse of the governing coalition, and a rapid rise in inflation and unemployment. Strikes become demonstrations and riots and the PCI, posing on a strong law and order platform and promising economic reform, are admitted to a new governing coalition, along with the Socialists and the CD. The price of their participation, which would put an end to the crisis, could be the cabinet seats which control the security forces. From control of the security forces, especially with powers extended to cope with terrorism, it would only be a small step, for a party so inclined, to use those forces to eliminate not only violent opposition, but democratic partners and opposition as well. This is pure speculation, of course, but it is far more likely than a coup from the right. The coalition system, in time of extreme crisis, could leave Italy vulnerable to a kind of back-door takeover not unlike that of Hitler in the 1930s or Czechoslovakia in 1947-48. Out of power the PCI has carefully cultivated its democratic image. Once in power, would the latent Stalinists in the party hierarchy be able to resist the temptation to seize it all?

b) The Terrorists - The principal strength of the terrorists is their regenerative capability. Despite considerable police success, they can regroup, recruit, rearm and strike again at important individuals and other targets. They clearly are not short of funds or weapons and, in spite of waves of arrests, there are still many sympathisers willing to give them refuge and to assist them in other ways. Like the Provisional IRA, as the organizations become smaller, they are harder to penetrate. A reduction in popular support for extremist organizations, while beneficial in some ways, can make the intelligence task more difficult. As the groups insulate themselves from their erstwhile supporters, the infiltration routes into the groups are closed off. It is quite likely that the Red Brigades and the Front Line are trying to tighten up security in just this manner at present. At the technical/tactical level they demonstrate considerable mastery of terrorist techniques, especially propaganda. Furthermore, the accurate targetting of specific members of the security forces suggests that the Red Brigades and some right-wing groups have infiltrated the security services and the associated ministries, where the "moles" can work to disrupt internal security operations. It has also been suggested, although proof is lacking, that the extreme left and right may be planning a joint terrorist campaign to bring down the political system they both despise. If such a campaign were to materialise, the threat to the democratic system would be considerable in itself, and might hasten the kind of worst-case scenario suggested earlier. Unfortunately, the state prosecutor who claimed to know about the leftist-rightist alliance was assassinated in June 1980 and whatever evidence he had died with him.

These advantages notwithstanding, the terrorists, at least those on the left, face considerable difficulties. Most of their best trained people have been arrested and convicted to lengthy sentences. That is a severe blow to both the effectiveness of the organizations and to their image in the public mind. The terrifying Red Brigades of the Moro kidnapping do not seem so invincible now. Increased police activity makes it more difficult for the purely clandestine members to keep in contact with their legal fronts, such as the Autonomia. Internal discipline within the Red Brigades has been disintegrating since 1978. A split developed in the movement in 1979 over the question of elitism, authoritarianism and isolation from the working class. These splits remain, as evidenced by the dissent amongst jailed BR members during the D'Urso kidnapping. Some of the imprisoned BR leaders urged the kidnappers to release their victim without forcing the government to meet their demands. This would seem to indicate that the leadership of the movement, once effective from within prison, is slipping away from Curcio and the other jailed members. The testimony of Patrizio Peci, the Turin "column" leader who cooperated with police after his arrest in February 1980, revealed that the BR had become careless in its recruiting, training and discipline. BR has begun to attract the criminal element. Young members are able to rise quickly without the same degree of training, discipline and commitment as the more senior members. Security lapses are frequent (the Red Brigades have a penchant for keeping archives at their safehouses). The many arrests that followed Peci's cooperation seemed to confirm his account of BR weaknesses. Information on the other groups, however, is insufficient for the purpose of estimating weaknesses.

4. Outside Influences

The Soviet connection. It would be simplistic, not to say inaccurate, to blame Italy's terrorist problem on "outside agitators." The wealth of evidence available shows Italian terrorism to be a home-grown phenomenon, a product of conditions unique to Italy.

There exists, however, a considerable body of circumstantial evidence that the Soviet Union has nurtured Italian leftist terrorism, thereby contributing to the destabilization of the Italian state. Details of Soviet involvement include the following:

a) Some 13 Italians, now known to have included members of the "historic nucleus" of the Red Brigades and leaders of Autonomia, received training in destabilization operations at KGB camps in Czechoslovakia before the end of 1968; others were later trained at camps in South Yemen and Lebanon.

b) Weapons used by the Red Brigades to kill Aldo Moro and others were of Czech origin, produced by the government-controlled arms factory, Omnipol. These weapons, and those supplied from Palestinian stocks, such as Soviet made SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles, could not have reached the BR without Soviet complicity.

c) Members of BR, Autonomia and other groups are known to have made contact with KGB agents operating under diplomatic cover in Italy.

d) Between 1970 and 1974, three prominent BR members sought by Italian police were given refuge in Czechoslovakia and one was employed at Radio Prague.

The Soviets, anxious lest they be blamed for instigating terrorism in Italy, were quick to deploy "disinformation" to shift the blame to the United States. In April 1978, the Soviet media accused the CIA of being the real force behind the Moro kidnapping. These allegations were repeated by the Italian and French Communist Parties. The Soviets followed up these charges with a skilful, although ultimately unsuccessful, piece of deception. The KGB's Service A produced a bogus US Army Field Manual that purported to describe American plans to manipulate leftist terrorism in allied nations. Technical flaws in the layout of the manual identified it as a forgery, but not before it had been reproduced in the periodicals of leftist groups in twelve countries, supposedly corroborated by supporting evidence in Philip Agee's Covert Action Information Bulletin. More recently, following remarks by the Italian President in January 1981, the Soviets denied any involvement in Italian terrorism.

Italian terrorists have also maintained links with other European terrorists, most notably the West German Red Army Faction. There is some evidence of German involvement in the Moro kidnap which, a Red Brigades document suggests, was supposed to be a major step in creating a trans-national leftist terrorist alliance which would carry out a coordinated assault on the European capitalist system. It is unclear how advanced such plans were, but they were undoubtedly dealt a major setback months before the Moro incident when the West German government foiled the Lufthansa hijackers at Mogadishu, leading to the suicide of three of the leading German terrorists in Stammheim prison. The Argentinian terrorists known as the Montoneros maintained a base in Rome, which was discovered in 1977. As yet inconclusive evidence implies that Libya has also been involved in supporting Italian terrorism, by financing it and/or providing training facilities on Libyan territory. Italian right-wing terrorists are known to be loosely affiliated with like-minded groups in other parts of

Europe, France especially. The European National Action Federation (FANE), a French-based neo-fascist movement, seems to provide a trans-national political link for these groups.

Even taken together this assistance does not alter significantly the Italian terrorist picture. The Moro kidnapping would have been possible without West German assistance. Initial suggestions that other right-wing Europeans may have had a hand in the Bologna bombing were not substantiated later by evidence. Italian terrorism is *sui generis*. It is very likely that, given the social/political/economic conditions of Italy in 1969-70, some form of radical leftist terrorism would have emerged even without prompting from Czech or Soviet instructors. Whether it would have developed in such a professional, ruthless manner without such guidance, however, remains open to question.

Trends

A number of trends are discernible from the evidence. First, Italy's chronic political/economic crisis remains and is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. Secondly, leftist terrorism has suffered a major reverse in the past year. Consequently, a lower rate of violence is likely until such time as the groups can reorganize. Third, the increasing professionalism and effectiveness of the security forces will make revitalization of the terrorist offensive more difficult than the original organization phase in the early 1970s.

Outlook

Italian terrorism will continue into the immediate future, as the political, social and economic conditions which allowed terrorism to flourish in the recent past are not expected to change. Weak government coalitions under uninspired leadership will continue to produce a power vacuum at the highest levels of Italian political life. The left remains the principal threat to democracy, although concurrent right-wing terrorism contributes to destabilization of the political system. Further right-wing terrorism and, in the longer term, revived leftist terrorism may be expected. Leftist terrorists may try to compensate for recent failures by carrying out some kind of "spectacular" to discredit the government and the security forces.

This analyst concludes that the Italian case demonstrates that even a relatively weak and unstable liberal democracy can defend itself against a systematic terrorist campaign without resort to all the apparatus of a police state. Given, however, the special conditions surrounding Italian politics and the economy, it is possible to visualize one grim scenario: a coincidence of severe political/economic crisis and major terrorist successes leading to a governing coalition gradually dominated by the PCI, who might take control of and use for their own ends the levers of repression, in response to a popular mandate for "law and order."

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STUDY NO 2: SOUTH AFRICA

Aim

To assess the current situation in South Africa with a view to identifying likely trends in political violence within the Republic, and the possible roles of neighbouring states and external backers. The Namibian problem is discussed only in so far as it affects the Republic's own security.

Data

Status: The Republic of South Africa (RSA) was established as such in May 1961, when South Africa left the Commonwealth and ceased being a parliamentary monarchy. The Union of South Africa had been established in 1910. Since the creation of the Republic, Bantu (black) homelands (bantustans) have been set up to provide limited self-government; of them, Transkei was declared independent by the RSA in 1976, Bophutatswana in 1977, Venda in 1980, and Ciskei (which voted on the issue in December 1980) is expected to achieve independence shortly. There are other, smaller bantustans, now officially known as "national states", which are geographically unsuited to independence. There has been no international recognition of the independent homelands. South Africa is a member of the United Nations.

Population: 28,800,000 (by race, 71 percent Bantu, 17 percent European stock, 9 percent coloured (mixed), 3 percent Asian).

Main Cities:	Cape Town (legislative capital)	1,108,000
	Pretoria (administrative capital)	563,000
	Johannesburg	1,441,000
	Durban	851,000
	Port Elizabeth	476,000
	Germiston	210,000
	Bloemfontein	182,000

SOWETO, a conglomeration of 28 townships 26 km southwest of Johannesburg, has a combined population estimated between 800,000 and 1,500,000, making it probably the second largest urban centre in the country.

Estimated GNP: $54.9 billion (1979) [20 percent up from 1978]

Economic: South Africa's booming economy is broadly based, but the main sources of income are mining and quarrying, wool, manufacturing, distribution and hotels, agriculture. Gold prices are an important factor, being a principal cause of current affluence and also of long-term uncertainty. The outlook is at present extremely favourable, although two problems can be seen. The first is a shortage of skilled labour which may emerge as a major constraint on growth; the second involves declining levels of economic growth in the major western countries which will have an impact on South Africa's mineral exports. In 1979 the RSA earned a surplus of $3,697 million in its balance of payments, and 1980 figures will be far higher. Only about 25 percent of the republic's energy needs come from oil so its dependency on imported energy is less critical than, say, Japan or Germany. To reduce this dependency still further, RSA has developed oil-from-coal plants. When the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL)'s third plant enters full production around 1983, home-produced oil will equal about half current imports. In addition, ethanol and methanol plants are being developed.

Language: Afrikaans and English; African languages, especially Xhosa, Zulu and Sesotho are also used.

Religion: Christian 60 percent, Bantu churches 14 percent, Hindu 2 percent, Moslem 1 percent, Jewish 1 percent.

Geography: The RSA forms the southernmost part of Africa, with a coastline on the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The northern border is formed by Mozambique, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia; Lesotho is completely encircled within South Africa. Walvis Bay is an enclave in Namibia forming part of RSA. The land area is 1,222,161 km^2. The climate is temperate, warm and sunny, 26°C in February to 17°C in July.

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
South Africa
ZAMBIA
ANGOLA
Zambezi
ZIMBABWE
Grootfontein
MOZAMBIQUE
BOTSWANA
Swakopmund
Windhoek
Walvis Bay
NAMIBIA
Limpopo
VENDA
Pietersburg
TRANSVAAL
Pretoria
Keetmanshoop
Soweto
Johannesburg
Luderitz
BOPHUTATSWANA
SWAZILAND
Vaal
Karasburg
ORANGE FREE STATE
Orange
Kimberley
NATAL
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Bloemfontein
Pietermaritzburg
LESOTHO
Durban
CAPE PROVINCE
TRANSKEI
INDIAN OCEAN
CISKEI
East London
Cape Town
Port Elizabeth
SOUTH AFRICA
Proclaimed independent
0 Miles 500
0 Kilometres 800

Historical Background

The seventeenth century Dutch settlers in Southern Africa differed from most European colonists on that continent and further east in that they adopted part of the country as their permanent home, in the manner of colonists in North America and Australasia, rather than regarding it as an "overseas" possession from which the white man would retire "home" when his working life was over. Whereas the whites who settled New England, New France, Botany Bay and New Zealand soon came to outnumber the natives, so that their right to remain and to rule could scarcely be challenged, the whites in South Africa allowed their adopted country to fill up with natives from the north, so that they have forever been a minority.

In the twentieth century the principle of "one man one vote" or "majority rule" has come to dominate western political and moral philosophy. This has been applied in Europe, Australasia and America without affecting racial balances of power. In the African and Asian colonies, acceptance of the idea has meant surrendering power to native people hitherto subordinate to colonial rule, and it has been a rather painful process for those who preached the principle to practise it. One aspect of colonialism has been the tendency for the colonizers to patronise the colonized: taken a stage further, this has sometimes developed into an assumed racial superiority. The fact that the rulers generally came from societies which enjoyed a more advanced technology and social system provided a form of evidence to bolster such beliefs. The alleged racial inferiority of the native population has almost always provided an argument for postponement of majority rule. The rise of nationalism among colonized people and their growing awareness of the power of protest and struggle have however provided the necessary counter-arguments. By the end of the 1970s, Western European colonialism of the sort that denied majority rule was virtually at an end.

When in 1948 the Afrikaner-led Nationalist Party came to power in South Africa its leaders elevated their sense of racial superiority over the other races who outnumbered them in that country to a quasi-political, quasi-religious ideology. God had given them the country, the right (indeed the duty) to rule, and in doing so He had demonstrated that all men were not equal in His sight. That the Dutch Reform Church should support this belief system is indicative of the depth of feeling and of commitment. It may seem as another manifestation of the "siege mentality" that existed amongst many colons in French Algeria, and is present among Protestants in Northern Ireland today.

The last decade has posed serious challenges to continued white South African rule. Ten years ago the black African majority constituted only a small threat to internal security. It was widely believed by whites that economic growth would gradually ease the worst effects of apartheid and create an African middle class willing to accept the political and social order because of the economic and material compensations. Externally, the so-called "outward movement" was in full swing as conservative leaders in Black Africa were wooed. Washington and London seemed to agree with Pretoria that South Africa was invulnerable to external attack or internal disruption.

In 1981 a combination of internal developments (Soweto and the resulting crisis of black expectations) and external changes (a collapse of white minority rule in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe and continual uncertainty over Namibia) require the RSA to adjust quickly to new and unexpected difficulties. Guerrilla sanctuaries, or the potential for them, exist along all South Africa's northern borders. Moreover, several of the regimes to the north might play host to super power or proxy forces. Internally, repression has not prevented terrorism and public disorder, but seems only to have broadened the base of opposition forces to include, among others, school children. And the two situations - the internal and the external - should perhaps be multiplied rather than added, since each strengthens the other, by example or by aid. In one respect only is South Africa stronger today than in 1971. Economically, the high price of gold and other factors have been favourable, and in this important respect the RSA is for the time-being on relatively firm ground. In the following section some of the major events affecting South Africa's security are listed chronologically.

Chronology of Major Recent Events

1948	Jan Smuts lost power to the National Party led by Dr. Malan. Policy of white supremacy (apartheid) implemented.
1952	ANC encouraged black workers to flout pass laws. "Veldt fire" of strikes. Black opposition based on passive resistance.

1960	PAC organized demonstrations to demand arrest for being without passes. In a remote township called Sharpeville, police panicked when 20,000 turned up, fired into crowd, killing 67 and wounding 186 (21 March). Demonstrations spread to all four provinces. On 30 March state of national emergency declared, 11,000 arrested.
1961	Responding to Sharpeville and subsequent arrests, "Spear of the Nation" and "We Alone" (Poqo), violent offshoots of ANC and PAC respectively, abandoned passive resistance and turned to sabotage.
1961-63	193 acts of sabotage reported. By mid-1963 security forces had begun to penetrate and destroy the underground movements. Police paid well for information, and harsh security measures helped their campaign. By 1965, resistance was virtually crushed.
1963	UN embargoed arms sales to South Africa.
1964	ANC and "Spear" leader Nelson Mandela sentenced to life imprisonment.
1965	SWAPO made first raids into Namibia from Angola.
1967	ZAPU and ANC committed to a guerrilla struggle inside Rhodesia. RSA commits troops in Rhodesia.
1968-70	Some 2,700-4,000 South African troops engaged in Rhodesia, plus 1,000 helping Portuguese in Mozambique.

1970	In Lesotho, the incumbent premier, Chief Leabua Jonathan, was encouraged by RSA to thwart the election results by staging a coup, the opposition leader being seen as a "Peking communist".
1973	Wave of strikes in Durban textile factories.
1974	Lisbon coup. Portuguese empire shortly to be abandoned. Oil crisis following the 1973 Yom Kippur war leads to RSA deals with Iran and intensifies search for alternatives.
1974	June. Machel's FRELIMO Government comes to power in Mozambique.
September - February 1975	RSA conducted high-level, secret talks with African leaders aimed at peace in Rhodesia.
1975	"Dar Declaration" signed by 16 African states in April, ruling out concessions to RSA and accepting armed struggle if peaceful means failed to bring about majority rule. August. Victoria bridge meeting between RSA's Vorster, Zambia's Kaunda, Ian Smith, Nkomo, Sithole, Muzorewa and Mugabe fails to find peaceful Rhodesian solution. March/April. Eruption of fighting among rival groups in Angola brought foreign intervention. FNLA is supported by China and Zaire, MPLA by the Soviet Union and (later) Cuba, UNITA by the USA (which also supplied arms to FNLA).

August. First South African military intervention in Angola, in support of FNLA/UNITA.

October. Cuban troops reinforce MPLA. High point of RSA invasion reached, with South Africans 800 km into Angola. 2,000 South African troops involved. General Meir Amit, former head of Israeli intelligence, visited RSA in 1975.

1976 22 January. RSA withdrew all her forces back to 50 km inside Angola (cost of intervention, 43 killed, 100 wounded).

June. Soweto riots develop, and continue until November. At least 600 dead (including 4 whites), thousands injured and widespread damage. Disturbances spilled over into some white areas of Cape Town, Johannesburg and smaller cities. Cause - white policies, laws and discrimination. Massive security clamp-down, some token concessions. 2,430 people detained. Soweto a serious setback for RSA, through unfavourable world attention, causing overseas loss of investment confidence at the very time when inflation had undermined the economy. In 1976-77 some 3,000-4,000 blacks, mostly the young and many of them students, fled the country to receive education elsewhere. About 7 percent committed themselves to military training under ANC or PAC.

December. The "SASO nine" convicted and sentenced to lengthy terms on Robben Island.

South Africa's prime minister visited Israel in 1976.

1977 Western powers drafted "Declaration on Southern Africa" calling on RSA to take steps to eliminate apartheid and grant equal rights.

September. Steve Biko, "African conciousness" leader, "died in detention".

November. UN passes mandatory arms embargo against RSA. US, Britain, West Germany, France and Canada (the "Contact Group") seek solution to Namibia problem through UN-supervised elections.

March. "Internal Settlement" in Rhodesia, sharing power between Smith and Muzorewa.

1977-78 RSA police reported 19 "notable incidents" of terrorism, involving 11 deaths (including 7 terrorists) and 33 wounded.

1978 June. Chief of RSA's security police alleged that 4,000 black South Africans were then undergoing guerrilla training in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania and Libya.

RSA's economy recovers due to "siege" precautions, which created a $1.5 billion surplus in 1978, and to rise in price of gold. Analysts estimate that the siege economy cost 1 million black jobs. Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, leader of PAC, died of cancer in prison, where he had spent 7 years.

1979 Year begins with gold at $130 ounce.

January. RSA announced capture of ANC terrorist who had infiltrated from Botswana into the Bophutatswana bantustan, thence into RSA proper. Believing this to be a regular pattern, RSA warned Botswana that "hot pursuit" might be made. 60 percent of South African white farms in area abandoned. RSA breaks off negotiations with Contact Group over Namibia.

February 25. Two terrorists arrested in northeast Transvaal; Soviet arms discovered.

March. Several SADF soldiers reported killed by landmine near Mozambique border.

May. Audacious attack on Soweto police station by 3 men armed with AK-47s and grenades. One policeman killed, others wounded, station burnt. ANC responsible.

May. Lancaster House conference opened in London to find Rhodesian settlement.

June 12. PAC leader David Sibeko assassinated in Dar-es Salaam.

September. Mysterious flash off coast of South Africa raises possibility that the Republic has exploded an atomic device.

November. Two police killed in repeat raid on station in Soweto. Townships begin to become ANC "no-go" areas.

At year's end, gold reaches $500 oz. Economy booms.

1980 January. Terrorists of the ANC attacked a Pretoria bank. They seized 25 hostages, killed two whites, and demanded release of imprisoned leader Nelson Mandela. Three terrorists died and 16 hostages were injured in shoot-out. Nine terrorists were arrested. 20,000 attended the Soweto funeral of the three dead terrorists.

21 January. Gold reached $875 oz.

March. Escalation of terrorism. South African army placed on war footing. General Malan refers to "low intensity, undeclared war". Six arms caches declared as uncovered in past 6 months, in Soweto and around the border with Swaziland. Much Soviet equipment. Special mixed races anti-gunman task force formed, stringent security regulations introduced. Military spending tops $2.25 billion.

April 18. Robert Mugabe becomes Prime Minister of newly independent Zimbabwe.

April. 100,000 students of mixed races boycott schools. Beginning in Cape Town, movement spreads to all provinces. Emigration of English-speaking whites reaches 15-20,000 a year.

May. Gold down to $563 oz. Severe racial upheaval includes a periodic bout of strikes in Durban textile factories. Black wages not keeping pace with inflation and black-white wage gap increasing. Unionizing of black workers goes ahead. More skilled jobs go to blacks, thus increasing their leverage.

June 1. ANC terrorists make professional attack on SASOL plants. Coordinated strikes against main plant at Sasolburg, where $7 million damage done, Natref refinery 3 km away, and another Sasol installation at Secunda, 150 km distant. The next day more bombs were found, unexploded, at US consortium buildings at the two latter targets. The ANC declares 1980 a "year of action".

June. Student riots continue in Cape Town. Workers join the boycott. Two killed by rioters. Black townships erupt, leaving more than 40 dead.

June 6. Renfrew Christie, a white South African, sentenced to 10 years for leaking RSA atomic secrets to ANC and to the International University Exchange Fund.

June 16. In Cape Town, a policeman stabbed to death in riots.

Reports indicate that the RSA has 50,000 troops involved in Namibia. Prime Minister Botha talks of a "total onslaught" against the Republic.

July. RSA army claims successes against SWAPO after penetrations of Angola.

July-August. Wave of strikes, many successful, sweep RSA. Many workers deported to bantustans.

August 11. Two Africans killed by grenade explosion in servants' quarters of white residence in Johannesburg.

In Cape Town 2 Europeans, 2 coloured and 1 black killed in riots.

October 15. Rioting in Soweto against presence of Piet Kornhof, one black killed. Railway sabotage.

October 26. Two black youths shot in Gugulethu riots.

October 30. Two grenades thrown at Soweto government office.

November 5. Five blacks injured in Port Elizabeth riots.

November 26. The three ANC terrorists who attacked Soweto police station in May 1979 sentenced to death.

November 26-68. Finance and economic ministers from Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, met aid donors at the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference at Maputo, to consider economic independence from RSA.

December 6. Three sticks of dynamite thrown into home of university lecturer in Grahamstown - work of white extremists.

December 10. Explosion wrecked office of Professor in Pretoria. A group called "White Commando" claimed responsibility.

The UN Contact Group and RSA agreed to meet again, this time with SWAPO representatives present, to resolve Namibian issue.

1981 January. South African troops raid SWAPO base at Cuamato, Angola.

January 13. Leading black journalist Qoboza resigned to protest government harassment of black media.

January 15. In Johannesburg, $400 million in bank securities stolen from Hill Samuel Merchant Bank in largest theft in country's history.

January 18. In Soweto, anti-segregation demonstration broken up by police.

January 28. White Commando claim responsibility for a bomb in liberal white councillor's Durban office.

January 29. In a "watershed" escalation South Africans made their first military raid into Mozambique territory to destroy ANC establishment. Some Mozambique army officers evidently involved as agents of South Africa. Two main black newspapers closed by government. UN talks on Namibia end, RSA having refused UN supervised elections.

February 5. Police arrest 10 suspected members of White Commando. Three days later, another Durban explosion linked to this group.

February 6. RSA imposed an embargo on rail traffic to Mozambique, denied political motives.

February 10. In Cape Province, black pupils end their 10-month school boycott.

February 22. Soviet ambassador in Maputo pledged aid to Mozambique if South African troops again crossed the border.

March 11. Black students in Cape Town resume boycott following government's failure to meet their deadline for educational improvements.

Organizations Involved in Conflict

Political Groupings

Mr. Botha's decision to call a general election for April 29, 1981, two years earlier than necessary by law, may indicate that the Prime Minister, encouraged by the election of President Reagan, is determined to take advantage of a likely respite from external pressure to eliminate his right-wing opponents (both within the Nationalist Party and outside it in the form of the extreme right-wing Herstigte Nasionale Party and the National Conservative Party) from positions of influence both within the Cabinet, the parliamentary party and the grass roots of Afrikanerdom generally. Certainly he cannot doubt the Nationalist Party's strength in relation to opposition parties such as the New Republic Party and the Progressive Federal Party. As the franchise laws disallow constitutional opposition among blacks, there can be no electoral threat from that direction. Black organizations, even if political, are therefore listed under the "opposition" section.

The Nationalist Party has held power continuously since 1948 and critics would say that its leaders have manipulated the system so that the party has, to all intents and purposes, a permanent monopoly of power in the country. As the standard bearers of racial superiority, the Nationalists have created the necessary apparatus to convert this theory into practice.

Security Forces

The total armed forces contain 86,050 men and women, of whom 66,250 are conscripts serving for 24 months, and the balance are regulars. Mobilization could raise the overall total to 404,500. The distribution between services is: army, 71,000 (6,000 white, 3,000 black and coloured regulars, 2,000 women, 59,000 white conscripts); navy, 4,750 (1,250 conscripts); air force, 10,300 (4,000 conscripts). Defence expenditure in 1980 was $2.56 billion.

Equipment is good, being composed of French, British and US supplies received prior to the UN embargo, and supplemented by home-produced weapons and equipment and what can still be obtained abroad by devious means and from countries willing to ignore the embargo, such as Israel. Without doubt, the South African Defence Force (SADF) is the most powerful in Southern Africa. It is well led and well trained, both for conventional and counter-guerrilla war, and could defeat any neighbour or combination of neighbours in a straightforward military contest.

Although most of the SADF is composed of whites, there are some Indian, black and coloured units. Near Cape Town is the Cape Coloured Corps Training Centre. Volunteers from this corps have already seen action in the operational area along the Angolan border. Most Indians go into the navy. At Lenz, near Johannesburg, there is a training area for black volunteers. Companies from the 21st Black Battalion, led by whites, have proven themselves in counter-insurgency operations on the Angolan border. Black military units in the homelands receive instruction from SADF.

Para-military forces include 110,000 Commandos - infantry style protective units formed as battalions and brigades. Initial training is for 12 months, followed by 19 days annual training. There are 13 Air Commando squadrons using private aircraft. The South African Police totals 35,500, of whom 19,500 are white and 16,000 non-white. There is a Police Reserve of 20,000.

The police are superseded for political operations by the security police, under the minister of police and justice, and the Department of National Security directly under the prime minister. The security police, the department, and military intelligence have separate networks of informers, white and black. According to press reports, the South African Secret Service (BOSS) runs a white-led, 1200 strong "32 Battalion" of the SADF inside Angola, as a training and operational base against SWAPO, and in support of UNITA.

Whether or not South Africa has an atomic capability is unclear. Reports of Israeli assistance in this field seem well documented, and certainly it is technically feasible that a device or a bomb exists. The South African Air Force has a credible delivery capability, within the operational context of Southern Africa.

The Apparatus of Control

The Nationalist Party has erected a structure of domination which depends on:

1. The control and distortion of the institutions of a state that remains outwardly democratic and ostensibly subject to common principles of Western-style law. In a manner not unknown on the African continent, doing so has meant gaining unassailable authority in parliament, using that authority to subvert the the national constitution and the basic legal framework of the state (including the subordination of the judiciary), equating the personal leadership of individuals with the state and, in practice, making criticism of those leaders the equivalent of treason.

2. Ensuring the enforcement of separation in order to prevent the numerically superior Africans from combining easily against whites, from taking concerted industrial action, or having the kind or urban standing that could constitute a physical challenge to white-run industries or a psychological challenge to white security. Thus the regime has regulated African employment, movement, residence, sport, sexual relations, and other activities. These regulations also deter Africans from somehow joining the whites of English origin in attempting to overcome the Nationalist monopoly. Homeland independence and the banning of urban-based political organizations for blacks is an attempt to fracture the solidarity of the black majority.

In addition, the state censors and controls publications and films. It opens mail, taps telephones, forces the press to observe self-censorship, and uses state-run television and radio and the educational system for internal propaganda. Pass laws and influx controls hamper the movement of Africans: police sweeps are an ever-present possibility; the ability of the various law-enforcement agencies to detain, question and physically intimidate is real. In the five years prior to 1979, 45 Africans died in police custody while under interrogation. The death of Stephen Biko in 1977 was one such. The banning process has been used since 1950 to prevent those so described talking or being with more than one other person at a time, and it also requires regular visits to the police station. Section 6 of the Terrorism Act of 1967 permits the police to detain suspected terrorists, or those who are presumed to have information about terrorism, indefinitely. Forty-five of the 447 prisoners on Robben Island are so detained. The RSA's total prison population is now 102,000. The Internal Security Act of 1976 sanctions preventive detention of anyone whose activities are thought to endanger the security of the state or the maintenance of public order. As soon as African or white dissenters become prominent they are questioned and either detained or banned. Physically, the main victims of this system are the blacks: psychologically, it is the whites who have probably suffered the most, although they cannot realize this, being under the spell of a system and its propaganda and therefore deterred from objective analysis. Recent moves towards "neo-apartheid" have removed some of the more visible and unimportant aspects, but the main structure remains intact.

Opposition Forces

African National Congress (ANC)

Formed in 1912 by black lawyers and clerics educated in Britain and the US, the ANC was originally a non-violent organization favouring boycotts, civil disobedience and strikes to achieve its aim of political independence. The ANC has welcomed non-Africans to its ranks. After Sharpeville, the ANC, now banned, revised its methods and formed the militant "Spear of the Nation" (Umkonto we Sizwe) which indulged in sabotage.

Both groups were penetrated by police; informers and leaders either went to jail or fled abroad in the mid-1960s. A long-standing connection between ANC and the white-led Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) seems to have strengthened into something approaching an alliance in the intervening years. After the Soweto riots of 1976, ANC began a new guerrilla campaign from external sanctuaries, but it continues to adhere to a policy of attacking symbols of white power, avoiding indiscriminate terrorism.

One headquarters is reported (by the New York Times) as being in an alley off Cairo Road, Lusaka, Zambia, but a major centre is in London, England. There are offices in New York. Another base, described by the SADF as a "planning and control headquarters", was in three houses on the outskirts of Maputo, Mozambique, until attacked in January 1981 by South African forces. The current president is Oliver Tambo, 64 year old former law partner of Nelson Mandela, the imprisoned "Spear" leader. Head of ANC intelligence is Neil Barnard; deputy president is Thabo Mbeki, Mavis Nhlapo is secretary for women and Papie Moloto is secretary for youth. Reginald September is a member of the ANC's revolutionary council. The Secretary General is Alfred Nzo. The organization is aware that it is "shot through with informers". The ANC seeks to reform these people and to exclude doubtfuls from policy-making or sensitive information. Sechaba, the ANC journal, is financed and produced in East Berlin. At least in public discussion, the ANC seems to regard the imprisoned Mandela as its true leader and South Africa's future black president. ANC is working to build up an intelligentsia to take over government after the downfall of the white establishment. The ANC is recognized by the OAU.

Pan-African Congress (PAC)

Robert Sobukwe created the break-away, exclusively African PAC out of militant intellectuals of the ANC in 1959. To upstage an ANC-sponsored campaign against the pass laws, the PAC organized the day of national defiance that led to the Sharpeville massacre on March 31, 1960. In the aftermath, PAC spawned "Only Ourselves" (Poqo), which undertook sabotage until most members were rounded up. The similarity between the title Poqo and Sinn Fein should not go unobserved. Another parallel can be drawn from Poqo's actions, which involved murders of chiefs and headmen in the Transkei and informers in Cape Town. Whereas the ANC found friends, through CPSA, in Moscow, PAC, through Dar es Salaam, looked to Peking. Once the internal security in RSA became too efficient, PAC moved its headquarters to Dar. Sobukwe went to jail and died there. During the 1960s the ANC seemed to be losing its primacy to PAC, but since Soweto and the loss of its leader, PAC has suffered sharp decline. China's partial disengagement in Africa may have been a factor. PAC's military wing is known as the African People's Liberation Army (APLA). PAC is recognized by OAU and has observer status at UN.

South African Communist Party (CPSA)

A multi-racial, minority party, the CPSA has adopted "broad front" tactics by associating itself with ANC and thus attempting to convert a national liberation movement into a Moscow-aligned exile government. In January 1980 the party leader was received and honoured in Moscow. Joe Slovo, 57, a white lawyer born in Lithuania, is a leading figure, being named by South African police as the brains behind the Sasol sabotage attack. His wife, Ruth First, is an activist writer. Another supposed terrorist masterminding attacks is Frere Ginwala, a radical woman lawyer believed to be living underground within the RSA.

Azanian People's Organization (Azapo)

Formed in September 1979 in an attempt to revive the late Steve Biko's "Black Consciousness" movement of the early 1970s. At present Azapo is an umbrella organization of educational and professional groups, unable to claim any substantial popular power base and with its leaders under police harassment.

Soweto Committee of Ten

Dr. Nthato Motlana's umbrella of Soweto groups united in opposition to any collaboration with the government or its institutions. Motlana is opposed to Chief Buthelezi (see below).

Port Elizabeth Civic Group (Pebco)

Another functional group, led by Thozamile Botha, Pebco rose to prominence in 1979 by its organization of the Ford Motors and General Tyre strikes, which combined trade union and civic action to achieve political results.

Zulu Inkatha Movement

Permitted as a "cultural" organization, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Zulu movement is based on the tribal homeland of Kwazulu. The Zulu are not only the biggest tribe, at 5.2 million outnumbering the white population, they are also the best disciplined and arguably the most ambitious. Inkatha has 300,000 paid-up members and its own uniformed youth movement. Buthelezi, who seeks one-man-one-vote for all South Africans, is adamant that his movement is not tribal, and he welcomes other tribes in local committees, notably in Soweto. Buthelezi does not conceal his ambition to be South Africa's first black leader, and opinion polls conducted by German analysts have shown that in 1977 he enjoyed 43.8% support in contrast to his nearest rival's - Mandela's - 21.7%. Buthelezi has met ANC leaders in London, and each recognizes the other's legitimacy. However, in June 1980 Oliver Tambo of ANC began to criticize Buthelezi and a sharp rift seems to have occurred.

South African Black Alliance (SABA)

Formed by Chief Buthelezi with leaders of South Africa's coloured community, notably the Rev. Allan Hendrickse of the Labour Party, as a prelude to what he hopes will one day be a national constitutional convention on South Africa's future. SABA includes Inkatha, the Labour Party (the leading political organization of the Coloureds), the Reform Party (an opposition Asian group) and a political party representing the tiny homelands of Owa Owa. SABA became the largest non-white but multi-racial political force in RSA's history. SABA urges blacks in homelands designated "independent not to lose their South African citizenship by opting for the new "state".

South African Liberation Support Committee (SALSCOM)

Created by white South Africans abroad in 1976 to encourage white deserters and draft-dodgers. Mainly active in the USA.

Witcommando (White Commando)

A right-wing vigilante terrorist group evidently composed of frustrated whites, like Algeria's OAU, or Ulster's UVF. Witcommando has made threatening attacks on the homes of liberal whites, including Professor Frans Maritz, one of the Prime Minister's leading advisers, who favours a multi-racial confederation in Natal.

Although not strictly speaking part of the "opposition", many Church leaders are influential among blacks and are dedicated in opposition to apartheid. The Bishop of Johannesburg, the Right Reverend Timothy Bavin, and the secretary-general of the South African Council of Churches, Bishop Desmond Tutu, have been outspoken critics.

Other Organizations Involved in the Conflict

Namibia is the setting of a guerrilla war between South African security forces and the South-West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO). The Ovambos are the largest ethnic group in Namibia, comprising some 45 percent, and SWAPO is largely supported by this group. The guerrillas are based in Angola and Zambia: their aim is to liberate Namibia from South African rule and establish self-government with SWAPO as the ruling party. Recent UN-sponsored negotiations between the "Contact Group" (US, UK, France, Germany and Canada) broke down when RSA refused to accept UN-monitored elections, as the RSA does not regard the UN as unbiased. (The final round of talks did however bring representatives of SWAPO and RSA to the same table, in January 1981). The cost of this decision for the RSA will be the continued maintenance of upwards of 25,000 troops in Namibia to counteract the estimated 7,000 guerrillas, further international criticism, leading possibly to sanctions, and an opportunity lost of establishing good relations with a SWAPO-dominated government. Analysts suggest that the negative decision may have arisen out of respect for right-wing Nationalist opinion, to avoid accepting a precedent that parties who use force are rewarded by Afrikaners with political victory, to keep "militant Marxist-Leninism" at arms' length, and to avoid a show of apparent weakness by Pretoria. Other factors may have been a desire not to stimulate further black expectations in the RSA, so soon after the recent events in Zimbabwe, and a wish not to encourage the OAU and the front line states to move forwards against the "final bastion". It may be that Mr. Botha has not changed his attitude since 1978 when he said in this regard: "if it comes to a choice between the friendship of the world and internal stability, then we shall have to choose internal stability". Some observers may doubt whether, in the long run, the two options can be separated, but the test of future intentions may come after the April elections. If Botha succeeds in undercutting his hardliners, he may return to negotiation.

Namibia has valuable mineral resources, which may be another factor, but seen purely from a defence outlook, with the foregoing factors set aside, South Africa would have a much shortened defence perimeter without Namibia, her armed forces would be released from a war which is unlikely to be won and may become costly, and the risk of being continually at odds with Angola and possibly Zambia might recede. Provided the domestic effects can be absorbed, this analyst considers it in the RSA's best security interests to find a solution, even if this favours SWAPO. This issue will provide a test of South Africa's willingness and ability to take short-term risks in her long-term interest, to accept and so far as possible to fashion change. The outcome may provide a pointer to her prospects at home.

Factors Affecting the Conflict

Sources of Conflict

The source of conflict is political: South Africa's blacks want power in proportion to their numerical superiority. Even if they were tempted by economic and social concessions to settle for less, their neighbours to the north, supporters elsewhere in the world of "liberation", would prompt them to think again. The banning of ANC and PAC has effectively placed control of an important segment of the conflict outside South Africa, making it more difficult for the government to come to terms. This conflict source, rooted in the country's own history, is overlaid by the anti-colonial movement of the past 30 years, and also by the anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist movement of Marxist-Leninism, which together provide catalysts, examples, hope. "One-man-one-vote" is an appropriate rallying cry, since it appeals to the western liberal conscience and tends to isolate the RSA. Experience in post-colonial Africa suggests that, once free of minority white rule, most states accept authoritarian minority black rule without undue concern. What seems to matter is that the ruler is black, although between rival tribes the sharing of power can often lead to friction or war. No outside state will interfere on behalf of the loser, or criticise the victor. In a sense, then, the source of conflict is racial as well as political, since there might be no problem if the

Afrikaners were black.

The white population, encouraged by the government, tends to see the conflict's source in Moscow, or Peking. They take the view that there would be no black unrest were it not for this communist conspiracy. No doubt these distant capitals are happy to fish in troubled waters and the Soviets, particularly, show a willingness to assist rebel groups. It would be a dangerous mistake for the West as a whole to accept this skewed assessment at face value, since false assumptions are certain to lead to flawed conclusions.

Methods of Conflict

Namibia apart, the level of conflict in the RSA is at present quite low. It takes three main forms. First, from camps in the frontline and socialist states, where some 4000 young Africans are apparently under training, ANC and PAC guerrillas infiltrate back into the RSA. ANC's deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, has explained: "We cannot fight a bush war. Look at a map. It is all developed. There are roads, radios, landing strips everywhere. This isn't Angola, Mozambique. We don't have forest. The machine would smash us if we tried to send in an army from the outlying areas. Also, 87 percent of the whites are in towns and cities. Our masses have to serve as our bush. The black community is our bush." Another spokesman, Reginald September, said that ANC had no timetable, but "history has a way of turning corners very sharply". He confirmed the strategy of slowly building up trained manpower in the homelands and urban areas "to build support for sabotage and strikes". Recent sabotage attacks, such as the spectacular attack on the SASOL installations, raids on police stations, the bank hold-up, and many other actions testify to the external groups' ability to operate in this manner. The level of infiltration is however quite low and it seems likely that it will remain so for the immediate future.

Second, urban demonstrations, riots, boycotts, strikes and similar quasi-violence, which spread across the whole country during 1980, and continue, pose familiar problems. The police and army are capable of handling such incidents provided they are not coordinated to occur simultaneously in many places and to continue over a long period. However, the cost of suppression is high in terms of international opinion, investor confidence and future internal harmony, while the cost of failing to control outbreaks could be devastating to white morale. Such actions create tensions that make concessions and compromise especially difficult. Already, the heightened sense of vulnerability has led to whites terrorizing liberals, and the possibility of white extremists engaging in counter-terror against blacks cannot be excluded. The existence of Soweto, close to Johannesburg, with some 1.3 million blacks living in a virtual "no go" area without peace, order or good government raises dire possibilities, and could provide the environment in which the first and the second conflict forms could overlap. In the first half of 1980 there were 500 murders in Soweto, and even more rapes.

A third conflict form lies in the international arena. It consists of efforts to isolate the RSA, deprive it of arms, trading partners and friends, and thus force it to yield to black demands or if not to yield, to be vulnerable to other methods of attack.

Strengths and Weaknesses

The Republic of South Africa

The principal strengths of the Afrikaner nationalists are:

1. Tough, uncompromising and self-righteous outlook, and ruthless determination to survive, regardless of other people's actions or opinions, now linked to a growing awareness of the need for change, to prevent the internal situation from getting out of control.

2. Armed forces capable of deterring or defeating any conventional invasion, other than one involving a major world power, and of dealing effectively with insurgency, especially in rural areas. Good intelligence. Reserves and para-military back-up. A possible nuclear capability.

3. Apparatus of control that has worked well in the past.

4. Possession of assets needed by the west - gold, one-fifth of world's uranium exports, coal, between 68 and 81 percent of world chromite ore, 53-78 percent of world's manganese, 54-75 percent of world's platinum, important quantities of vanadium, cobalt as a by-product of platinum mining - as well as strategic assets in the form of bases that offer control of important sea lanes.

5. A strong economy. Powerful economic leverage over Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, other northern neighbours.

The Republic's main weaknesses are:

1. The contradiction between traditional qualities such as stubbornness and new imperatives such as flexibility, between being a hero and a survivor, and the destruction of ideological values inherent in this.

2. Police forces which have performed unevenly in past crises, and which are criticised by the military. This weakness may be in process of being remedied.

3. Growing dependence upon skilled black labour, and a shortage of it.

4. Possible inability to contain several crises simultaneously, particularly if Namibia continues to require troops, or if the frontline states sponsor attacks.

5. Isolation internationally, with embargo on arms supply and ever present threat of UN sanctions. No guaranteed backer even in the face of, say, Soviet military attack.

6. Dependence upon an apparatus of control which would need to be partly dismantled in the course of reaching any compromise with blacks.

7. An economy vulnerable to fluctuating demand, boycott, and labour indiscipline.

The Opposition

Strengths.

1. Psychological breakthrough among blacks, achieved by external and internal events, leading to rising expectations in economics and politics, and a growing confidence that these can be met.

2. Multiple front campaign that covers the spectrum from constitutional pressures (Chief Buthelezi), through urban disorder to terrorism (ANC/PAC), and, in Namibia, guerrilla warfare (SWAPO), and which brings the front to every province and city.

3. The potential for greater violence, both by an intensification of current methods, the development of prolonged urban guerrilla struggle inside the RSA, the stepping up of a cross-border war from the frontline states, and possible military assistance from those states and their backers, or by proxy forces.

4. International support, particularly from OAU, Third World, UN and the socialist countries, but also from liberals in the western capitalist states.

5. Growing industrial power, as skilled black labour breaks the traditional system of returning strikers to bantustans, and as trade unions gain more leverage.

Weaknesses.

1. Currently, too low a level of exemplary violence - the blows against symbols of white supremacy - to undermine confidence in the system or to create the "climate of collapse".

2. Lack of unified leadership and overall strategy.

3. Vulnerability to police infiltration, imprisonment, detention or banning, leading to poor coordination of internal actions.

4. Current lack of enthusiasm among frontline states to expose their economies or their territories to RSA retaliation by offering overt ANC/PAC operational bases, freedom of movement, let alone military support.

Outside Influences

On the international front, even if we assume that in the short term the SADF is capable of containing incursions and urban violence, there is the effect of such violence on the attitudes of western governments and investors. Should the past image of a state capable of containing internal disorder and fostering a high growth rate be substantially damaged, it is possible that western governments would at last begin to put substantial pressure on Pretoria to come to terms with black aspirations. Moral aspects apart, this might be out of concern for their own economic stakes in the Republic, recognizing that an escalation of violence into civil war could only damage those interests and make their continuation under a successor black regime doubtful.

It is this possibility, that the nearest equivale the RSA has to friends might begin to see the white regime changing from being a western asset to becoming a western liability, that could do more than anything else to tip the scales. Ambassador Andrew Young of the Carter administration saw South Africa in this light, but was a step ahead of his colleagues. The Reagan administration is likely to take several steps back from such a judgement, preferring perhaps to shore up the status quo, to emphasize the practical need for raw materials, strategic bases and a "bulwark against communism" over the moralistic needs of human rights. Hopefully, any decision by the US to support RSA in its present difficulties would be conditional upon the latter regime agreeing to speed up political change and move to some form of power-sharing with all communities, even if this is for the time-being non-parliamentary. Prime Minister Botha's decision to hold an April 1981 election may have been influenced by a wish to develop such a scenario.

The breathing space that might be provided by a relaxation of western pressure might correspond with a period of, say, two or three years during which the frontline states will wish to concentrate their efforts on internal reconstruction and not be disposed to support guerrilla warfare across their borders. These states, in turn, may use this time to disengage their economies from undue reliance on RSA, so that their future options are less constrained by economic factors. It is greatly in the RSA's interests to offer generous assistance that will undercut such a process and cement interdependence.

As for the Soviet Union, China and Cuba, each may try to strengthen ties to frontline states, the exile resistance movements, and with the internal subversive factions. Military training and arms will doubtless be available; so will diplomatic and propaganda support. The latter will seek to divide US opinion in the event that the Administration is "soft" on RSA and will continue to drum up liberal opposition to all forms of contact with the regime, especially investments. It seems doubtful if Cuba will wish to have its troops drawn into armed conflict against SADF, either in RSA or Namibia, as from previous experience they are aware that they are no match. Castro might not easily withstand a severe overseas military defeat. There is no way that Soviet or Chinese forces are going to become involved, beyond advice and training.

Trends

The trend is towards a gradually escalating war on many fronts. Of these fronts, the economic is probably the most promising, from the opposition viewpoint, although black leaders may not realize it. Economic power-sharing is almost certain to lead to some degree of political power-sharing. As trained black labour becomes indispensable, and as unions find ways of protecting unskilled members from arbitary banishment to bantustans, a measure of partnership will develop. We have seen this pattern in Poland. Carefully used, it can make the power of armed forces appear impotent. Even in the army, the recruitment of blacks may have a similar effect. A rising tide of violence could undermine white confidence and make alternative political structures seem an acceptable price for peace. Conflict aimed at evolutionary change is already becoming effective and the trend is towards neo-apartheid, and perhaps a halfway house in which rudimentary power-sharing along SABA lines is possible.

This trend may be reinforced, and eventually even be replaced, by a more revolutionary movement for the complete overthrow of the white regime. This is what ANC and PAC are seeking, although domestic support for violent revolution seems to be low. Revolutionary trends may be diverted, at least for a time, if Pretoria shows flexibility and accepts the evolutionary course, including a Namibian settlement, and if the frontline states can be kept in a neutralist posture. Much depends on the election outcome and on US actions.

Outlook

Withoug strong and united leadership, South Africa's opposition forces have small hope in the short-term (3-5 years) of achieving the revolutionary overthrow of the white regime. They do have good chances of prompting evolutionary change which might include a form of power-sharing not based on universal franchise.

If, by government fear of showing weakness or by right-wing Nationalist ideology, the evolutionary path is blocked, the crisis will deepen. In 3-5 years the level of violence may be beyond control and considerable urban and rural areas could become virtual "no go" districts under rebel control. The apparatus of alternative government headed by an acceptable black leader might emerge and the whites would be forced onto the defensive. From that point, any number of scenarios are possible including ones in which the alternative regime calls for foreign aid and the RSA threatens nuclear retaliation if it is given. This takes us into futuristic speculation, which is outside the province of this analyst.

The success of an evolutionary policy would not necessarily defuse the revolutionary movement, particularly if it is "too little and too late". It is a fear of giving too much away without ensuring security that may undermine such a policy. The Nationalists are faced by choices, all of which involve grave risks. To the siege mentality, the risks which are familiar and are calculable, may seem less unattractive than those that call for great acts of faith, especially when such faith contradicts ideology.

The security outlook for the next 3-5 years is not too terrible. There is likely to be rising violence and unrest, but this should be within the power of the state system to contain and of the white population to tolerate. The bigger question is - what then?

The best outlook, from the white's (and possibly also the West's) viewpoint, is that the government will have used the intervening years to make real changes which remove the main sources of resentment and incorporate blacks into the power structure. If sufficient black South Africans felt they had a fair share of economic advantages plus political power (even if the latter lacks full democratic status), and therefore backed the system against the external revolutionary forces, the future would be bright. In effect, a multi-racial state would exist, and time would inevitably transfer greater power to black leaders. It has to be said that this scenario, although within the bounds of possibility, seems remote.

A more probable outlook is that the RSA uses the breathing space to carry out what the whites see as reform, but what other races and the overseas audiences see as shams. This could be the worst of all worlds, since it would weaken the system without resolving the crisis.

The last outlook is that the whites see the breathing space as God's benediction and evidence that all is, after all, well, and they proceed in disregard of opposition. At least this would leave them with intact ideology and system, if without friends, and the garrison state would be established.

In both the last two outlooks it is realistic to expect conflict to increase in scale, methods and areas, and inevitably the frontline states will be dragged into it, willingly or not. So may outside backers, and in this dimension lie the worst dangers.

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STUDY NO 3: PUERTO RICO

Aim

To examine the background to political violence on and emanating from the island of Puerto Rico with a view to assessing the likely future directions of such campaigns. The study concentrates on pro-independence conflict, which is the principal source of violence.

Data

Status: A self-governing community, with a republican constitution separating the powers of legislature, administration and courts, associated with but not fully a part of the United States, but whose people have American citizenship. The term "Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" is used.

Population: 3,319,000 (all figures, 1977 est)

Main Cities:		
	San Juan (capital)	418,700
	Bayamón	205,500
	Ponce	188,500
	Mayaguez	99,800
	Arecibo	86,200

Gross Domestic Product: $8,735,000,000 (1975.76)

Economic: Manufacturing is the main source of income, with textiles, clothing, electrical and electronic equipment, plastics, chemicals, petrochemicals and processed foods as the main products. Deposits of copper and nickel, and off-shore petroleum, offer prospects for a valuable extraction industry. Agriculture is the second source of income. Dairy and livestock product income has overtaken that of sugar, the main crop. Tobacco, coffee, pineapples, coconuts and sugar products such as rum and molasses are also important. High foreign investments, encouraged by tax incentives and duty-free access to the USA, have levelled off. With the phased introduction of US wage minima due to take full effect this year, the attraction of the island to foreign investors as a source of cheap labour has declined. Tourism, accounting for 5 percent of receipts from abroad, is of growing importance. Densely populated, Puerto Rico has a persistent unemployment problem.

Language: The official language is Spanish. Although English is widely known, most Puerto Ricans normally speak Spanish. With rare exceptions, Spanish is used by radio and television stations and newspapers. Schools, universities, the Church, and public agencies use Spanish.

Religion: About 85 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, the remainder belonging to Protestant denominations. With some rare exceptions, the Roman Catholic Church is conservative and has not become radicalized in the Central and South American manner.

Geography: The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico comprises the island of Puerto Rico and three smaller islands, lying about 80kilometers east of Hispaniola (Haiti and the Dominican Republic) in the outer Caribbean. The climate is maritime-tropical with a mean temperature of 24.4°C (76°F); however, temperatures range from 17°C to 36°C. The land area is 8,897 km^2 (3,435 $miles^2$).

Historical Background to the Puerto Rican Independence Struggle

Although political ideology is an important ingredient in present day Puerto Rican terrorism, the principal casus belli is national independence. This motive has a long history in the island's affairs, being pursued in part by constitutional means and in part by violence.

In 1868 a handful of Puerto Rican patriots planned and tried to execute an armed rebellion against Spanish imperial rule. Betrayed and quickly suppressed, the Grito de Lares, as this uprising is known, became a symbol of pro-independence struggle. Notwithstanding this failure, the abolition of slavery on the island in 1873 has been attributed to the efforts of the leaders of the early independence movement.

The Spanish hold on Puerto Rico was broken in 1898, not by an indigenous force, but by an invasion of United States troops, a consequence of the Spanish-American war. The Foraker Act of 1900 and the Jones Act of 1917 provided the political framework for Puerto Rico's subordinate position within the US political system. The Island was included in the American tariff system and US Constitution, and all federal laws applied there unless specifically excluded. The United States held power over currency, defence, citizenship, international commerce and other fields of jurisdiction. Puerto Rico could elect a nonvoting resident commissioner to the United States and a legislature with jurisdiction over matters of local character. The governor was appointed by Washington.

Until World War I, life in the island's mountain villages appeared, at least in retrospect, relaxed and contented. It was said that the boricuas (Puerto Ricans) were all jibaros, that is the type who have little aptitude for modern ways and therefore tend to be out of step with technological change. The jibaro's mental outlook is in its own way sophisticated, replete with evasion and the tactics of delay. As a worker or incipient proletarian, he has become the base element in society. Because, under one form of rule or another, his opportunity to alter circumstances has been small, he has tended to be apolitical. To the modern independentists, the removal of the jibaro image is a part of the overall effort that must be made of concientización, the consciousness - raising needed for spiritual independence. The myth of Puerto Rican docility is politically expedient, the independentists say, for it justifies the intruder in staying as long as his presence is not openly challenged by the people, and it explains why he should make the decisions for the conquered. As early as 1902, Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón, member of the Unionista Party, warned Puerto Ricans that they risked losing their patria - their cultural heritage - if they facilitated the absorption of their country by the Americans. The task, he claimed, was for Puerto Ricans to know themselves and their physical and spiritual needs. They must conquer their weaknesses and be disposed to fight. Defeatism entailed inability to develop, and the reduction of a people into instruments of another race.

But this advice was generally ignored, and Puerto Ricans did indeed lose most if not all of their patria. American capital and capitalist economics developed the island but economic changes tended to underline the gap between rich and poor, even if they did not widen it . Big plantations brought machines that replaced human labour, but fortunately American corporations also created job opportunities off the land. Moderate Puerto Rican politicians saw the need for foreign skills and management as temporary: and indeed the subsequent advance in education slowly closed the gap between yanqui knowhow and domestic ability. Puerto Rico became the victim of what Adlai Stevenson called "the revolution of rising expectations". With the exception of the jibaros, Puerto Ricans adopted a lifestyle borrowed from the West, an attitude of consumerism. Building materials and furniture, food and clothes were imported. Movies, cars, radios and other novelties were foreign-made. Yet, between 1915 and 1925 the wages of a sugar worker increased 26.5 percent against inflation at 48.6 percent, and three-fifths of the total population in 1926 lacked permanent employment. Pauperization occurred at a time of over-all expansion of the economy. The years 1929 to 1936 brought a serious crisis. There were disastrous hurricanes, a market crash, the depression, and nationalist violence.

Pedro Albizu Campos, a mulatto, began his political career within the Unionist Party. When, however, the Unionists opted for the "free associated state" concept - the commonwealth formula that would eventually be adopted in 1952 - Albizu Campos followed José Coll y Cuchi into a breakaway Nationalist Party. In 1925 this new Party elected Albizu as its vice president and, in 1930, president. His election underscored a drastic change in the party's programme: the workers would be organized into anti-imperialist action, there would be an anti-latifundios (large landed estates) campaign, and steps would be taken to nationalize industries and businesses. Albizu's followers in the Río Piedras campus of the university tried to dominate student activities and this movement spread to the lower schools. Albizu argued that, as the yanquis had established their rule by propaganda, this must be effectively countered in kind. When the New Deal policy for Puerto Rico stressed federal government responsibility for the well-being of the island's people, Albizu sought to discredit it as being merely US "propaganda of misery" designed to excuse continued American presence on the basis of need.

Albizu's ideology of independentismo contained the basic building blocks of any militant revolutionary movement. First was the idea that Puerto Rico was in crisis - worse off now than it had been in the past. Also, the community's destiny and its vital existence were now dependent upon outside forces. In sum, the people could improve their lot by concentrating all their defensive vigour into an aggresive and, if necessary, violent removal of the exterior forces now, before it was too late. Liberation, for Albizu Campos, was a matter of removing the economic, political and cultural obstacles from the path. With political dependence there could be no economic independence, and the reverse was equally true. There could be neither piecemeal solution nor compromise. Puerto Ricans had to look on the situation as a warlike confrontation: they must be prepared for the self-sacrifice and aggressiveness of a war of liberation. Similar ideals presumably inspire some at least of today's militant activists.

Albizu Campos' views did not go unchallenged. Luis Muñoz Marín, who argued that Puerto Rican independentists must develop "respectability", gained unique influence over the New Deal administrators in Washington and San Juan who were striving to salvage the island's economy. A realist in his political and economic outlook, Múnoz concluded that Puerto Rico could only hope that its continued servitude might grow cautiously less servile over the years. By the mid-1930s Albizu Campos' Nationalist Party had become radicalized. Following their ideological plan, they became the arch-enemy of North Americans, the instigators of violence, seekers of civil war.

On February 23, 1936, two men assassinated the island's Chief of Police. They were arrested and taken to the nearest police station, where angry policemen murdered them. The Nationalist Party in the same year formed the "Cadets of the Republic", a private army which paraded in uniforms and with wooden rifles - much under the influence of Mussolini's blackshirts.

On March 21, 1937, the Nationalists planned a parade in the city of Ponce. At the last moment police permission for the event was withdrawn, but by then the Cadets were ready to begin. Police surrounded the parade, which opened with the playing of La Borinquna , the unofficial national hymn. The parade did not move, but shots rang out, apparently fired by the police. In the ensuing shooting, twenty-one persons were killed and 150 wounded. The "Ponce Massacre", as the event was inevitably dubbed, tarnished the American image in the eyes of Puerto Ricans, irrespective of political affiliation, and provided the Nationalists with martyrs.

In 1940 Muñoz Marín's Popular Democratic Party won the local elections. The party's programme proposed that, instead of separating immediately from the links that held it to the North American system, Puerto Rico should establish a useful and friendly relationship with the United States. The Populares, as the democrats were called, conceived of Puerto Rico as a bridge between the two Americas - English speaking and Latin. The 1944 elections gave Munoz Marin overwhelming public support, and one year later he was able to destroy the "immediate" independentist wing within the Populares. Party success rested upon their ability to work with the American administration on the basis of "equal partnership". Soon after the 1940 victory, President Roosevelt had appointed Rexford Tugwell to the governorship of Puerto Rico. Tugwell, an intimate of Roosevelt since 1932 and a New Deal insider, harboured apprehensions about the potential economic and social side-effects of technology and of the monopolizing impact of huge corporations. He wrote: "For this moment in the world's history we are jointly committed to a great struggle for freedom and decency."

Despite some friction that arose between men of different backgrounds and dispositions, the one addicted to efficiency and the other full of charisma, the reformist efforts of Tugwell and Munoz Marin yielded dramatic results. By 1945, the Puerto Rican rehabilitation effort, known as Operation Bootstrap, was widely publicized in the United States and elsewhere. The island's living standards steadily overtook the rest of the Caribbean countries. In his later years in office, Tugwell was criticized for his "enlightened colonialism", and Puerto Ricans who favoured statehood argued that, in collaboration with Munoz Marin, he was establishing a kind of fascist dictatorship. In 1946, Washington appointed "the first Puerto Rican" to the governorship, Jesus T. Pinero, and two years later Munoz Marin assumed that office, after an act of Congress granted Puerto Rico the right to elect their governor.

Operation Bootstrap performed something of an economic miracle. Per capita income, $121 in 1940 and $256 in 1948, reached $500 in 1958 and $1,129 in 1968. Exports percapita rose from $49 in 1940 to $529 in 1968; imports per capita rose from $57 to $719 over the same period. Literacy climbed from 68.5 percent in 1940 to 85.9 in 1966. During this period the initial shift away from corporate domination towards state-sponsored projects gave way to the precise opposite. The results were greater efficiency (from a capitalist standpoint), and the process of capital concentration that Marx discussed as predictive of class antagonism. Critics allege that the island was reduced to a client status, as the provider of cheap labour. Its power to regulate economic activity was curtailed: more economic dependency, under a new guise, resulted. Moreover, between 1945 and 1964, close to 750,000 Puerto Ricans - more than one-third of the population - left the Island, lured by hopes of a better life in the United States, the economic pattern at home having failed to provide sufficient jobs. One employment sector did increase, but that was a non-productive one - the local government. Between 1969 and 1973, government employment increased from 105,000 to 155,000. The government's debt increased from $1.5 billion in 1969 to $6.6 billion in 1975. By the early 1970s Puerto Rico's economy was characterized by stagnant manufacturing and agricultural sectors and, consequently, by the large and increasing public debt, a great dependence on US transfer payments and a bloated public sector. The increased cost of petroleum further burdened the already stagnant oil-energy based economy. Unemployment reached 20 percent in 1977, with 71 percent of the 3 million residents qualifying for food stamps (over 60 percent using them).

While Operation Bootstrap was still in its miracle - performing phase, the US Congress in 1950 enacted Public Law 600, giving the island power to draft its own Organic Act under the "commonwealth" arrangement. A referendum was held in Puerto Rico in which a majority endorsed the plan. The Nationalists boycotted the referendum and began a violent attack. Albizu Campos made a speech in Fajardo proclaiming the "Republic of Puerto Rico" and, on his way back to San Juan, his party was followed by police cars. Suspecting that the Nationalists were armed, the police alerted the metropolitan police to stop the party. The police found in the car three loaded pistols and five explosives. The party were charged and imprisoned. Later in the day, over one hundred prisoners in the penitentiary rioted and escaped. It was said that the Nationalists had planned this riot to divert attention, while they took possession of public buildings throughout the island. They succeeded in Jayuya and held the city for three days, after they had killed or captured the local police force. In San Juan they made an attempt on Munoz Marin's life, but in a shoot-out in which five died, police thwarted them. The insular National Guard was mobilized and the authorities ordered arrests of all known Nationalists. While these arrests were under way in Puerto Rico, two Puerto Rican Nationalists from New York, Griselio Torresola and Oscar Collazo, assaulted Blair House in Washington and made an attempt on President Truman's life. Torresola and one policeman were killed: Collazo and two police were wounded. At his trial, Collazo refused his lawyer's insanity plea, saying that his act had been "for the cause of the liberty of my country" and to "reaffirm to the end that we have the right to be free". Militant nationalism in Puerto Rico, as elsewhere, stands or falls upon the extent of its emotional appeal.

According to Collazo, the attempt on Truman's life was inspired by the President's comment that the uprising in Puerto Rico was an internal affair, for which the United States bore no responsibility. It was to make this statement appear to be a lie, and to awaken American consciousness of the colonial nature of the problem, that the attack was planned. Interviewed in his Kansas jail in 1972 by Juan Mari Brás, leader of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, Collazo expounded the future of socialism in Puerto Rico and in the world; he lamented the slowness of the revolutionary struggle and the lack of radical social awareness among the Puerto Rican middle class. He recommended that the radicalized working class join idealistic youth in the anti-imperialistic struggle.

Collazo's example of foolhardy revolutionary action was emulated in 1954 by four more Nationalists - Lolita Lebrón, Irving Flores Rodriguez, Rafael Cancel Miranda and Andrés Figueroa Cordero - who opened fire in the United States House of Representatives, wounding five congressmen. Apologists for such outrages explain that the "political prisoners" who committed the acts made an outstanding contribution to what they call the "spiritual density" that the resistance needs, which arises from military activity. The claim is also advanced that it is this special quality which has caused Puerto Rico not to follow Hawaii and Alaska into statehood, but rather to adopt, in 1952, the compromise position of *Estudo Libre Asociado*, a status which recognizes Puerto Rico as an entity *apart* from the United States. The essence of this interpretation is that the characteristics of compromise and of limited duration that attach to the *Estado Libre Asociado* point not in the direction of eventual statehood, but towards independence. The Congressional attack marked the end of National Party terrorism, but pointed towards a later mainland campaign.

At the core of the Estado Libre Asociado or commonwealth pattern of relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States are "a common defense, a common market, a common currency, and the indissoluble link of the United States citizenship". Critics of the arrangement, such as Ruben Berrios Martinez, President of the constitutional Puerto Rican Independence Party, allege that "the establishment of commonwealth was used to create the myth - both for internal and external consumption - that Puerto Ricans exercised the right to self-determination..." He has also pointed out that the old relationship really remained unaltered and that Puerto Rico obtained absolutely no additional economic or political power, except the right to design the structure of its internal government. Under the system Puerto Ricans, although they are American nationals, may not vote in mainland elections; they are eligible for federal assistance programmes (some times at a lower rate of reimbursement than in the States). No doubt remembering an earlier rallying cry - "No taxation without representation" - the US Government wisely made the islanders exempt from federal taxes. Puerto Ricans are, however, eligible for the draft. In a later plebiscite, in 1967, 60 percent of voters confirmed preference for commonwealth over the other two options - statehood and independence. In 1975 a US committee recommended a new compact of permanent union between Puerto Rico and the US. President Ford studied the proposals but believed that full statehood was more appropriate. Although he formalized his views in a statement at the close of his term, no follow-up action occurred. Seen in its best light, the commonwealth concept combines and mediates the two main strands in Puerto Rican politics - statehood with its greater participation in federal power, and independence with its autonomy over local affairs. Yet, just because it is a compromise, it is never likely to satisfy the advocates of either alternative.

During the 1930s the Communist Party of the USA organized a Puerto Rican branch. This was the Partido Comunista Puertoriqueno (PCP), a Moscow-aligned Marxist-Leninist party. Local tradition held that its membership was so small that general meetings could be held in a Volkswagen Beetle. However, after World War II, the PCP set about infiltrating the independence movement, the university, and the labour unions. The Vietnamese war was used to mobilize anti-American sentiment, with Marxists in the van. Between 1967 and 1976 a regular series of riots and confrontations was staged at the university. Weak university presidents encouraged these events by a mixture of concessions and inadequate security responses. These were both the forerunners and the pace-setters of student violence across North America. One girl student was accidentally killed, but three ROTC cadets or police men were deliberately murdered by students armed with small arms.

University activists created the Pro-Independence Movement (MPI), as a front for subversive action. Its leader visited Hanoi, the Movement opened the equivalent of an embassy in Havana, and no one made any attempt to conceal these foreign connections. According to specialist analysts, the MPI was immediately taken under control of the Cuban secret service, the Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI). The same is said of the successor group, the PSP, whose leader, Juan Mari Bras, proclaimed the independentists' right to resort to violence. The PSP is committed to Puerto Rican independence, and has also infiltrated the constitutional Puerto Rican Independence Party. The violence that Mari Bras encouraged has been a permanent feature of Puerto Rican life since 1968. The Puerto Rican Armed Commandos for Liberation (CAL) - a group that was active in the early years - claimed that they could make manufacturing and commerce on the island so expensive for American owners that they would leave. Consequently they bombed and burned business premises, warehouses, hotels and public buildings.

By 1964, Sanchez Vilella had replaced Munoz Marin as governor and head of the *Populares*. His programme involved greater government intervention and a more socialist slant, but the party divided between socialists and independentists. At the 1968 elections, this split proved fatal to the *Populares*' fortunes: the new governor was Luis Ferre. His *NuevoProgresista*, New Progressive Party, obtained 43.6 percent (400,815) of the votes.

The *NuevoProgresistas* were founded by a group of leaders, headed by industrialist Luis Ferre, who left the old Republican (pro-statehood) Party when that organization refused to participate in the 1967 plebiscite. Ferre adopted a populist programme more right of centre than the *Populares*. He also used Munoz Marin's old strategy of declaring that political status - which by this time meant statehood - was not to be an issue in general elections. But with the election safely behind him, Ferré repeatedly asked for support for statehood among his friends and colleagues in the US Republican Party. This earned him criticism and cost him supporters in Puerto Rico. Meanwhile, the *Populares* settled their internal dispute and united. Consequently Ferre was beaten in the 1972 elections and the *Populares* returned to power under Rafael Hernández Colón. Their narrow majority did not survive long. In 1976 the *NuevoProgresistas* were back in office, with Carlos Romero Barceló as governor.

Meanwhile the constitutional Puerto Rican Independence Party, which had experienced sustained defeats throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, gradually gathered strength. It received 25,000 votes in 1968, 52,000 in 1972 and 73,000 in 1976. Its platform advocates independence and democratic socialism. Other independentists included the PSP, which took nearly 11,000 votes in 1976. US Senate testimony confirmed that the PSP is directly controlled by the Cuban secret service, the DGI, which in turn is under KGB direction. Direct links are also alleged between PSP and the Fuerzas Armades de Liberación Nacional (the Armed Forces of National Liberation, or FALN), but no evidence is available from open sources to confirm these allegations. The PSP has endorsed virtually every act committed by FALN.

The PSP has representatives on the executive committees of the Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the Latin American Students' Organization, both of which are based in Havana. Since World War II the United Nations has provided a forum for various manifestations of the anti-colonial struggle. The UN Charter of 1945, Chapter 11, recognized the interests of colonial people, and in 1952 the anticolonialist lobby within that organization was able to sponsor a declaration that a people's self-determination was one of the basic human rights to be enjoyed by all peoples and nations. One year later, the US government sought to remove Puerto Rico from the UN's purview as a colonial territory, on the grounds of the commonwealth status newly granted. The Puerto Rican Independence Party and the Nationalist Party held, however, that the island should still be considered a colonial territory by the UN, and won support from the Soviet Union, India and Mexico. The US view prevailed, but the issue is nevertheless periodically raised. Early in 1972 Cuba sought a UN discussion, calling for worldwide solidarity with the Puerto Rican "struggle for independence". US representative George Bush called this an act of interference and deplored that the UN should be forced to waste its time on propaganda postures. Nevertheless, the Puerto Rican Socialist Party was granted a hearing in 1972. Their delegates told stories of police persecution, CIA covert actions against the party, and all manner of oppression. Cuba's representative argued that leftist sabotage represented "a legitimate form of struggle for national independence" - as clear an incitement to terrorism as one is likely to hear - and denounced "yanqui usurpers", American aggression and the like. The UN Special Committee adopted a draft resolution on "the inalienable rights of the people of Puerto Rico to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution..."

Inevitably, this was hailed as a victory by the independentist left, while other Puerto Ricans expressed unease at what they saw as outside manipulation of their affairs. A substantial part of the population, including the working class, was in favour of closer association with the US - a large sector, in fact, favoured statehood. How could a small minority of Puerto Ricans, the terrorist-minded independentists, be allowed to mislead international opinion?

Year by year the United States succeeded in deflecting the issue away from the UN General Assembly. In 1977, however, the *Populares* joined the Puerto Rican Independence Party and the *NuevoProgresista* in telling the UN Committee on Decolonization that Puerto Rico was indeed a colony. The *Populares* took this step after bargaining for an amendment with the Cuban delegate; the *NuevoProgresistas*, because this would strengthen the appeal of statehood.

Sakari Sariola attributes the statements to the discovery of oil off the island's north coast and UN resolutions favouring the claims of colonalized people to such resources. The oil is under deep water, and the feasibility of extraction is currently uncertain. Besides oil, extensive nickel and copper deposits have been discovered in Puerto Rico, calculated at a value of at least $10 billion in 1977. Oil and minerals could transform the island from poor relation to confortable or even rich neighbour. Such an economic improvement could create opportunities for political change, which all parties will doubtless try to use to their own advantage.

Meanwhile, terrorism continued in the United States and on the island. Some of the principal events from 1977 onward are listed in the next section. FALN's main area of operations has always been the continental US. Cells on the mainland appear to have been composed almost exclusively of Puerto Ricans resident there. New York and Chicago, which are important centres of emigre Puerto Ricans, evidently provide the urban sanctuaries for FALN terrorism. Although FALN has a presence on the island, and has claimed responsibility for violent acts there, its principal target has always been the mainland. In 1978 a new group emerged in Puerto-Rico - the Macheteros. Their precise political affiliation is uncertain, as is their strategy. Certainly they are leftist, and probably Castro-inspired. The fact that they used an AK-47 Soviet automatic rifle in one of their attacks points to Cuban support.

The group's full title is Boricua Popular Army, and an English translation of Macheteros sometimes results in their being described as the Machete Wielders Terror Group.

In contrast with FALN's indescriminate bombings, the Macheteros direct their attacks at police and military targets and at symbols of US military occupation. In October 1979 the group was one of several that took responsibility for six bomb explosions in Federal installations on the island and in Chicago, so they appear to have a mainland wing.

After their 1976 election success, the Nuevo-Progresistas faced a situation close to economic bankruptcy. According to one report, the jobless rate in some towns rose above 50 percent. In contrast to the previous two decades, when poor conditions provoked emigration, Puerto Ricans seemed now to prefer not to leave: between 1970 and 1974 21,000 more Puerto Ricans returned than left. The oil crisis had a particularly severe impact on the island, as it did throughout the poorer nations. The quadrupling of prices put the island at an energy cost disadvantage compared to the mainland and forced more companies to quit. One result was posponement of the start-up of a $1.6 billion petrochemical plant, intended to provide a springboard to economic advance. Governor Carlos Romero Barcelo manipulated these conditions towards ever greater public support for the notion of statehood, which he continued to separate from election politics while subtly promoting it, by pointing to the safety-net of federal transfer payments, subsidized electricity for the poor, and of course food stamps. Anticipating victory in the 1980 elections, Romero announced a 1981 plebiscite in Puerto Rico to determine whether or not the islanders wanted statehood.

In late 1977 former governors Luis Munoz Marin, Roberto Sánchez Vilella, Luis Ferré and Rafael Hernández Colón sent an appeal to President Carter urging the release of the five Puerto Rican nationalists in US prisons, mentioning particularly Andres Figueroa Cordero, who was dying of cancer. Figueroa was the first to be freed and on his return he proclaimed: "If a people asks for a right, that right has to be claimed with a bullet if the request falls on deaf ears". Governor Romero tried to harness the nationalist sentiments thus released for his own purposes. By blaming the commonwealth status for the hated "colonialism", he sought to direct change towards statehood rather than towards independence. He said:

> "We are disenfranchised American citizens. Our situation is an affront to the principles of American democracy and is a source of embarrassment in the United States as the United States is perennially accused of colonialism. Only through statehood can a sense of political dignity be restored to the Puerto Rican people. Only by statehood will the United States prove that the principles of democracy are still vibrant."

In September 1979 President Carter freed the other four prisoners as a "humanitarian gesture". His pacific act was hardly reciprocated. Lolita Lebron declared: "I hate bombs, but we might have to use them". At a series of rallies held for them in Chicago, New York and San Juan, all four reaffirmed their revolutionary ardour and willingness to use violence. In the United States, FALN claimed that the release of these activists was brought about by fear of reprisals threatened by that group.

During the run-up to the November 1980 elections the main opposition party, the Populares, attacked the government over the fatal shooting of the two alleged terrorists on July 25, 1978, which they claimed had been a "sting". This use of an emotive issue for party political advantage was effective in discrediting the NuevoProgresistas, but the price was to transfer legitimacy from government to violent groups. When the votes were cast, the result was so close that there was uncertainty for some days as to the outcome. Carlos Romero Barcelo just scraped home by some 3,500 votes, and the NuevoProgresistas remain in office. However, the narrowness of the victory has caused the Governor to postpone indefinitely his plan for a 1981 plebiscite on statehood. Evidently many Puerto Ricans who favour independence voted this time for the Populares in order to oppose statehood. The low ratings of the independence parties in 1980 may therefore be artificial.

Chronology of Major Recent Events

1977

18 February:	Two large bombs exploded at Gulf and Western and Chrysler buildings in New York, responsibility claimed by FALN.
12 March:	Bombing of factory in Marlboro, Massachusetts, claimed by Sam Melville-Jonathan Jackson Unit of New World Liberation Front (NWLF) - an American radical group - demanding release of five Puerto Rican nationalists convicted of terrorism in the 1950s.
22 March:	FALN acknowledged bombing two New York buildings, one housing FBI, demanding release of the five, and an end to investigations into its activities.

9 April:	FALN claimed responsibility for eight fire-bombs in three New York department stores.
4 June:	Two killed in rioting at Puerto Rican independence celebration in Chicago. FALN claimed bombing at Chicago city hall.
3 August:	One person killed, five injured by bomb in American Express office in New York. Another bomb in Head office of Mobil Oil. FALN claimed credit.
25 October:	Thirty militant supporters of FALN took over Statue of Liberty for nearly nine hours.

The FBI reported 683 bombing incidents in the United States and Puerto Rico during the first half of the year, with 6 persons killed and 67 injured, property damage amounting to $4.9 million. An unknown proportion of these attacks were perpetrated by Puerto Rican terrorists.

1978

26 February:	Four members of FALN arrested in New York on illegal weapons charges.
12 July:	The 110th bomb credited to the FALN went off, in Queen's, New York, apparently in the maker's hands, leaving him seriously injured. He was William Morales, who was arrested.
25 July:	Police killed two alleged terrorists trying to sabotage communications towers near Vallalba, Puerto Rico. Two days later 8 men were arrested on charges of shooting at governor's home. Next day previously

unknown group sent taped message threatening vengeance.

24 August: A policeman, Julio Rodriguez Rivera, shot dead on the beach at Naguabo, Puerto Rico, by terrorists of a new group, the Macheteros. In their communique the terrorists said their aim had been to "take arms, uniforms and a police vehicle".

Throughout 1978 there were 1,524 criminal bombings in the United States, causing 78 deaths and 444 injuries, the FBI reported. Clearly, Puerto Rican responsibility exceeded the instances listed above.

1979

30 January: Bomb damaged coastguard building, Ponce, Puerto Rico.

8 March: Death by cancer of Andrés Figueroa Cordero.

10 March: Revolutionary Commandos of the People exploded three bombs at US recruiting centres in Caguas, Puerto Rico.

11 April: William Morales sentenced to 29-89 years in New York. He escaped in May. In March 1981 he is still at large.

28 April: Omega-7, anti-Castro Cuban group, murdered Cuban exile Carlos Muniz Varela, in Puerto Rico.

19 May: In Puerto Rico, activist Bishop Antulio Parilla-Bonilla and 20 others arrested attempting to disrupt US naval exercises.

There were 573 bomb attacks in the US, January-June, involving 7 deaths and 82 injuries, FBI report. Puerto Rican involvement unknown.

6 September: Clemency granted to four long-term Puerto Rican prisoners in US jails.

17 September: Three bomb attacks at US National Guard armoury near San Juan.

11 November: Socialist independentista, Angel Rodriguez Cristobal, one of those arrested 19 May, committed suicide in Tallahassee jail. Supporters claimed he was murdered.

3 December: At Toa Baja, Puerto Rico, 18 US service personnel riding a bus to a military compound were ambushed. Two were killed and 10 wounded. Although three groups claimed credit for the attack, the Macheteros seem the most likely. An AK-47 Soviet automatic was used in the attack.

9 December: Shots fired at US vehicle at Roosevelt Road base, Puerto Rico.

1980

12 March: San Juan. Gunmen of the Macheteros fired on US army car carrying three military instructors. None seriously injured.

15 March: Chicago and New York. FALN units of 7-8 raided the Carter-Mondale headquarters in Chicago and George Bush's campaign headquarters in New York. The offices were ransacked and slogans painted. No injuries.

4 April: Evanston, Illinois. Eleven leading members of FALN arrested by FBI. Speculation that the 11 were planning to kidnap a wealthy businessman, Henry Crown, unconfirmed by FBI, but thought likely.

10 April: Jersey City, New Jersey. FBI raid on FALN hideout uncovered dossiers on 100 business executives compiled by the group, possibly for the selection of kidnap victims. Diagrams also found showing possible bomb positions in Madison Square Gardens, site for 1980 National Democratic Convention. On same day another hideout was raided, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and more evidence uncovered.

11 April: Jan Juan, Puerto Rico. An explosion at a major electrical plant blacked out all of Puerto Rico. Grupo Estrella, a little-known organization which associated itself with an electrical workers' strike in 1978 claimed responsibility.

Analysts in April estimated that FALN had detonated more than 100 bombs in five US cities, and killed a total of five people - four of them in a 1975 bombing of New York's landmark Fraunces Tavern. FALN strength is hard to assess - one estimate puts the number of its har core terrorists since 1974 at 24 - and the FBI admits that the group is hard to penetrate and is well protected by Puerto Rican communiti

21 April: Ten of those arrested on 4 April arraigned in Chicago on weapons and robbery charges. All shredded their indictments before the Judge and demanded the rights of "freedom fighters". The eleventh member, Marie Haydee Beltran Torres, 25, was taken to New York to face charges arising out of the 1977 Mobil Oil bombing.

Later sentenced to life imprisonment.

10 August: Leaders of three opposition parties in Puerto Rico called on Senate Judiciary Committee to investigate deaths of two alleged terrorists in July 1978, near communications towers.

24 November: Police in San Juan said that terrorists might have been involved in $2.4 million armed robbery, believed to have been the island's largest.

10 December: A Federal Grand Jury in Chicago indicted 10 suspects (arrested 4 April) on charges of using terror and violence in 28 bombings. All were later convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The rarely invoked charge of seditious conspiracy was included. FBI said that the group represented only about one-third of FALN suspects in US. He estimated size of group at 25 to 35. Morales is wanted on same charges.

1981

9 January: Revolutionary Commandos of the People claimed responsibility for letter bombs that exploded the previous day at three post offices. The group denounced registration for the draft and urged young Puerto Ricans not to sign up to fight "the battles of imperialism".

12 January: *Macheteros* terrorists raided Muniz Air National Guard base near to the International Airport at Isla Verde, destroying nine military

jet fighters. Damage estimated at $45 million.

February: Two Chicago members of FALN arrested for armed robbery. They are trying to conceal their terrorist connections and have been released on bail.

Organizations Involved in Conflict

Political Groupings:

NuevoProgresistas,New Progressive Party (NPP)

The governing party, led by the Governor, Carlos Romero Barcelo, which advocates statehood as the eventual formula but meanwhile governs through a populist programme. In power 1968-1972 and 1976-1980. Votes in November 1980 759,000.

Populares, Popular Democratic Party (PDP)

Main opposition party, led by Rafael Hernandez Colon, in power 1940-1968 and 1972-1976. Committed to improving but retaining the Commonwealth arrangement. Votes in November 1980 756,000.

Partido Independentista Puertorriqueno, Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP)

The main constitutional independence party, social democratic in nature, but with an Allende-type style that opens it to PSP infiltration. The leader is Rubén Berríos Martínez. Votes in November 1980 88,000.

Partido Socialista Puertorriqueno, Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP)

The revolutionary party of Cuban-backed Marxist-

Leninism, the PSP seeks independence and a Moscow-aligned communism. Juan Mari Bras, the party leader, has encouraged separatist violence and praised terrorist actions. The PSP maintains a New York office. Votes in November 1980 5,800.

Summary, 1980 Votes

NPP	759,000
PDP	756,000
PIP	88,000
PSP	5,800

Both the major political parties in the US have endorsed the concept of statehood for Puerto Rico, should the population opt for it, although with what degree of commitment we do not know.

Security Forces:

The insular forces are backed by the agencies of the United States, such as the FBI and, if necessary, the US Armed Forces. On the island there is a police department numbering 9,539 and a National Guard which, under the constitution, can be called out by the governor to assist the civil power. There is also an Air Guard unit, situated at the Muniz Base adjacent to the Isla Verde International Airport. The US military presence on the island is centered at the large Roosevelt Roads Naval Base, 50 km east of San Juan, the largest such base outside the Continental United States. There is a Navy compound at Toa Baja, a San Juan suburb, and other scattered detachments. There are also instructors with the R.O.T.C.s in the universities and with the National and Air Guards. These forces have no role in internal security, other than to guard their own facilities.

Opposition Forces:

Puerto Rican revolutionary forces are today a composite group of nationalists and Marxist-Leninists, all subscribing to both philosophies but with differing emphasis. Popular support for independence is so weak that the movement would have no power without communist ideology, and the revolutionary left would find it difficult to gather a following without the handle of national independence. Both strands need a foreign enemy against whom the masses might be rallied, and America provides this target. As colonizing power or as capitalist oppressor, the United States fits conveniently into the textbook of either viewpoint.

The legal organizations advocating revolution are the PSP, described earlier, which grew out of the MPI, which was most active in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when a broad front policy was being developed. On the US mainland, a group called the Movement of National Liberation (MNL) campaigns on behalf of "political prisoners", that is to say imprisoned Puerto Rican terrorists, and provides a legal front for FALN.

Illegal, underground organizations proliferate at such a pace that it is difficult to keep track. Some groups seem to claim responsibility for one action and then disappear, rather in the manner of film production companies that are incorporated to make just one movie. The main groups are:

Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional, Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN)

The mainland terrorist organization formed in 1974 to attack targets in the continential USA, FALN was based on the earlier Movemento de Independencia Revolutionario en Armas. Composed of emigre Puerto Ricans in the States, principally in New York, Chicago, Newark and Washington DC, FALN also has supporters and possibly cells in many other areas, including California. FALN has a presence in Puerto Rico, but this has not been its real operational area. The members claim to be soldiers engaged in a war of liberation and uses the rhetoric of the revolutionary left. The PSP endorses its activities. Most operations have been bombings, but this may be changing. There have also been bank robberies, and possibly drug dealing, to raise funds. FALN has claimed responsibility for more than 100 bombings since 1974, involving 5 deaths and over 70 injuries. Strength unknown to the FBI or city police departments, but probably in the region of 30-40 hard core terrorists. Recent arrests have dented operational capability and the FALN is doubtless regrouping.

Puerto Rican Popular Army, or Macheteros, or Machete-Wielders

Surfaced in 1978 as an insular group specializing in attacks on security forces and US servicemen. More recently, the group has taken to spectacular "propaganda of the deed" operations. Actions show a fair degree of sophistication and dash. Prefers shootings and ambushes to bombings, except in attacks on military targets. Has used AK-47 of Soviet bloc origin. Seems likely to be a significant organization of future internal conflict. No member of the Macheteros has yet been arrested and convicted. Strength unknown, but small.

Forces of Popular Resistance (FARP)

A lesser group which poses as "guerrillas" rather than terrorists, and which has specialized in bank robberies on the island.

Revolutionary Commandos of the People (CRP)

CRP have claimed responsibility for a considerable number of bomb attacks on the island.

Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution (OVRP)

Another insular group concentrating on bomb attacks.

Grupo Estrella

A small and little-known group, connected with extremists behind the electrical workers' strikes.

According to Associated Press in February 1981, unidentified FBI officials have estimated that all groups listed contain no more than 100 members "but they are becoming increasingly sophisticated and operate in concert more often. They're damned near impossible to penetrate: their recruitment is very slow and selective, and they guard carefully against infiltrators".

Although removed from the main inquiry of this study, it should be noted that anti-Castro Cuban groups, such as Omega 7, occasionally operate inside Puerto Rico.

Neither they nor any other movements have formed vigilante or "right-wing" terrorist groups against the revolutionary left.

Allegations that the PSP and FALN are actively supported by the DGI inevitably brings that intelligence organization within the purview of this study, as a possible sponsor of opposition forces. The depth of DGI penetration of US and Puerto Rican institutions and its involvement in clandestine operations is unknown, but the new US administration will doubtless challenge this threat and seek to expose its operations, so more information may soon be available. Since it is a stated part of Cuban revolutionary philosophy to provide support for "wars of national liberation", and since Havana views the Puerto Rican independence movement in that light, assistance by way of intelligence, training, weapons, "cover" and diplomatic and propaganda activities is to be expected.

Factors Affecting the Conflict

Sources of Conflict

Although the original source was a desire for independence, and although this remains the stated goal, the increasing involvement of the revolutionary left is now perhaps the principal dynamo behind political violence in Puerto Rico. If ideology is the main driving force of the terrorist groups, this may be a significant factor shaping its future.

Methods of Conflict

According to the best available evidence, MPI/PSP strategy is based on what they call "The

Theory of the Crisis". This advances from two assumptions:

1. The United States values Puerto Rico only for the profits it can make out of the island;
2. Puerto Ricans are docile and will neither vote nor fight for their independence.

These being the accepted conditions, their strategy is one of achieving the "asset-to-liability shift" in the minds of the American public and government, which gradually changes US perceptions of Puerto Rico from being, initially, an asset worth defending to being, eventually, a liability to be rid of as painlessly and quickly as possible. The Puerto Rican population is side-stepped, and will act principally as onlookers. The strategy is divided into four fronts:

1. The First Front - Political (1964-1971)
   Bombing of US businesses and assets on the island, incendiary attacks by night, spreading at a later stage to government installations. One communications centre received 45 bombs in one attack. With the MPI acting as the front, much of this attack was launched by the now defunct CAL, consisting of a mere 20 terrorists. The first front was political because its aim was to gain publicity, to awaken US opinion to the burden imposed by responsibility for Puerto Rican affairs, due to the "rising revolution struggle". The reduction of investment by economic loss was a secondary purpose, but an important one.

2. The Second Front - Economic (1971-1976)

Early in this phase the MPI became the PSP, which now directs the campaign. The PSP declared 1971 the "Year of the Workers' Organization" and formed the United Labor Movement (ULM) as a front for this action. In a tactic described as "Labour terrorism", the ULM combined strike action with terrorism against reluctant workers and against companies which resisted strike demands. Many stores were destroyed. In July 1973 a big offensive was launched against the Electric Power Authority and the Fire Department. Firemen refused duties and the National Guard was mobilized to control the outbreaks and protect property. Transmission grids and transformer units were attacked, straining electricity supplies. The National Guard was called on again in 1974 when the next offensive fell on the water utility. One of the most concentrated bomb attacks coincided with strike action. Suspecting PSP involvement, the police raided some leaders' homes, but nothing incriminating was found. By the end of 1975, the PSP through the ULM had virtually taken control of the Puerto Rican labour movement. But in March 1976 three prominent PSP members were arrested while unloading a large quantity of explosives. The Second Front began to unwind, and by the end of the decade responsible leadership had regained control of Puerto Rican labour. The aim of the Second Front was the wrecking of the island's economy and rendering it a liability to US investors.

3. The Third Front - Mainland Terror (1974-)

During the early 1970s the PSP called for propaganda and practical cooperation from the emigré Puerto Rican population in the United States. Leaders went to New York, where they opened an office, led marches, meetings and protests. Their targets were the young second generation emigrés, many of whom were fertile ground for heroic seeds, being socially dislocated, unable to speak English well or, in many instances, Spanish at all, and of whom few had ever seen Puerto Rico. They were instructed in "history", the sacrifices of the martyrs and the "political prisoners", police brutality, and their future role as liberators. From this audience were created the FALN cadres and the necessary support apparatus. Another target was the American revolutionary left. At a Madison Square rally, Angela Davis , Jane Fonda, Irwin Silver and leaders of the American Indian Movement pledged support. Now began the "war of the entrails" as FALN became the "spearhead of the anti-imperialist struggle" against the US. The attack was opened by five bombs exploding in the financial district of New York City on the night of October 24, 1974. The mainland has experienced 100 more such attacks since that date. Many terrorist acts have been committed in Chicago, Newark, Washington, DC and elsewhere. The characteristic elements of FALN's actions are as follows:

1. *Ruthlessness*. No warning of a bomb has ever been given. Booby traps are used. Busy taverns have been targets.
2. *Security*. As described earlier, the groups have defied all attempts at police infiltration.
3. *Productivity*. If the total strength of cells is as low as estimated by the FBI (30-40), the number of attacks testifies to industriousness.
4. *Justifications*. Attacks are followed within 10 minutes by a telephoned claim of responsibility, made to a newspaper, and instructions on the whereabouts of a communique. The latter is always taped beneath the handset in a public call box. Under FALN's logo, the justification of the attack is given. This is often to force the release of "political prisoners" (or "prisoners of war"), or to revenge some recent act by authority, such as an arrest or conviction of FALN members. Ideological or independendist demands are included from time to time, such as the removal of US Naval installations from Puerto Rico, an end to exploitation of Puerto Rican labour, the conservation of the island's resources.
5. *Retaliatory*. As the rhetoric suggests, many FALN attacks follow some government action, such as President Ford's support for statehood, the suicide in prison of an activist, or whatever. This is a paradoxical pattern in

an offensive campaign, since most terrorist groups are able to justify their actions within their philosophy without waiting for some new event to trigger them.

6. Dedication. All members are dedicated intellectuals. Man and wife teams are not uncommon. After William Morales had lost most of both hands and one eye in his bomb accident, he sued the authorities for negligence in failing to recover more of the lost pieces. After this action failed, and he had been sentenced to 89 years, he escaped. Police have little doubt that he is still an active terrorist.

    Statistics from New York City show that 75 percent of FALN attacks have been against banks, corporate offices and government buildings. Half the total have occurred on Mondays and Saturdays, and October is a busy month.

After the chance arrests of eleven FALN members in April 1980, police specialists have concluded that the group was just about to attempt the kidnap of multi-millionaire, Henry Crown. This would have been a new tactic for FALN, but in the months previous they had made symbolic raids against Republican and Democrat party offices, which also broke their earlier pattern. The fact that several of the 11 were unknown to the police confirms the lack of accurate intelligence on membership. In raids following the arrests the police discovered well researched plans for bomb attacks on the 1980

Democratic convention as well as corporate structures, suggesting a hit list. The latter, police believe, has been given undue attention, but it seems clear that FALN were on the verge of some impressive and original actions. At their trials (ten in Chicago; one in New York) all accused shredded their indictments and refused to recognize the court. There were large street demonstrations in their favour, supported by the emigre population of Chicago. Police anticipate that these prisoners will now become the focus of fresh attacks aimed at achieving their release. Communiques following two December 1980 bomb attacks called for this.

The third front is intended to bring home to Americans the domestic costs of a continued Puerto Rican connection.

4. The Fourth Front - International

This front brings the United Nations, the Cubans, the Third World, the Soviet Bloc and international opinion into the island's fortunes. Following the Algerian example, the MPI/PSP persistently pursued the independence issue at the United Nations and, with Cuban assistance, achieved some success. It was the unexpected endorsement in that forum by the leaders of the two main political parties, the NPP and PDP, of the concept of Puerto Rico being a colony that leaves powerful ammunition in the hands of critics. For all that this may have been said for narrow reasons of resource ownership, "the moving finger writes, and having writ, moves on..." and all the tears of these politicians will not wash out one word of testimony which effectively condemns the Commonwealth constitution as colonial. This is the theme which the independence movement and their overseas allies may exploit to America's embarrassment. It is a theme which could find support in liberal America too. The same argument justified Zionist, Algerian, Vietnamese, and a dozen other campaigns which relied to a greater or lesser extent on terrorism. It is one which tends to excuse such acts and to earn the mantle of a war of national liberation. The international front is intended to gain world support and to force Americans, through guilt, to adjust their perceptions of their relationship with Puerto Rico.

By the four fronts - political, economic, mainland terror and international - PSP and their supporters evidently hope to persuade Americans that it is in the United States' best interests to grant independence.

Strengths of the Opposition

The principal strength of the PSP position (and by that is meant the whole revolutionary independence/leftist movement) lies in Puerto Rico's unstable political status. Whatever the practical merits of the commonwealth arrangement, and they are many, the fact remains that in the eyes of the international community as well, probably, as in those of the US domestic media and liberal opinion, the arrangement is dated. It belongs to a by-gone era which tolerated paternalism. Insofar as it is colonial, and this is how Puerto Rican political leaders have described it, it offends basic American prejudices. Lenin might say that the first of his objective conditions exists. Nor is it an arrangement that can easily be rejuvenated, made appropriate to the 1980s. It may of course be continued simply because available alternatives are judged to be unacceptable, in the dire "least bad option" manner of Northern Irish experience. Clearly, since there is no prospect of the island voting for independence, and because a move to statehood could create a stable and lasting relationship within the United States constitution, it is in the PSP's best interests that commonwealth status should continue as the backdrop to their campaign. Voting patterns in 1980 tend to confirm this, and the near defeat of the NPP must be seen as a PSP success.

The second important strength of the Four Fronts is the international dimension. Moral, political and, to a lesser extent, material support by Havana are vital components in so minority-based a movement. They amplify and interpret the struggle, give it the appearance of strength and, for as long as the revolutionary surge in the Caribbean and Latin America continues, show the inevitability of socialist victory. This asset could become stronger still if the PSP succeeds in mobilizing liberal America to its cause. In August 1980, the case of the two men killed by police in the July 25, 1978, communication tower attack was referred to Senator Edward Kennedy's Senate Judiciary Committee. Through the New Left and the Cuban connection, skilful propaganda could conceivably convince liberal Americans that the terrorist campaign has right on its side. It would not be novel for this constituency simultaneously to condemn violence and condone its perpetrators.

A third strength is the ambivalent attitude of some Puerto Ricans towards violence committed in the name of independence. For all that the PSP and other independence parties attract few votes, the hero's reception given to returned "political prisoners", the sanctuary provided for terrorists on the island and in US emigré circles, and the leftist hold over intellectuals, professors, students and the radical chic combine to suggest that a small but sufficient percentage of Puerto Ricans are willing to help terrorists. This does not amount to revolutionary mobilization: it merely provides an ambience favouring sub-revolutionary actions, rather in the manner of present-day Italy.

The vulnerable state of the Puerto Rican economy and many people's dependence upon assistance could have been exploited for revolutionary ends, but at this stage attempts have not succeeded.

Within the terrorist groups themselves, strengths may be listed as dedication, security and productivity. Operational sophistication and cunning are difficult to assess, but may be improving.

There is one final word to be added to this assortment of strengths, but it may apply more to the pure concept of independence than to the violent revolutionary wing of that movement. If off-shore oil and insular mineral deposits turn out to be as valuable a resource as some predict, the wealth from their exploitation could be a powerful force for change - and hence for instability.

Weaknesses of the Opposition

The inability of the present system of government to long continue unchanged must be seen as the sole truly revolutionary asset in Puerto Rico today. There is no radicalized working class, no massive sense of oppression or revolutionary opportunity, no leader or party able to rally the masses in a violent cause. Since there can be no real rebellion, the opposition has wisely adopted a strategy of leverage which, they evidently believe, needs only the semblance of a revolutionary situation on the island plus the reality of high costs in the United States to succeed. But for all that the strategy is wise in the circumstances, it is also flawed by a serious weakness. The leverage campaigns which succeeded against the British in Palestine, Cyprus and Aden, and against the French in Algeria, were all backed up by fully mobilized communities - the Jewish Zionists, the Greek Cypriots, Arab Nationalists or Marxists, and Algerian Muslims. Although in no case could the insurgents successfully challenge the British or French military, they had at their disposal the massive political force of united peoples. It is difficult to imagine any of these rebellions succeeding had the fight been restricted to a handful of zealots amid indifferent masses. One of the principal reasons why these colonial assets were converted into liabilities was the impossibility of liberal democracies long governing against the militantly expressed wishes of the majority. This is not the problem in Puerto Rico.

Another weakness is the alien strain of Cuban-backed Marxist-Leninism which is open to exposure as foreign interference in Puerto Rican affairs, a form of imperialism as sinister as any imposed by Spain or America. For all that this assistance is important in other ways, its strident nature may limit the extent to which grass roots Puerto Rican nationalism can be harnessed to the revolutionary wheel.

To the present time at least, the PSP's campaign has not succeeded in turning Puerto Rico into an American liability. Of the four fronts, two have come and gone without even being recognized by American public opinion as more than general, inexplicable violence. The two that are continuing - terror and international activity - claim no more attention than a hundred other sources of violence and propaganda. The sheer size of the United States and the high level of apolitical violence simply blot out low-intensity campaigns unless the latter possess remarkable characteristics. It is extremely doubtful that more than a handful of specialists in the whole US government and its agencies is aware that a political campaign as such is being waged. The narrow base of really dedicated believers may have restricted recruitment into FALN and other groups and thereby kept the level of violence below the threshold of public anxiety in the US. It is a weakness of the opposition that it has not yet solved the problem of bringing Puerto Rico into every American's living room. So far as economic liability is concerned, the laws that will raise Puerto Rican minimum wages to the continental level are likely to do more to discourage investment than all the bombings. Yet these are evidently acceptable economically as well as necessary socially, and the gap between PSP theory and accomplishment is again shown to be wide.

A final weakness may lie in the ideologically narrow first assumption that supports the "theory of the crisis". It is open to many doubts that America values Puerto Rico solely on account of profits. Strategically, the island has value, and even if its positive usefulness is limited, the negative consequences of having it fall into Castro's camp would be serious. Moreover, in spite of and perhaps because of the Vietnam precedent, the American people might be reluctant to bow before terrorist pressure even if, in economic terms, the island had become a liability. Certainly, so long as a majority of Puerto Ricans wished to remain in some sort of association with the US, the moral pressures on Americans to retain the link would likely outweigh any pressures for breaking it.

Outside Influences

Because of its weak domestic roots, the PSP campaign's future course is likely to be determined as much by outside influences as by domestic. Currently, the new US Administration seems determined to stem the tide of Cuban-sponsored revolution in the Caribbean and Central America. If it succeeds, and is able to construct a carrot-and-stick diplomacy towards Cuba that persuades that country to halt its revolutionary exports, then the PSP might lose vital support. If on the other hand the Cubans resist all American efforts to restrain them, so that the confrontation turns into one of low-intensity conflict between the two powers, Havana might be tempted to step up its support for a campaign which has the special characteristic of reaching the enemy's "entrails".

Echeloned back from Havana, Moscow's future role in the Caribbean may also depend on how successful Washington is in reestablishing something approaching the Monroe Doctrine. If the present heated exchanges between the two great powers turn out to be merely the beating of breasts before leaders meet to redefine zones of interest, Moscow too may ease pressure against the Western Hemisphere. This would be a necessary part of any lasting deal with Castro, and could also undercut the PSP. If, however, the allegations of sponsoring terrorism sting the Soviets into showing their adversary what USSR-sponsored terrorism can really be like, then, beside the Cubans and their DGI apparatus, the PSP might find itself a small element in a much larger battle.

As for the United States, that country's policy towards Puerto Rico is bound to affect the campaign. Politically, anything short of genuine enthusiasm for statehood by the Administration and Congress may dampen the hopes of Puerto Ricans who seek that solution. If at any time a political lobby arose in Washington that favoured Puerto Rican independence, this might be used as the thin end of a wedge. Another factor is the future form of response to terrorism. Will the authorities recognize the nature of the threat and, if so, will they use the instrument of public information to discredit and isolate the terrorists and to expose the Cuban connection? Will they sensibly continue to treat terrorist actions as ordinary crime, thus depriving the movement of legitimacy? If violence escalates, will the media and the public over-react, thus beginning the process of alienation that the PSP seeks?

Trends

The phased nature of the four fronts campaign leaves little evidence from which to establish trends. Moreover, the recent convictions of 11 FALN terrorists may have disrupted the chain of events on the mainland. In the international arena some sort of a trend can be detected, which is a developing propaganda campaign for independence from colonial, or (more topically) neo-colonial, status, coupled with justification of terrorist acts. This campaign applies to a wide geographical area and has attracted considerable support amongst intellectuals, liberals, unions, churches as well as the more left-leaning groups in North America. Events in El Salvador, which of course has far more ammunition for such a campaign than Puerto Rico, are acting as a catalyst. The likelihood is that this lobby's attentions will in due time be transferred to Puerto Rico.

Also in the international sphere is the Cuban export of revolutionary technique, weapons and assistance. This has become a trend in the Caribbean. There are some signs that it already affects Puerto Rico, but if the trend continues, the level and sophistication of revolutionary violence may reflect this assistance.

On the island itself, the recent actions of the Macheteros indicate a trend towards exemplary terrorism directed against the US military presence. The attack on the Air Guard, which destroyed war material without taking lives, might become a trend, but it is too soon to be certain.

Outlook

In spite of its low intensity and apparent past failures, Puerto Rican independence terrorism is likely to persist. Even if the island becomes the 51st State, there is no guarantee that it will end. Indeed, this prospect may be a negative factor in US government minds if and when the issue is debated. Writing in the Wall Street Journal in February 1980, Mr. Reagan stated that he did not think that statehood could, or should, come about until "the great majority...feel the pull of statehood with passion". The November 1980 elections showed that this is not the present case.

Unless there is an upsurge in pro-statehood opinion, Puerto Ricans may be doomed to live with a system which is inherently unstable, and which their own political leaders have condemned. If this is the case, the prospects for independence, however remote, will remain, and the sponsors of violence will have a constituency.

In a worst case scenario it is possible to foresee a severe economic recession, a failure of the social aid programme, and the long-awaited mobilization of the urban masses. This is unlikely. A grim but more realistic scenario sees the PSP making slow gains, particularly in the middle class, strengthening its base domestically, and forging strong mainland links with the CPUSA, the Socialist Workers Party, Maoists, some unions, the New York based Center for Cuban Studies, the US Peace Council, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies and through them to the intellectuals, liberal mediamen, the universities and the entire liberal community. Ruthless violence such as bomb attacks would be counter-productive to such an alliance, but kidnappings of capitalists, and major propaganda of the deed attacks on the scale of the destruction of the Statue of Liberty and, later, the disruption of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, could begin to bring about the asset-to-liability shift.

After their recent setbacks, FALN is in any case virtually certain to stage some major attack, to recover credibility. Such a campaign could for the first time bring ideological conflict into the heart of America, with radicalizing and polarizing effects.

It is doubtful if this can be achieved without considerable assistance from abroad. The future of this help is a major "if" in this outlook. In the event of Moscow and Havana deciding to intensify their attack, with all the risks this would entail, then very severe terrorism both in Puerto Rico and on the mainland might result. Without any help, the campaign may remain small and ineffective. Most probably, aid at about the present level will continue, and it will be up to the ingenuity of the terrorists to raise their profile by imagination rather than additional strength. This will probably happen. Even at this level, ideological penetration is still possible, and this is perhaps the major danger that the Puerto Rican crisis poses for the United States.

Leaving violence to one side, the prospects for Puerto Rican independence, which seem so dim today, might change dramatically if the Populares were to return to their original independentist position. They cannot do this today, because as political realists they know they cannot cope without US financial assistance. But what if oil and mineral income made such assistance less vital? Economic independence can produce an abrupt wave of nationalism - witness Mexico, Alberta and Newfoundland - and rather than prompting gratitude, the aid that has for so long been the sustaining force in the economy is suddenly seen as insulting. Time may not be on the side of statehood.

Sources

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Mr. Ferdinand E. Sanchez-Martinez. Mr. Sanchez is a lawyer by profession and a conflict analyst by vocation. He has studied Puerto Rican terrorism since he was a student at the University of Puerto Rico in the late 1960s, when campus was disrupted by MPI-inspired riots. He has worked in various capacities for the government and is now back in private law practice. The section dealing with "The Theory of the Crisis" is based on his analysis and the writer is much indebted to Mr. Sanchez's assistance.

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STUDY NO 4: AFGHANISTAN

Aim

The aim of this study is to determine whether effective resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is possible.

The parameters are as follows: the study is confined to events in Afghanistan since December 1979; owing to the circumstances surrounding the Soviet occupation, source material providing hard, accurate, factual information is limited; the term "resistance" includes both political and military dimensions.

Working assumptions: that the Afghan resistance, by itself, probably cannot force the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces, but that "effective" resistance can prevent the Soviets from fully establishing stable and effective control of the country and exploiting that stability for activities beyond Afghanistan's borders.

Data

Status: Since a coup in April 1978, a one-party Marxist republic. A Soviet-backed coup on 27 December 1979 placed the current leader, Babrak Karmal, in power. The country is known as the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Population: Estimates vary from 15 to 19 million. Some 2.5 million are nomadic.

Main Cities:	Kabul (capital)	Pop. 750,000	(all figures approximate)
	Kandahar	Pop. 210,000	
	Herat	Pop. 160,000	
	Kunduz	Pop. 110,000	
	Charekar	Pop. 100,000	
	Mazar-i-Sharif	Pop. 100,000	

Estimated GNP: $2.9 billion U.S. (1979)

Economic: Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. Arable land is extremely limited. Average per capita income was estimated at approximately $110 in 1976. Country was self-sufficient in wheat up to at least 1976, but owing to internal disruption, it had a shortfall of some 600,000 tons in 1979. Since April 1978 Afghan and Soviet governments have signed more than 40 economic agreements. Dislocation of normal trade and aid has led to Afghan economy becoming almost totally dependent on USSR--which (according to Afghan government) now provides 80% of aid. Soviet government is to provide $15 million per annum in grant-in-aid, 1980-84, as well as $576 million for financing development. In 1979, about 22% of Afghan exports went to USSR, imports from USSR totalling 46%. Trade agreement (Feb. 1980) anticipated further 70% increase in trade (an increase in imports of about 60% was reported in Pravda, 9 Sept. 1980). In return, Soviets gain access to coal and natural gas, reserves of which are estimated respectively at 85 million tons and 70 million cubic metres (1976) (see also Appendix A).

Language: Pushtu (majority) and Dari (Persian--minority).

Religion: Predominantly Islamic. Estimates (1976):

Sunni	90%
Shia	5%
Other	5%

Geography: Center and east dominated by Hindu Kush mountain range, rising from 2,000 to well over 4,000 metres. South and west consist mainly of desert. Turkestan plain in the north (along Soviet border), Herat-Farah lowlands and Helmand River basin (west and southwest) offer possibilities for cultivation where water is available. Generally speaking, there is no shortage of water, as mountains act as watershed, but control is a problem. Depending on seasonal fluctuations availability ranges from flood to drought. Climate is harsh, reflecting extreme contrasts in geography.

Historical Background

Owing to internal tribal rivalries and foreign invasions, Afghanistan has been a battleground for much of its history. The Persians, Alexander the Great, the Mongols, Arabs and Turks bearing Islam extended their empires and influence across Afghanistan. An independent national identity did not begin to emerge until the 18th Century when the unification of the Pushtun tribal confederation led to the creation of the monarchy which, to a greater or lesser extent, ruled Afghanistan for the next two centuries. Throughout the 19th Century the British and the Russians competed for control of Afghanistan. Following the final victory of Lord Roberts at Kandahar in 1880, the British withdrew, leaving Abdur Rahman Khan, a neutral although unfriendly Amir, on the throne. By his death in 1901 he had extended his influence, if not his actual control, throughout most of what is now modern Afghanistan. The legislative and constitutional foundations of the modern state were laid in the 1920's by King Amanullah who, although forced by rebellion to abdicate, was a progressive and liberal modernizer. A constitution providing for a form of appointed cabinet government was adopted in 1931.

In 1964 the constitution was amended, making Afghanistan into a constitutional monarchy and establishing elected political institutions. In 1973, the king--Zaher Shah--was ousted in a coup which put Daoud Khan, a former Prime

Minister, in power. In his previous tenure (1953-63) Daoud had--for reasons of a tribal and territorial dispute with Pakistan--turned to the Russians for economic assistance and training of the Afghan armed forces. But after 1973 he attempted to place Afghan foreign policy on a more non-aligned course. The "Pushtunistan" dispute with Pakistan was resolved; closer economic links were established with Iran and conservative Arab regimes. Military personnel were sent increasingly to Egypt, India and the United States for training. Economic overtures were made to Egypt and Yugoslavia. This independent course proved to be his undoing. In April 1978 he was overthrown and killed in a violent coup, carried out by Nur Mohammed Taraki--a Marxist dissident--and a number of Soviet-trained military officers. This coup was declared to be a Marxist revolution, putting the nation on a new course of modernization and reform and setting in train the events which culminated in the Soviet invasion in December 1979.

Chronology of Major Recent Events

27 April 1978 -	Coup d'état: Daoud overthrown and killed. Replaced by Nur Mohammed Taraki who proclaimed a Marxist revolution.
5 Dec. 1978 -	Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation, signed by Taraki and Brezhnev in Moscow. Treaty is to last 20 years and provides for economic cooperation and guarantees of Soviet military assistance.
14 Feb. 1979 -	Afghan resistance guerrillas seized U.S. Ambassador as hostage. He was killed when Afghan security forces tried to rescue him.

19 Mar. 1979 - Afghan army mutiny and popular uprising in Herat. Government officials, pro-regime soldiers and at least 20 Soviet advisers and their families killed during uprising. Total casualties between 8,000 and 20,000.

27 Mar. 1979 - Hafizullah Amin, foreign minister, appointed Prime Minister under Taraki.

April 1979 - Afghan security forces under Russian direction executed some 1,000 unarmed male civilians at the village of Kerala.

July 1979 - Soviets introduce first combat troops into Afghanistan: airborne battalion deployed at Bagram air force base.

5 Aug. 1979 - Army mutiny in Kabul.

Aug.-Oct. 1979 - Visit of 50-man Soviet delegation to study Afghan situation, headed by General Ivan Pavlovsky, Deputy Defense Minister and commander of ground forces, and General Alexei Yepishev, chief political commissar of the Soviet armed forces.

16 Sept. 1979 - Coup d'état; Amin overthrew Taraki in a violent coup.

2 Dec. 1979 - Lieutenant-General Viktor Paputin, first Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, arrived in Kabul--apparently either to bring Amin into line or, failing that, to engineer his overthrow.

8 Dec. 1979 - Soviet airborne regiment arrived at Bagram.

20 Dec. 1979 - Elements of the airborne regiment cleared rebels from the Salang Pass, key point on highway from Soviet frontier.

22 Dec. 1979 - Three Soviet Motorized Rifle Divisions deployed along Soviet frontier with Afghanistan.

24 Dec. 1979 - Final meeting between Amin and Soviet Ambassador ended in apparent disagreement.

25-27 Dec. 1979 - Soviet 105th Guards Airborne Division deployed by air into Kabul airport and Bagram air base. Further flights brought in elements of two other airborne divisions (103rd, 104th).

27 Dec. 1979 - Coup d'état: Soviet troops occupied strategic points in Kabul and assaulted Darulaman Palace, killing Amin, family and staff during or after assault. Babrak Karmal, then in Prague, Czechoslovakia, proclaimed as new leader. Soviet Motorised Rifle Divisions crossed into Afghanistan.

31 Dec. 1979 - Karmal arrived in Kabul.

21-27 Feb. 1980 - General strike in Kabul and other major cities, accompanied by riots and repression.

24 Apr.-9 May 1980 - Uprising by schoolchildren in Kabul led to violent confrontations with Soviet troops, resulting in many casualties among the students.

14 May 1980 - Afghan government proposed talks with Pakistan and Iran to stabilize Afghanistan's internal situation and permit withdrawal of Soviet troops.

22 June 1980 - Soviets withdraw 8,500 troops and 108 tanks from Afghanistan.

25 July-4 Aug. 1980 - Afghan Army's 14th Armoured Division mutinied at Ghazni. Revolt crushed by Soviet troops.

11 Oct. 1980 - Clashes between Afghan and Soviet forces at Pule-i-Charki.

15-24 Oct.	1980	- Karmal visited Moscow: received assurances of continued Soviet support.
29 Dec.	1980	- Riots in Kabul marked first anniversary of Soviet invasion.

Organizations Involved in Conflict

1. Political Groupings--the Government of Afghanistan.

The Afghan government nominally consists of the Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which is organized on typical Communist party lines with a Politburo and a Central Committee. Babrak Karmal is the General Secretary of the Party as well as being President and Prime Minister. The Politburo, consisting of 21 members, acts as the cabinet or executive arm. The Defense Minister, General Rafi, was only a short time ago a major in the army. In the traditional Soviet style, Karmal's reports to plenary sessions of the Central Committee are unanimously approved and are followed by meetings around the country to express support for the decisions. It should be noted, however, that the PDPA consists of two factions--Khalq (Masses) and Parcham (Banner)--bitter rivals who were coaxed into an uneasy alliance within PDPA in 1977 with Soviet encouragement. Since the 1978 coup the PDPA has been wracked by a power struggle between the two factions. The Khalq, the larger of the two and supported by the army, predominated until Amin was overthrown. Since then, Karmal, a Parchamite, has purged the Khalqi faction in the Party, the government, and the armed forces. This has reduced the PDPA's power base, already small to begin with, to almost nil. Without complete Soviet support the government would fall very quickly.

Consequently, real power resides in Soviet hands. Thousands of Soviet bureaucrats arrived in Kabul shortly after the invasion and although ostensibly attached to the civil service as advisers, they appear to have taken over all policy- and decision-making functions. Soviet officials are said to occupy senior positions in every Afghan ministry except foreign affairs--where a Russian is deputy director. Every cabinet minister has two Soviet officials attached to him as "advisers." Karmal himself is all but a prisoner of the Soviets; his six chief advisers, as well as his bodyguard, driver, doctor and chef, are all Russians. Although clearly this means the Soviets are carrying the burden of government virtually by themselves, they have taken steps to ensure their long-term hold on the country. The Soviets control the following key sectors of the Afghan Government:

a) Security Service--early in January 1980 the Soviets disbanded the State Security Administration which had been formed after the 1978 coup. In its place they created a new security service around a contingent of some 600 Soviet intelligence officers, mainly from the KGB. East Germans may also be involved in this reorganization. The KGB chief in Afghanistan, Vassily Sufrachenko, is said to have a large staff of Soviet officers who speak both official languages. The entire intelligence apparatus is at his disposal. It is not clear, however, from existing sources, to what extent the Soviets control the police force although close ties to the security services are likely. The Afghan national police force is believed to have been reorganized into three divisions: security, personnel, and infiltration, the latter division responsible for such programs as recruiting tribes which will fight against rival groups.

b) Ministry of Information and Culture--described by opponents of the regime as the "most blatantly Soviet-dominated" of all government departments. This ministry is responsible for propaganda. Soviet staff produce virtually all press releases and Soviet personnel have been assigned as editors of Afghan newspapers. At the end of January 1980 the ministry ordered the expulsion from Afghanistan of all non-communist members of the foreign press corps.

c) Education--after the invasion Soviet advisers were assigned to the education system. Forty-three Russian professors were sent to the University of Kabul to teach, to revise the curriculum, and to bring programmes and texts "up to the high standards of the Soviet Union." The university is reported to be administered by a five-man advisory committee of Soviet experts. Some 1,500 university students were sent to Soviet universities in 1980. New texts are being prepared for schools as well, and Russian language is being introduced on a widespread basis. Pioneer camps for young children on the Soviet model were held for the first time last summer. The Soviets have agreed to provide experts to help manage agricultural and industrial institutes. They are also to set up a "Faculty of Workers," which appears to be a school for ideological training of people who will organize a new Afghan Communist Party along Soviet lines. Similar schools were established in Angola and Ethopia as Soviet influence increased in those countries. In addition, a "Faculty of Preparedness" is being established. Nothing is known about this but it may be some kind of formal military academy or an institute for training an armed wing of the party. In the meantime, military and police officers are being trained in the USSR.

Soviet control of the economy has been detailed in the Data section earlier in this study. It is likely that the fighting, especially since the invasion, has integrated the two economies further, probably to a greater extent than was intended. Disruption of local food production has made Afghanistan almost entirely dependent on supplies from the USSR. While this might allow the Soviets to exert a degree of control over the population, it also increases the costs to the Soviets of maintaining the occupation, estimated to be from $10 to $15 million per day. Karmal's visit to Moscow in October apparently failed to convince the Soviet leaders to increase their economic stake in Afghanistan--a sign that the Soviets may feel they are overcommitted already in that sector.

The implications of Soviet activities in these four areas are clear. The Soviets are prepared to tolerate and shore up the shaky Karmal regime and its economy for the short-term at least. Control of the security service and the press are intended to hold the line until such time as a more stable and broadly-based party can take over the running of the country with a degree of control and legitimacy. Efforts in the educational field are designed to produce that new leadership and organization.

2. Security Forces.

a) The Afghan Armed Forces--on paper the Afghan Armed Forces are supposed to consist of an army of 80,000 (13 divisions and some independent brigades) and an air force of 10,000, with 160 combat aircraft. However, this total has probably been greatly reduced, possibly to less than half of the established strength, by desertions and defections, which increased sharply after the invasion. In addition, outside observers are uncertain how many of the military aircraft currently in use in Afghanistan are actually Soviet or Afghan, since both forces use many similar types. From the outset, entire Afghan formations (some of division strength) resisted the invasion and some units defected en masse to the insurgents after killing their officers and Soviet advisers. In August 1980 elements of the 14th Armoured Division mutinied at Ghazni when the government attempted to replace its commanding officer, a Khalq sympathiser. Clashes between Soviet forces and two Afghan armoured brigades occurred in October at a base north of Kabul. In September, the government published new penalties to reinforce conscription laws, laying down severe penalties for draft-dodging and desertion. Implementation of the law was postponed until November while the government appealed to young men to volunteer to serve for patriotic reasons. When these appeals failed the government resorted to press gangs to round up men of military age. The threat of the harsh penalties, the press gangs and the low esteem of the Afghan armed forces have induced increasing numbers of young men to leave the country and/or to join the resistance movement. To supplement its military manpower the regime is relying to a large extent on "Volunteer Defence Groups," a kind of people's militia drawn from the younger ranks of the Parcham organization. These groups are believed to include many who have received ideological training in the Soviet Union. They are paid at a rate several times that of Afghan army conscripts.

As noted earlier, the Afghan security service is now largely a Soviet manned and run organization. Little is really known of the Afghan police. On balance, then, although they bore the brunt of the fighting both before and immediately after the Soviet invasion, the Afghan armed forces are not at present making an effective contribution to the counter-insurgency campaign. The army consists of a dwindling number of poorly paid, unmotivated conscripts reluctant to fight seriously against their own people. The Soviets cannot trust them and have been forced to disarm complete units to prevent mutiny. Under such circumstances, the Soviet armed forces have carried out most of the counter-insurgency operations since the spring of 1980.

b) The Soviet Armed Forces--estimates of the actual number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan vary from 85,000 to 100,000. At present this force is believed to consist of eight divisions, one airborne and seven motorized rifle divisions. It is possible that some of these units may not be at full establishment in terms either of manpower or equipment, because many elements of Soviet mechanized units would be inappropriate for combat in Afghanistan. Since the autumn, the Soviet command has divided the country into seven sectors, with at least one division in each, as follows:

1) Kabul (Central Sector) - 40th Soviet Army Headquarters--commanded by General Mihailov
- 105th Guards Airborne Division
- 360th Motorized Rifle Division

2) Kunduz-Fazirabad (Northeast)
- 201st Motorized Rifle Division

3) Mazar-i-Sharif (North) - 16th Motorized Rifle Division

4) Jalalabad (East Central)
- 275th Motorized Rifle Division

5) Kandahar (South) - 357th Motorized Rifle Division

6) Shindand (West) - 68th Motorized Rifle Division

7) Herat (Northwest) - 54th Motorized Rifle Division

Reports during the autumn suggested that small numbers of specially trained anti-guerrilla commando troops had been deployed in each sector, but nothing more is known about these units, if indeed they exist at all. It appears that the airborne division is used as a kind of mobile reserve or "fire-brigade." Between three and five more motorized rifle divisions are believed deployed along the Soviet-Afghan frontier. They could be moved into Afghanistan quickly if required.

The Soviets also have considerable air forces at their disposal, which are thought to include:

30 MiG-23 fighter-bombers
108 MiG-21 fighter-bombers
Some Il-28 light bombers
76 MiG-17 fighters (Unless the designation is meant to refer to Su-17 fighter bombers - some of which were reported in January 1980 - these probably belong to the Afghan Air Force, which had 80 of them and is operating under Soviet control).
72 Mi-24 armed helicopters (six squadrons)
4 Yak-28 reconnaissance aircraft
10 MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft
35 military transport aircraft, used for transport and airborne operations within Afghanistan. This number probably does not include those used for resupply and reinforcement from the USSR.
78 transport helicopters of various types.

These aircraft fly missions from bases in either Afghanistan or the USSR, but are maintained and repaired in the USSR.

Many indications point to a long-term Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Some of these are as follows:

1) A large road and rail bridge complex is being built across the Amu Darya River (along the Afghan-Soviet border) at Termez. This will replace the pontoon bridges which carried the initial invading force. The port of Termez is also being rebuilt.
2) A pipeline is being laid from the Soviet border to Pul-i-Khumri, where a large underground storage facility will replace temporary rubber fuel bladders used since the earliest stages of the intervention. Western intelligence sources believe the pipeline will be extended later.
3) Soviet engineers have resurrected plans for building a railway from the Soviet border to Kabul.
4) Soviet military engineers have been upgrading facilities at Afghan air bases--extending runways, building aircraft revetments and housing for Soviet air force personnel. These activities appear to indicate that in future most operations and even first-line maintenance will be carried out from inside Afghanistan.
5) Soviet military engineers have renovated the Darulaman Palace to serve as the Soviet command headquarters. A battle management computer system has been installed.

At first glance, the Soviet armed forces appear to have all the resources required for a protracted campaign, including the specific advantage of relatively short lines of communication and supply. They do, however, face considerable obstacles and some difficult problems--both endemic and unique--which will be discussed later.

3. Opposition Forces--The Afghan Resistance.

The Afghan resistance movement is a loose amalgamation of groups, without central organization under a single leader. This reflects both the movement's spontaneity--it grew naturally from traditional Afghan hostility to central authority and foreign invaders--and the ethnic diversity of its component parts. This latter point is very important. Afghanistan itself is an amalgam of eight major ethnic groups, the largest being the Pushtun (about seven million). Quite apart from cultural differences, these groups have engaged in violent rivalry for centuries. Cooperation is the exception, not the rule. Consequently, the resistance movement developed tribally, locally and regionally, at different times and in different locations, the only common bond being Islamic opposition to Marxism. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion there may have been as many as 60 separate factions fighting the Soviet-backed regime. Recent estimates have cut that number by about half and all but a few are very small and ineffectual. Most groups tend to confine their activities to specific geographic areas defined principally by the ethnic or tribal makeup of the particular area. Some of the larger groups, however, do operate across these unofficial boundaries. In May 1980 the major resistance groups convened a "Loya Jirga" or grand council in Peshawar, Pakistan. Its main objective was to create a united front and a government-in-exile. All but one of the largest groups agreed to cooperate under a united banner, but continuing dissension since has precluded any significant accomplishments. The principal resistance groups in Afghanistan are:

a) National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA). NIFA claims to have about 100,000 members and six million followers, but such claims should be regarded with scepticism (one rule of thumb suggested by informed

Afghan-watchers is to delete the last zero in any figures). Sayed Ahmed Gailani, aged 48, is the leader of NIFA. A former religious instructor, he served initially as an adviser to Taraki, but became disillusioned with the Marxist tendencies of the government and went into exile in Pakistan in October 1978. There he began to organize a resistance movement. Gailani and his movement are pro-Western and favour modernization of Afghanistan. Regarded by his followers as a saint, Gailani also has ties to the Saudi royal family. The military commander is Mohammed Hakim Aryubi. He is reported to head a 16-man military council which directs NIFA's military operations. Gailani and other NIFA leaders have travelled in the West and have established a front organization in Britain, complete with a propaganda branch.

b) Hezbi-i-Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Party of Afghanistan). This movement claims to have some 7,000 Mujahideen (Freedom fighters) although it has weapons sufficient to arm only half that number at any one time. The leader is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, aged 22, a former engineer trained at the University of Kabul. He is highly regarded for his administrative skills and the Hezbi group never lacks for funds (although it is not clear what sources provide them). The group operates a clandestine radio station inside Afghanistan and a hospital in Peshawar. The military commander is Mului Jalal Udi Den. The Hezbi is an orthodox Islamic movement, opposed to modernization, and is the one major group which refused to join a government in exile. Other groups tend to regard Hekmatyar as something of a freebooting gangster--some go so far as to suggest that he is a Communist stooge deliberately promoting disunity among resistance groups.

c) Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Alliance). A movement of indeterminate size, although likely to number only a few thousand at most, since it recruits almost solely from a single province (Badakhshan). Jamiat's leader is Burhanuddin Rabbani, aged 40, a former professor of religion at the University of Kabul. Like Hezbi, this is an Islamic fundamentalist group, although it is more tolerant than Hezbi. It has little following outside Badakhshan where its popularity rests to a large degree on the movement's professed desire to bring the king back from exile. Although limited in size and popular support, the movement is believed to be quite wealthy.

Recent reports indicate that the Hezbi and the Jamiat are closing ranks and distancing themselves from the less orthodox groups. No formal military organization exists in any of the groups. The number of fighters that a group can put in the field is dependent not only on the availability of weapons but also on the personal esteem of the leader and his subordinates. Consequently, a guerrilla unit can vary in size from a handful of men to several hundred. There are no fixed establishments. More will be said about quality of the fighters under "Strengths and Weaknesses" later in this study.

Factors Affecting the Conflict

1. Sources of Conflict.

The insurgency was touched off by the well-intentioned but poorly planned and badly managed "reforms" instituted by the Taraki regime. Rather than tackle the real problems of the country--poverty, disease and illiteracy--the government displayed great insensitivity by trying to change radically and quickly the traditional social structure. This was a risky course of action for a government consisting of a small group of urban intellectuals who shared little in common with the rural communities who make up most of the population. Their approach was far too doctrinaire and did not take into account the "subjective" conditions of Afghan society. Furthermore, the ruling junta, dominated at that time by the Khalq faction, weakened its own position by purging rival communists (the Parcham) and nationalists from the civil service and the armed forces. This forced out many competent technocrats whose skills would have been essential for effective implementation of the reform programme. Three principal aspects of the reform program engendered resistance:

a) Land Reform. The government expropriated some 3 million acres of land and attempted to redistribute it (in lots of 2½-5 acres) to between 250,000 and 300,000 peasant families. The programme foundered in resistance and confusion. Owing to widespread uncertainty about the permanence and legitimacy of the scheme, much land went uncultivated in 1978. Some peasants refused to accept new plots because Islamic law requires some compensation for land received. In any case, some of the best land was not redistributed. At the same time the government abolished the usury system, which historically had kept tenant farmers in a permanent state of debt to landowners, but failed to provide an alternative form of crop financing. As a result, many peasants had no money to buy seed. Finally, redistribution forced many families to move to land hundreds of miles from their traditional homelands, to regions of the country dominated by other tribes who spoke different dialects. These mistakes go a long way in explaining not only resistance but also the decline in production of basic foodstuffs which is characteristic of Afghanistan as a whole.

b) Women's Liberation. A government decree granted equal rights for women. Three aspects of this programme produced opposition:
   1) abolition of the "bride price"--traditional cash payments by which fathers sold their daughters to the husband-to-be. This removed what many Afghans regarded as a form of social security;
   2) compulsory education for women;
   3) permitting women to attend political meetings.

c) Secularization. Marxist program offended the deeply devout peasantry and their religious leaders:
   1) the green flag of Islam was replaced by the Communist red flag and Lenin's portrait was mounted on public buildings;
   2) land reform took holdings away from the Mullahs;
   3) the government took over from the Mullahs administration of law;
   4) the government purged the clergy of those Mullahs opposed to government policy;
   5) Khalqi cadres told villagers that Islam was a "tired" religion standing in the way of progress. From successive waves of religious exiles who had fled Soviet Central Asia the Islamic clergy had learned about Soviet attempts to stamp out Islam. The attitudes of the cadres and secularization in general convinced them that the Marxists intended to do the same in Afghanistan.

Given these programmes, the traditional tribal opposition to central authority and inherent Afghan xenophobia (especially towards Russians), the outbreak of resistance can scarcely be seen as surprising. When the population resisted the government's programmes, often violently, the government made the situation worse by trying to use repression to impose its will. Although widespread and brutal, it appeared to be ineffective. By the time of the Soviet intervention outside observers estimated that the resistance controlled more than 75% of the country.

The government used Soviet-piloted aircraft and helicopter gunships to attack rebel concentrations, villages suspected of giving refuge to the resistance, and even to suppress urban uprisings. In the autumn of 1979 the regime tried the "carrot and stick" approach: scorched earth against the resistance and its sympathisers in combination with persuasion--buying off clans and tribes, toning down the Marxist content of reforms in order to win back the Mullahs. Although these methods apparently had a degree of success, they were insufficient to stem the tide of disorder. In any case, repression continued on a wide scale, and increased after Amin's coup. In September 1979 Amnesty International reported that the regime had imprisoned some 30,000 "political prisoners" and had executed 2,000. Torture and mass executions were widespread.

The government reform programme, resistance to it, and repression used to enforce it, produced a cycle of violence which the government--with its poorly motivated security forces--proved unable to control. The introduction of Soviet forces on a large scale has increased the level of violence without producing greater stability or security for the regime.

2. Methods of Conflict.

A. The Security Forces

1) Military Operations. In the first few months after the invasion those Afghan army units still loyal to the government did most of the fighting. The Soviet forces provided air support, tried to secure the cities and the LOC's, and attempted to block guerrilla infiltration and supply routes from Iran, Pakistan and China. By late spring,

however, large Soviet formations were fully involved in "search and destroy" missions, employing tanks, APC's, strike aircraft and armed helicopters. These operations appeared to achieve short-term successes in driving the resistance out of the areas attacked, but the insurgents would filter back in as soon as the Soviets pulled out. Moreover, resistance activity (or rumours of it) frequently forced the Soviets to concentrate their forces in and around the major cities, leaving other areas free for the resistance. By mid-year it was clear that the Soviets did not have sufficient troops to cover all vulnerable points simultaneously and this may explain, at least in part, the increase in the use of airpower at that time. From June 1980, air strikes against villages, either as reprisals or as routine operations, became a regular feature of Soviet operations. The MI-24 Hind D helicopter gunship, heavily armed, armoured, maneuverable, has proved the most active and effective weapon for this task. Until recently, the rebels have had no weapon to counter it effectively. Dubbed the "flying tank," it is the Soviet weapon the insurgents fear most. By using air attacks against villages, particularly those close to the major cities and highways, the Soviets are clearly trying to deny the insurgents safe haven and to force them into the mountains where they pose less of a threat to the government. Closely linked to this is a "scorched earth" policy aimed at denying food to the resistance. This began in early autumn with the obvious intention of disrupting the harvest, thereby producing food shortages among the insurgents during the winter.

The Soviets have used aircraft to "seal" the frontiers, since the sheer length of Afghanistan's border and its difficult terrain would prohibit effective deployment of troops along the frontier, at current force levels at least. Helicopter gunships patrol the border, keeping infiltration routes under surveillance. They and other Soviet and Afghan military aircraft have also made some 200 forays across the frontier into Pakistan. While some were the result of pilot error, others were reconnaissance missions, and still others consisted of deliberate bombing attacks around refugee camps. These attacks are obviously intended to persuade the Pakistani government to exert greater control over the refugees and to do more to discourage guerrilla infiltration. At the same time, Soviet military aircraft have scattered many thousands of small anti-personnel mines along the frontier infiltration routes.

Considerable controversy has been raised about accusations that the Soviets are using chemical weapons in Afghanistan. Although positive proof remains elusive, several observations bear mention here. First, the means to deliver chemical weapons onto a target are integral to Soviet army formations; they could also be delivered easily by air. Secondly, persistent agents could be valuable in denying certain areas, such as mountain passes, to the insurgents. Third, the generally poor standard of health of the average Afghan and their lack of protective gear would make chemical agents particularly effective. Finally, granted the Afghan tendency to exaggeration, there seems to be, nonetheless, reason to suspect that some forms of chemical agents have been used, although type, frequency and location are impossible to verify. However, given descriptions of employment, characteristics and casualties, it is highly likely that these weapons consisted of highly concentrated CS-type or mustard-type agents, and not nerve gas as originally reported.

The Soviets have deployed some specialist units--airborne forces and mountain-trained troops--to carry the ground war to the resistance on its own terrain, but there is insufficient evidence at present to determine the effectiveness of these units. The Afghan government attempted a "divide and conquer" technique during the autumn. It attempted to exploit ethnic differences by bribing tribal leaders with large sums to enlist their men in militia units to fight the resistance. This technique is believed to have had, at best, only a limited degree of success because of the brutal reprisals carried out by the insurgents against anyone thought to be a government-paid mercenary.

2) Political Activity. Apart from those sectors of government previously described as under Soviet control, the Afghan government has attempted to extend its influence through Afghan society. Numerous Soviet-style organizations have been established to ensure party and state control over key areas of Afghan life. These organizations have been closely linked to their Soviet equivalents, and include:

a) trade unions;

b) Democratic Organization of Afghan Youth (DOAY)--the youth branch of the PDPA. A Soviet delegation led by the head of Komsomol, the CPSU's youth branch, attended a DOAY conference this summer. The pioneer camps mentioned earlier (see "Political Groupings") were run on Soviet lines with Soviet assistance;

c) Union of Writers and Poets--established at a conference at the beginning of October 1980. It was urged by the Central Committee "to create works that influence the hatred of the people against the enemies." A delegation was present from the Soviet union of writers. The two groups signed a cooperation agreement.

d) Union of Artists--founded at a congress in September 1980.

e) Journalists Union--constituted at a congress on 15 September. Four hundred and fifty Afghan journalists and a Soviet delegation led by the chief editor of Izvestia attended the congress. Its task is "to present the facts . . . concerning the irreversibility of the Saur Revolution, the daily increasing consolidation of the situation . . . and about the establishment of its authority and prestige in the international arena to all the people of the country, the region and the world." The union signed an agreement for cooperation with the Soviet union of journalists on 4 November.

3) Psychological Warfare. The Afghan government and their Soviet sponsors have mounted a considerable psychological warfare offensive, in order to control and influence news coverage of the Afghan war and to win the "hearts and minds" of Afghan people. Soviet and Afghan methods include the following:

a) Expulsion of all non-Communist journalists from Afghanistan at the end of January 1980.

b) control of the press--described earlier under "Political Groupings," but including as well the creation of the journalists union and of a PDPA newspaper, Haqiqati Enqelabi-Saur.

c) Censorship--in Afghanistan, but also applying strictly to Soviet and foreign coverage of the war. As late as 24 December 1979 the Soviet government accused the American government and media of outright lies when American officials warned that a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan might be imminent. The Soviet government did not admit that there were Soviet troops in Afghanistan until three days after the invasion and coup. For the first five months of 1980 the only references in the Soviet press to the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan were to the effect that the Afghan government had invited Soviet assistance and that the "limited military contingent" would be withdrawn when it was no longer required. During that time there was no mention of fighting, but in early June the Soviet press began to admit that the Soviet forces were encountering resistance. This less optimistic tone probably reflected the Soviet government's inability to conceal the fact that Soviet troops were suffering casualties. There was no Soviet television coverage of their troops in action until 12 August. At that time an hour-long documentary showed Soviet troops carrying out various military tasks, but not fighting. Evidence is by no means conclusive, but it appears likely that no battle scenes have yet appeared on Soviet television.

d) Government lip service to Islam--the Karmal government has promised to respect Islam. They replaced the original red flag of the April revolution with one incorporating Islamic symbols. Party and government leaders attended mosques and began their meetings with readings from the Koran.

e) Marxist indoctrination--carried out at trade union meetings, at the DOAY summer camps, and in the armed forces, who receive four hours of political lessons per week. A seminar of political propagandists from party organizations in Kabul city and province opened at Kabul Polytechnic on 28 October. Lenin's birthday was celebrated in April 1980. The press was filled for several days with biographical material on Lenin and extracts from Brezhnev's autobiographies. Ho Chi Minh's anniversary was celebrated in May, as was the anniversary of the Soviet Revolution in October. The government opened a Lenin museum in Kabul in November 1980, and an Afghan-Soviet friendship week is planned for November 1981. Soviet-Afghan friendship societies have been formed in both countries.

f) Propaganda to the West and Third World--at this stage only a preliminary content analysis is possible, but even so, it is revealing. Since the invasion a number of themes have been run constantly, while others have been dropped, added or modified, apparently on the basis of the manner in which they are received in the West. The Soviets test their propaganda themes. Those that elicit either no response or an adverse reaction because of a lack of credibility are usually dropped immediately. Key themes identified since the invasion included the following:

(1) Justification for the Soviet intervention and presence. Four main ideas make up this theme:
  (1a) Soviet forces were invited in by a legitimate government placed in power by a popular uprising;
  (1b) Soviet presence is legal under the terms of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship in 1978;
  (1c) Hafizullah Amin was a CIA agent or stooge;
  (1d) Soviet intervention is defensive in character since it is a response to imperialist action which threatened to undermine the gains of the April Revolution. The so-called Afghan resistance is just a tool of the CIA.

(2) Withdrawal of forces. The central argument of this theme is that Soviet forces will be withdrawn as soon as foreign intervention and provocation ceases and the Afghan government requests the Soviet withdrawal. This theme is advanced with supporting "proof" of foreign intervention, including the following:
  (2a) reports of Chinese, Pakistani and American advisers training the insurgents, backed up by "confessions" from captured rebels that they were trained by such advisers;
  (2b) displays of captured arms with American, Chinese or Egyptian markings;
  (2c) quoting reports from Western newspapers that the CIA and others are running guns to the rebels;

(2d) "confession" by an American held in prison and at least one report that an American "adviser" was killed helping the insurgents.

(3) Political Settlement. In May 1980 the Afghan governnent offered a proposal for a political settlement, to include:

(3a) bilateral talks with Iran and Pakistan to normalize relations;

(3b) assistance of other governments in return of refugees;

(3c) cessation of outside interference before talks begin;

(3d) joint Soviet-American guarantees of non-interference;

(3e) withdrawal of Soviet troops upon reaching bilateral agreements;

(3f) turning the Persian Gulf region into a "Zone of Peace," by removing "foreign" bases from the region.

The idea of a political settlement does not, of itself, constitute propaganda. The Soviets and their Afghan supporters genuinely want a political settlement to the conflict. The extent to which the idea serves as a vehicle for propaganda is revealed through the timing of the proposal and the Soviet activities which preceded and followed it:

(3g) Soviet statements, frequently quoting American critics of U.S. policy on Afghanistan, to the effect that Western reactions to the Afghan situation threaten détente--thereby shifting blame for tensions onto the West;

(3h) Soviet appeal for a "peace offensive" by the World Peace Council to "save" détente;

(3i) Soviet claims that progress is being made internally and that life is returning to normal;

(3j) token withdrawal of Soviet troops in June, accompanied by a great deal of media coverage explaining it as a gesture of Soviet goodwill.

The peace proposal preceded by two days the first meeting of Soviet and American foreign ministers since the invasion and the troops withdrawal was announced one day before the Venice summit of Western leaders.

(4) Atrocity propaganda. Three main themes are run under this heading:

(4a) the Afghan rebels carry out atrocities such as torturing, mutilating and beheading prisoners;

(4b) foreign reporters have directed the rebels in the conduct of atrocities. This charge has been made several times, but attracted most attention in August 1980 when Pravda accused Dan Rather of CBS News of ordering Afghan rebels to torture, stone and behead their captives;

(4c) the United States is supplying chemical weapons to the Afghan rebels.

(5) Disinformation. The Soviets are known to favour this technique, as deliberate distortion is hard to prove when themes are presented in respected Western media. The

> use of recognized journalistic or other authorities to advance the Soviet view makes it palatable in the West. The Soviets have facilitated the work of journalists they considered potentially friendly, by, for instance, permitting them to use Soviet military aircraft. Such journalists have been shown parts of Afghanistan, such as Kabul and Herat, which are pretty well under government or Soviet control, while avoiding the rebel-dominated countryside. Thus they have tended to sympathize with the official claim that the country is returning to "normalcy" and that the rebel groups have been broken up and pose no further threat.

B. The Resistance Movement

1) Military Operations. Resistance tactics are defined by the traditions and experience of the Afghan people, the terrain, the weapons available to the insurgents and their limited technical capabilities. This means, in short, guerrilla warfare. Even after a year of combat, however, a coherent strategy is not apparent. The tendency of resistance groups to act independently and to reject cooperation with other groups precludes a coordinated campaign with a clear military objective. If there are comprehensible objectives they seem to be to keep the Soviets off balance and to raise the human and material costs of the Soviet occupation to levels that would prevent Soviet consolidation of their

position in Afghanistan. The more sober Afghan resistance leaders do not believe they can force the Soviets to leave Afghanistan by military means alone. Consequently, military activities have to be viewed as part of a broader struggle for national liberation, involving political and psychological action as well. Military action, constrained by the factors noted above, consists mainly of the following:

a) ambushes of Soviet and Afghan army convoys, which force the security forces to deploy troops to protect the lines of communication;

b) hit and run attacks on Soviet and Afghan bases, camps, depots and airfields, which inflict casualties and damage, permit the insurgents to capture weapons and tie down more troops on defensive tasks;

c) sabotage of power stations and lines, mines, government buildings, schools, bridges, roads and other physical components of the infrastructure of the modern state;

d) assassination of government officials, party members, Soviet soldiers and people who collaborate with the regime--no accurate figures are available but a conservative estimate would be that several hundred people have been assassinated. The insurgents threaten those thought to be wavering between support for the government and support for the resistance. Captured Afghan soldiers, on the other hand, are usually disarmed and set free. Many of them join the resistance of their own volition;

e) fomenting mutinies and urban insurrection--some large-scale and numerous small-scale uprisings occurred in almost all of the major cities in 1980. The city of Herat was in rebel hands for a considerable length of time--perhaps several weeks--at the end of the summer.

2) Political Activity. Resistance political activity consists principally of the following actions: recruitment of guerrillas amongst refugees in Pakistan; subversion within the Afghan armed forces; lobbying amongst Islamic and Western countries for weapons and financial aid; and attempts to establish a united front among the resistance groups. More will be said about their accomplishments in this area under "Strengths and Weaknesses."

3) Psychological. The resistance movement does not have at its disposal psychological warfare capabilities in any way comparable to those of the Afghan government and its Soviet supporters. The Hezbi-i-Islami claims to operate a clandestine radio station inside Afghanistan, but this analyst has no information on its operations or the content of its broadcasts. The NIFA runs an English language propaganda broadsheet in London, called Afghan Voice, which is intended to reach an international audience. Gailani and his aides have made frequent appearances before political audiences and on the electronic media in Britain and the United States, appealing for arms for the resistance groups. Resistance groups in Pakistan readily provide information to Western reporters and occasionally take them into Afghanistan to see the situation for themselves. Inside Afghanistan, amongst the population, the resistance groups distribute "night letters"--propaganda broadsheets calling for continued support from the population and frequently warning of impending resistance activity. The general strike and urban insurrection in late February 1980 was preceded by

"night letters" calling for popular support of the strike and insurrection. More recently, in January 1981, Western embassies advised all non-diplomatic Europeans to leave after several Europeans were murdered and a series of "night letters" warned foreigners to leave.

3. Strengths and Weaknesses.

A. The Soviets and the Afghan Government

On the face of it, the Soviets and their clients have considerable advantages in this conflict, although the strengths are primarily Soviet, not Afghan. The Soviets bring to battle a large, well trained and organized army with abundant modern weapons, reserves nearby in the USSR and a high degree of mobility. The Soviet Air Force is unchallenged in the air and has suffered only limited casualties from ground fire. Land lines of communication and resupply from the Soviet Union are short and may be supplemented by air transport. The Soviets control key sectors of the Afghan government. Of the sectors they control, the news media may be the most important. Soviet experience in psychological warfare, and their considerable resources for conducting it--from the USSR as well as from Afghanistan--could be decisive weapons in this conflict.

On the negative side of the balance sheet, however, many factors combine to offset Soviet advantages. There is no popular base of support for the Karmal government and there exists widespread, almost universal hostility to the Soviet presence. The current regime rests on a small power base of party members, military officers and government officials and is torn internally between rival communist factions. Internicene quarrels have cost the lives of many government members, even at cabinet level, and this fighting combined with selective assassinations by insurgents is gradually whittling away not only the finite number of party supporters, but also the government's ability to rule and whatever pretence to legitimacy it might claim. As suggested earlier, this government would collapse almost immediately if the Soviets withdrew their support. Any Soviet-backed successor regime would probably have as much difficulty in establishing both its right and its ability to govern the Afghan people (see Appendix B).

The failure of the Marxist regime has put most of the burden of government on the Soviets. Although taking over certain key aspects of government was probably part of the Soviet plan from the outset, carrying the entire load may not be an advantage at all. It constitutes a drain on the Soviet economy, it is winning them no friends in Afghanistan and undermines Soviet propaganda assertions that Afghanistan is an independent state. Linguistic and cultural barriers undoubtedly impede the efficient working of government, since the Soviets had to withdraw early in 1980 the Soviet Central Asians who could communicate easily with their Afghan counterparts. Some had defected while others were "contaminated" by the infection of militant Islam.

Unable, then, to win the "hearts and minds" of the Afghans, the Soviets have relied primarily on coercion. This too has not been without its limitations. The Soviet army is a mechanized force on the European model, organized, equipped and trained primarily for operations against a foe with similar characteristics. With the exception of a small number of officers with experience in Angola and Ethopia who are, apparently, being promoted rapidly, there are no Soviet soldiers with training and experience in counter-insurgency. For doctrinal and for obvious political reasons, the techniques of subversion are not taught in the Soviet Armed Forces. Political warfare, and countering it, is the purview of the KGB. Furthermore, relatively few Soviet troops receive special training for combat in mountainous terrain. Only certain military colleges offer such courses for officer training. Forces in those Military Districts which have mountains undergo a certain amount of training in mountain combat, the Trans-Caucasian Military District apparently having the most comprehensive training program. Those troops in Afghanistan drawn from the Turkestan Military District (who constituted a large proportion of the initial invasion force) are likely to have received some training in mountain warfare. The airborne forces are considered best suited for this sort of terrain, because of their high levels of motivation, light equipment scales and their mobility and flexibility. It may be fair to assume, then, that a proportion of the Soviet troops presently in Afghanistan are trained in mountain warfare, but the pattern of Soviet operations thus far suggests they are relying principally on firepower and "search and destroy" tactics rather than on small-unit operations specially tuned to the terrain.

At the same time, the Soviet technique of "air control," that is, air strikes against dissident villages to discourage support for the resistance--a tactic reminiscent of the Royal Air Force in Iraq and South Arabia in the 1920's-30's--is likely to be counterproductive in the long term. The attacks will intimidate some villagers into acquiescing to Soviet rule, but the large majority are likely to retain, if not to increase, their opposition to the government. Those that flee to the refugee camps will help to swell the ranks of the resistance movement and the reports of such atrocities help to discredit Soviet accounts of pacification. Finally, the destruction of villages, farms and crops increases the Soviet economic burden in terms of feeding the Afghan population.

The Afghan army, if it ever was an asset, has long since become a liability. Reports suggest that perhaps as much as 60% of the army has deserted or defected. Entire units have mutinied, frequently killing their Soviet advisers. The Soviets have been forced to disarm units they could not trust. Again, this has placed the burden of fighting on the Soviet Army, which has shown some problems of morale and discipline. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion an undetermined number of Soviet Central Asian troops defected after fraternization with the local population. By February 1980 the problem was sufficiently acute that the Soviets were forced to withdraw units containing Central Asian troops and to replace them with purely Slav units. Yet, even these troops have caused problems. In May, apparently "significant" numbers of Soviet soldiers refused to fire on demonstrating Afghan school children and were "removed" thereafter. This is believed to be one of the first open mutinies by regular Russian troops in many years and it is worth recalling that similar insubordination occurred during the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The morale of the Soviet troops is believed to have suffered considerably from exposure to the brutality of the Afghans. Soviet soldiers captured by the insurgents have been tortured and mutilated before being killed. Observers believe that the brutalizing effect of the war has led to a sharp increase in indiscipline amongst Soviet troops, who are now more frequently involved in incidents of rape, murder, robberies and looting. The Soviet troops are now said to be heavily involved in the "black market" economy of Kabul, including the sale of gasoline and weapons. Analysts also say that Soviet commanders are concerned about increasing use of hashish and other drugs by the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Although there are no reliable indications of the extent of the problem, some sources indicate that hashish has replaced scarce vodka as the Soviet soldier's recreational drug. As the Americans have discovered, drugs can create severe discipline problems in a conscript army in combat, and a volunteer army in peace time. If the Soviet problem is becoming widespread in Afghanistan--where, like South Asia, drugs are easy to acquire--there is a very real danger that it could spread to other parts of the army as units are rotated into and out of the combat zone. This is quite apart from the threat to Soviet civilian society, which already has a severe alcoholism problem and could, thus, be vulnerable to drug abuse.

Finally, with regard to the psychological warfare dimension, it should be emphasized first that the Soviets have been relatively successful in managing news coverage of the Afghan war, both in the West and at home. Censorship has proved a potent weapon in removing the events inside Afghanistan from the front pages of the Western media. The New York Times, for example, carried 61 stories of the fighting in Afghanistan in January 1980. By the end of the first fortnight of October, the number had shrunk to seven. But they have been unable to remove Afghanistan as an "issue" from the Western media. The invasion was undoubtedly a key factor in the election of Ronald Reagan in the United States and the more aggressive foreign policy emerging from the new administration.

Moreover, although the war has received little coverage at home, at least in relation to actual Soviet involvement in fighting, Soviet censorship has an unhealthy by-product: an active rumour mill, which can be very hard on the morale of a population inherently distrustful of their government's pronouncements. The lack of Soviet news about the war, particularly casualty figures, has produced speculation about "the truth." The absence of government candor on the subject of Afghanistan can only be harmful when more detailed, if occasionally inaccurate or tendentious, reports reach the Soviet population from Western sources such as the BBC, Voice of America and Radio Liberty. There may not be outspoken opposition to the war within the USSR, but evidence suggests there is not a large degree of public support either. After the first few months it was clear that the propaganda theme claiming that Soviet soldiers were in Afghanistan on "international duty" did not have much appeal. Since about mid-1980, when the first negative reports began to appear in the Soviet press, Soviet propaganda has switched to emphasizing that Soviet troops are in Afghanistan to "defend the Motherland." It is hard to know whether this patriotic theme, which normally has considerable appeal, has any credibility with respect to Afghanistan amongst the Soviet population.

One possible problem for the Soviet leadership is that the uncertain state of public opinion stemming from censorship of news on the Afghan war could blossom into widespread disillusionment and distrust on a greater scale if Soviet forces are compelled to fight in Poland. In those circumstances, a complete news blackout would probably be impossible, in spite of the capabilities of state propagandists. The implications for morale and discipline amongst the Soviet population as a whole could be severe.

This raises the one great imponderable--the will to continue. The author sees no evidence to suggest that this is lacking in the Soviet leadership, civilian or military. They are probably convinced that they can absorb the current casualty rates and, undoubtedly, even higher rates. For the time being at least, they can ignore public opinion and even, if it exists at all, criticism from within the ranks of the Party. Only a series of sharp defeats or embarrassments in Afghanistan which could not be covered up, combined perhaps with the opening of a "second-front" in Poland, might shake the Soviet will to continue the Afghan war.

B. The Afghan Resistance

In relation to the conditions for "peoples war" detailed by Elliott-Bateman, the Afghan resistance has most of the "subjective" conditions in its favour. Although it is impossible to measure political attitudes amongst the Afghan population, or even perhaps to get an accurate reading of attitudes amongst Afghan refugees, the consensus amongst informed Western observers is that the resistance has the popular support of most of the Afghan population, inside and outside of Afghanistan. Moreover, the Islamic faith gives the insurgents and their sympathizers a high level of motivation to fight against overwhelming military odds. The resistance views their struggle as a jihad, a holy war. There are even indications that the unity of purpose imposed on Afghanistan by the resistance to Soviet occupation is generating a kind of Afghan "nationalism" which has long eluded Afghan nation-builders. The divided and loosely organized nature of the resistance precludes easy Soviet penetration and disruption. Since the invasion the ranks of the mujahideen have been stiffened by a large influx of

Afghan soldiers bringing a degree of discipline, expertise, and some weapons.

All of what Elliott-Bateman calls "geopolitical" factors favour the resistance. Afghanistan is far too large and the terrain too diverse for the Soviets to establish total control of the countryside, at least without a many-fold increase in the number of troops in the occupation force. The terrain itself favours the guerrilla warfare tactics of the resistance, although there is a shortage of overhead cover, while imposing constraints on the mobility and effectiveness of the mechanized Soviet forces. The guerrillas are able to "live off the land"--at least to an extent. The Soviets are tied to lines of supply vulnerable to attack. In Pakistan the guerrillas have a relatively secure base area: Soviet harrassment on the present scale cannot disrupt recruitment and training and the Pakistani government seems prepared to tolerate the activities of the resistance so long as Soviet reprisals against Pakistan are not severe. Finally, Afghanistan's proximity to the strategic Persian Gulf brings the conflict into the sphere of competing powers. The West has a stake in the outcome inside Afghanistan and this makes Western support for the resistance more likely.

Where the resistance is weakest is in organizational aspects. There is no leadership around which to build a unified movement, a fact which informed observers attribute not only to ethnic differences but also to the predominance of the Sunni sect. By contrast with the Shiite, the Sunni sect lacks the rigid authoritarian hierarchy of Mullahs and Ayatullahs which in Iran provided the organizational nucleus of the revolution. At the small group level, however, the tribal or group religious leaders are influential, frequently in a negative sense. They lack political sophistication and understanding of military affairs. Trained military men joining the resistance after defecting from the Afghan army are frustrated by the ignorance and obstruction of the clergy.

Despite the fact that the various resistance groups claim thousands or even millions of followers, there is no evidence of a grass-roots political infrastructure. Such organization as there is appears to be haphazard and dependent largely upon the personal esteem of a local guerrilla or religious leader. Nor, as noted earlier, is there a clear political program. Beyond forcing the Soviets out of Afghanistan, there is no agreement between the principal resistance groups on the political future of a post-Soviet Afghanistan. The propaganda campaign is uncoordinated and subject to considerable distortion and exaggeration. This distortion is attributable in large measure to the predominance of the oral tradition of story-telling amongst the largely illiterate Afghan population. The nature of the war suggests that intelligence-gathering is not particularly difficult--sympathetic Afghan civilians are likely to pass along anything they know about Soviet activities. But again, this information is prone to distortion and, more important--because of a shortage of radio communications--is likely to take a long time to reach the insurgent commanders who could exploit the information.

On the whole, the resistance is poorly armed. The most common weapon is the WWI vintage Lee Enfield .303--a single shot, but accurate, rifle. Part of its appeal is the fact that ammunition is cheap and easy to acquire. But the resistance is also equipped with a variety of older weapons, as well as more modern ones. Clashes with Soviet and Afghan forces (particularly ambushes of vehicles) and defections from the Afghan army have brought increasing numbers of captured Soviet weapons including AK-47 automatic rifles, mortars, machine guns, and a few RPG anti-tank weapons and shoulder-fired SAMs. With the exception of the latter (and they may have only a handful of these), the resistance has no weapon to counter the Mi-24 helicopter gunship. All evidence suggests that they are receiving limited help from the outside. Egypt is the only country that has offered military training--and in December 1980 anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Other Islamic countries have donated funds for the refugees in Pakistan (now probably numbering over one million). Presumably some of that money reaches the resistance movement where it is used to buy weapons, food, and medical supplies. Despite reports that Britain and the U.S. have supplied arms to the resistance, there is no convincing evidence that they have done so. The most conclusive evidence would be a significant increase in the number of helicopters shot down. So far that has not happened. It is not known what weapons or other supplies, if any, have been provided by China.

4. Outside Influences.

To some extent, these have been dealt with already, but a few further observations could be made. First, the Third World, particularly the oil rich Islamic countries, represents a potentially powerful ally for the resistance. They carry an influential voice in the United Nations, and through oil revenues could easily finance military and propaganda operations of the resistance. The release of several millions of dollars solely for the purchase of large quantities of modern small arms would be a major boost by itself. The Islamic community, however, is divided internally--over the Palestinian question and the Iran-Iraq war--and is fearful of provoking the Soviet Union, which has the motive and the means to destabilize those Islamic regimes most likely to support the resistance (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan). Only Egypt has made a commitment to the armed struggle. Pakistan, moreover, appears to be entering a new period of turbulence which could result in the unseating of President Zia Ul-Haq. A successor regime might be willing to recognize the Afghan government and to clamp down on resistance activity originating from within Pakistan.

The West, which has a considerable stake in the outcome of Soviet activities in the region, has not done a great deal to support the resistance. The initially overzealous American reaction irritated the Europeans, who have demonstrated reluctance to follow the American lead. The Carter administration then backpedalled to bring its response more closely into line with that of the Europeans. Like the nations of the region, the Americans are vulnerable to Soviet pressure, particularly when economic factors come into play. They are understandably reluctant to take actions which might hamper lucrative trade with the Soviet bloc. The new American administration, on the other hand, indicated in early March 1981 that it might be prepared to supply weapons to the resistance. Given the current preoccupation with El Salvador, however, Afghanistan appears to have a relatively low priority. Nonetheless, Afghanistan remains one important area where the United States could cause significant trouble for the Soviets--on its own account or in response to Soviet meddling elsewhere. If the Islamic OPEC nations were to agree to "bankroll" the resistance, the United States could easily supply appropriate weapons in quantity.

The political and economic pressures working on the Soviet Union and its bloc at present constitute collectively the third major outside influence on the Afghan conflict. Internally, the Soviet Union suffers from a stagnating economy, food shortages, a looming energy crisis, declining living standards, widespread alcoholism and related social problems, and a "nationalities" problem--demographic shifts which will place the Russians in a minority. Externally, the situation in Poland poses a severe challenge to Communist orthodoxy which, if not arrested soon, could spread throughout the Eastern bloc. Furthermore, because of détente and the Soviet Union's decreasing ability to provide resources such as oil, the bloc nations are becoming enmeshed gradually in the trade cycles of the West, another factor which loosens the Soviet grip on its allies. The results of the most recent CPSU Congress--in particular the significant absence of change in leadership--suggests that the "tired old men" who run the Kremlin remain committed to resisting change of all types. This means that any modification of Soviet policies during the next five years will come about not as the result of planning but as the result of random leadership changes owing to the death of older members. A power struggle after Brezhnev's death, with all the uncertainty that entails, cannot be ruled out.

In the foreseeable future, the Polish crisis is one factor among those which might exert an influence on the Afghan war. If the Soviets are forced to invade and occupy Poland, taking on the additional burden of the Polish economy, Afghanistan could begin to appear to be an unnecessary problem. Quite apart from the question of whether the Soviet military machine could cope with a "two-front" war and still secure the border with China, there is simply the matter of priority. Poland is essential to the survival of the Soviet bloc; Afghanistan is not. Consequently, a Soviet occupation of Poland could provide the opportunity for a negotiated peace and a face-saving Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. However unlikely, this is a situation the West should be ready for.

In the longer term, the Soviet requirements for oil could affect their perceptions of and behaviour with regard to Afghanistan. The coincidence of oil shortages in the USSR (and its bloc) and internal instability in Iran could, at some point in the future, lead to a progressive Soviet involvement there with the objective of taking control of the country and its oil fields. While a pacified Afghanistan would provide a useful platform for Soviet intimidation, subversion or even invasion of Iran, continued unrest in Afghanistan would again raise the possibility of over-extending the commitments of the Soviet Army. That factor notwithstanding, it is possible that economic pressures and the potential gains to be made by controlling access to Persian Gulf oil could become too strong to resist, particularly if Iran offers opportunities for exploitation. In this case, a more rigorous repression of Afghanistan would probably precede action against Iran.

Trends

The current dearth of hard news about the fighting means that any attempt to identify trends in the Afghan war will be tentative. That said, it is possible to make several qualified observations. First, at current force levels the Soviets are likely to increase their control over the country only gradually in the foreseeable future, although to a greater or lesser extent they now control the major urban population centres. The Karmal regime will remain unpopular and unstable and may have to be replaced, if it does not collapse first out of its own internal conflicts. Secondly, as they gain more experience in counter-guerrilla operations, Soviet forces will inflict consistently higher levels of casualties on the insurgents. The level of resistance activity has already declined noticeably, although that may be due in part to winter weather. But, in the face of Soviet skill and firepower, a frontier sealed by mines and a population cowed by coercion, insurgent activity is likely to decline further, with the exception of isolated incidents of heavy fighting and occasional urban uprisings and terrorism. Resistance operations will probably be confined, over time, to less accessible areas of the country and, unless they receive large quantities of modern anti-armour and anti-aircraft weapons, the resistance will be unable to inflict unacceptable casualty rates on the Soviet forces. Third, the resistance appears unlikely to resolve soon its structural problems. Consequently, they will not be able to exert sufficient political leverage on the Soviets to convince them to withdraw. Nonetheless, resistance activity will continue, forcing the Soviets to maintain an occupation force in Afghanistan of at least the present size.

Outlook

Barring the following changes in the political/military situation:

1. a protracted Soviet military, political and economic commitment in Poland or elsewhere;
2. a massive influx of modern weapons for the insurgents;
3. major structural improvements in the resistance organization, specifically, the emergence of a unified leadership and command structure and a binding agreement for cooperation between groups;

then the Soviets will be able to retain their control of Afghanistan. It will not, in present circumstances, become their Vietnam. However, it could become a "Northern Ireland"--a political embarrassment, an administrative nuisance and a constant drain on troops and the economy. It would not be sufficiently pacified to be fully integrated into the USSR as a Republic, but the Soviets would have to govern and occupy it in perpetuity. On the other hand, it might in time become sufficiently stable to serve as a platform for launching political or military operations against surrounding countries. A Baluch liberation movement in Iran or Pakistan, for example, might serve as a useful vehicle for further regional destabilization and the extension of Soviet influence.

If, however, any of those three changes were to obtain, the Soviet position in Afghanistan would be weakened substantially. Only the first, in the analyst's opinion, would be likely to produce an "asset to liability shift", thereby providing an opportunity to negotiate some form of political solution.

In summary, then, given the working assumptions established at the beginning of this study, it would seem that while effective resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is possible, only assistance from the West and the Third World can ensure a protracted campaign that would prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting strategically its position in Afghanistan.

Appendix A

Technical and Aid Agreements with USSR and Soviet Bloc

During 1980 the Afghan government concluded agreements with the USSR covering Soviet provision of agricultural and livestock experts, cooperation on printing, film production, health, transportation, scientific development and cultural affairs. In addition, the Soviet government provided grants to cover purchase of printing machines, oil and gas equipment, phosphates, cereals, cotton, photographic supplies and consumer goods. On 29 January 1981 a Soviet trade delegation (headed by the deputy head of the Import Department of the Ministry of Foreign Trade) arrived in Afghanistan to negotiate a five-year agreement for exchange of goods. The same day the Soviet and Afghan governments signed agreements providing for: the establishment of three technical training schools; cooperation between ministries of higher and vocational education in both countries; technical and driver training courses for Afghans, in the USSR.

The Afghan government has also concluded several agreements with Czechoslovakia and East Germany. These covered provision of clothing, foodstuffs, medical equipment and supplies, heavy machinery, teaching and sports equipment to Afghanistan.

Appendix B

Recent Developments in the Afghan Government

In an obvious attempt to broaden the base of his government, Babrak Karmal announced on 27 December 1980 plans to establish a "National Fatherland Front." Clearly the regime hopes this will develop into a broad political coalition that would have greater appeal than the PDPA. At a meeting attended by party and government representatives, together with non-party and tribal spokesmen, a 44-member commission was established to draft a charter for the Front's first congress. Representatives of "all classes, strata and democratic groups, and all social and religious forces" will allegedly be invited to apply to the commission to participate in the congress, to be held around the end of this month (March 1981).

Karmal told the commission that the Front's chief duty would be to enlist the Afghan people "in the building of a new society" which would respect tradition and Islam, while at the same time explaining, publicizing and propagating the policy of the government. He followed up this declaration by meeting (4 January 1981) with tribal leaders in Paktia province, who allegedly pledged their support to the Front.

The "broad front" strategy is a classic revolutionary tactic, although it usually precedes rather than follows a seizure of power. It is quite likely that the Soviets (and perhaps Karmal) regard this as a tool for the development of a consensus government less closely identified with Marxism and the Russians. In the absence of any follow-up news on the Front it is not possible to determine whether it is in fact gaining any support. Given its late arrival on the Afghan political scene--and the manner of its birth--the National Fatherland Front will have a difficult time convincing the Afghan population that it is anything other than a Soviet puppet organization.

The Afghan Resistance countered the Karmal government's Front strategy by announcing the same day (27 December 1980) the establishment of a resistance news agency, the Afghan Press Agency. Headed by a former Afghan civil aviation official and a Pakistani journalist, it is based in London, with bureaus in Pakistan, India and Iran.

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Dr. Carl Jacobsen, Director of Soviet Studies, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami

Professor David Jones, Director, Russian Micro Project , Dalhousie University

Colonel William F. Scott, Professor, Russian Studies, Georgetown University

Mrs. Harriet F. Scott, Soviet Analyst

Dr. Stephen Sternheimer, Professor, Boston University and Research Fellow, Russian Research Centre, Harvard University

Professor Peter Vigor, Director, Soviet Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst

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STUDY NO 5: NORTHERN IRELAND

Aim

The objective of this study is to determine whether political violence has become institutionalized in Northern Ireland to the extent that it may be expected to continue indefinitely.

Parameters: although the study will examine sources of conflict and events as they have evolved since 1969, the focus will be on the current situation, looking to the immediate future.

Working Assumptions: that by "institutionalized" political violence the analyst means a tradition of endemic social and political conflict that may be transmitted from generation to generation because the groups in conflict have an interest in maintaining that condition.

Data

Status: Northern Ireland is a province of the United Kingdom. It was self-governing, with its own legislature, for fifty years (1922-72). Since March 1972 the British Government has ruled Northern Ireland directly, through the office of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Members of Parliament from the province sit at Westminster.

Population: 1,547,000 (1981)

Main Cities:	Belfast	354,000 (1978)
	Londonderry	88,000 (1978)
	Lisburn	82,000 (1978)
	Newtownabbey	75,000 (1978)

Estimated GNP: $6,367,800,000 (1978 - approx. exchange rate £/$)

Economic: Although Northern Ireland experienced economic growth above U.K. average 1974-77, growth was mainly in services, particularly government services. This was offset by a decline relative to the U.K. in manufacturing. Principal production activities: food, drink, tobacco, textiles, clothing, shipbuilding. The British government supports the Northern Ireland economy with grants and subsidies to the Northern Ireland Consolidated Fund. In Fiscal Year 1978/79 these reached £859 million. Unemployment rate (1979) was 11.3%, almost double the rate for the U.K. as a whole.

Language: English.

Religion: Protestants outnumber Catholics by about 2/1.

Geography: Total area: 14,120 sq. km. Belfast is heavily industrial with a high population density, but most of the remainder of the province is rural, agricultural with much lower population density. The countryside is open, rolling, treed but not heavily forested. Large hill features dominate the southeast and the west central parts of this province and a large lake is set almost in the centre. The border with the Irish Republic, covering 412 km, is ill-defined and easily crossed.

Historical Background

The roots of the present troubles stretch back to at least the 17th Century, when Protestant/Catholic conflict was acute, not just in Ireland, but in the British Isles as a whole. During the 19th Century Irish nationalism experienced a revival, spurring the British to consider proposals for Irish "home rule." Home rule was postponed in 1914 by Protestant obstinacy and the outbreak of the First World War. Nationalists attempted a hopeless uprising in 1916 which would have been all but forgotten except for British reprisals--execution of the leaders of the uprising. This "martyrdom" inspired a revolutionary campaign of terrorism, propaganda and guerrilla warfare, 1919-21. In 1922, the Irish Free State was created, excluding the six Protestant-dominated counties of Ulster which remained under British rule. Prior to 1969, several attempts by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to coerce Britain to give up Northern Ireland failed dismally. In the mid-1960's the (Protestant) Unionist Party, under the leadership of Terence O'Neill, initiated a cautious reform programme designed to ease discrimination against Catholics in housing, employment and social services. At the same time, inspired at least in part by the American experience, a Catholic civil rights movement developed and gained a high profile and much sympathy, particularly in Britain. The reforms and the civil rights protests frightened the Protestants, who feared assimilation into the Irish Republic. This fear manifested itself in communal violence between Catholics and Protestants which overwhelmed the local law enforcement capabilities in August 1969, leading to introduction of the British troops into Northern Ireland.

Chronology of Major Recent Events

14-15 Aug. 1969 - British troops called out "in aid of the civil power" to quell rioting in Londonderry and Belfast.

19 Aug. 1969 - General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland assumes responsibility for security.

10 Oct. 1969 - Publication of Hunt Report on Royal Ulster Constabulary (police) reorganization. Main recommendations: disarming of RUC and

disbandment of "B-Specials" auxiliary police force.

Jan. 1970 - Split in IRA--division into Official and Provisional IRA.

1 Apr. 1970 - Ulster Defence Regiment--army reserve unit--raised.

3 July 1970 - Falls Road searches--first gun battle between Army and IRA.

6 Feb. 1971 First regular British soldier killed.

9 Aug. 1971 - Internment operation--342 people detained without trial.

30 Jan. 1972 - Bloody Sunday. Paratroopers shot and killed 13 people during rioting in Londonderry. "No Go" areas established by IRA.

24 Mar. 1972 - Direct Rule imposed from London. Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont prorogued. William Whitelaw appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Army ordered to adopt low-profile.

July 1972 - Meeting between IRA leaders and British Government in London, but negotiations achieve nothing.

21 July 1972 - Bloody Friday--IRA bombs kill 13 and injure 130 in Belfast.

31 July 1972 - Operation "Motorman"--security forces clear "No Go" areas in Belfast and Londonderry.

18 Mar. 1973 - IRA bombs exploded in London, 200 persons injured.

28 July 1973 - Elections for Northern Ireland Assembly.

8-9 Dec. 1973 - Sunningdale conference to discuss details of power sharing.

4 Feb. 1974 - IRA bomb blew up bus carrying soldiers and families in Britain--12 killed.

15-26 May 1974 - Ulster Worker's Council strike--Protestant backlash. Collapse of power-sharing agreement.

July 1974 - Bomb at Tower of London. 1 killed, 42 injured.

6 Oct. 1974 - 5 killed, 67 injured in bombing of pub in Guildford, England.

22 Nov. 1974 - 19 killed, 180 injured in bombing of pub in Birmingham, England.

29 Nov. 1974 - Parliament passed Prevention of Terrorism Act. IRA proscribed.

Aug. 1975 - Bomb injured 33 persons at pub in Surrey.

5 Sept. 1975 - 2 killed, 63 injured by bomb at London hotel.

Oct. 1975 - 3 bombing incidents in London killed 3, injured 38.

27 Nov. 1975 - Assassination of writer Ross McWhirter in London.

5 Dec. 1975 - End of internment without trial.

6-12 Dec. 1975 - Balcombe Street siege--hostage-taking in London.

6-7 Jan. 1976 - Spearhead Battalion and first squadron of Special Air Service (SAS) deployed to Northern Ireland to reinforce British presence in South Armagh.

1 Mar. 1976 - British Government announces intention to phase out Special Category Status for IRA prisoners.

2 July 1976 - British Government announces intention to expand UDR and RUC.

21 July 1976 - British Ambassador to Dublin assassinated.

10 Aug. 1976 - 3 children killed by IRA getaway car. Start of Peace Movement.

7 Mar.-22 Apr. 1977 - IRA hunger strike at Portlaoise Prison in Dublin.

27-28 July 1977 - Provisional and Official IRA feud left 4 dead, 25 injured in more than 40 incidents.

19 Jan. 1978 - European Court of Human Rights cleared Britain of charges of torture in allegations arising from internment operation in 1971.

17 Feb. 1978 - 12 persons killed in fire-bombing of restaurant in Belfast.

5 May 1978 - Anglo-Irish talks in Dublin on cross-border security cooperation.

19 Aug. 1978 - 8 bombs planted by Provisional IRA exploded at British Army bases in Germany.

16 Mar. 1979 - Bennett report on RUC interrogation methods published--contained some criticism.

22 Mar. 1979 - British Ambassador to Netherlands assassinated in The Hague.

30 Mar. 1979 - British M.P. Airey Neave assassinated at Westminster. Irish National Liberation Army claimed responsibility.

27 Aug. 1979 - Assassination of Lord Mountbatten in Irish Republic. 18 soldiers killed in bombing at Warrenpoint in Ulster.

2 Oct. 1979 - Sir Maurice Oldfield appointed as Chief Security Coordinator in Northern Ireland.

5 Oct. 1979 - Anglo-Irish talks in London.

11 Dec. 1979 - Charles Haughey, regarded as nationalist, becomes Prime Minister of Ireland.

7 Jan.-25 Mar. 1980 - Conference at Stormont on power-sharing ended without success because of intransigence of Protestant and Catholic sides.

Feb.-Mar. 1980 - IRA "hit team" attacked British troops in West Germany on four separate occations. One army officer was killed.

27 June 1980 - Assassination of Miriam Daly, founder of Irish Republican Socialist Party.

June 1980 - European Commission on Human Rights rejected IRA plea to be regarded as "political prisoners."

2 July 1980 - U.K. government tabled a Green Paper (Consultative) on proposals for devolution of power to Stormont. Proposals include an assembly elected by proportional representation and a bi-partisan executive.

27 Oct.-18 Dec. 1980 - IRA hunger strike at Maze Prison. Ended without concession by the government on special status.

8 Dec. 1980 - Meeting in Dublin between British and Irish Prime Ministers. Discussions centered on Anglo-Irish relationship and possible "new institutional structures" for cooperation between Britain, Dublin, and Ulster.

Jan. 1981 - Reprisal attacks--Protestant gunmen seriously wounded Bernadette (Devlin) McAliskey and the Provisional IRA responded by murdering Protestant leader Sir Norman Stronge.

Organizations Involved in Conflict

1. Political Groupings.

Since 1971, when the provincial assembly at Stormont was prorogued, the British Parliament at Westminster has borne full political responsibility for the province. Government policy and executive decisions are enacted by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the "lead minister" responsible to Parliament for Northern Ireland affairs. His executive arm is the Northern Ireland Office, a ministry with its own civil service staff, through which the government acts in all areas of its jurisdiction: finance and taxation, industry and trade, social services, security, etc. Other ministries intimately involved with the Irish problem cooperate, when required, with NIO. These include: Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Office, the Exchequer, and the Home Office. The Conservative Party, under the leadership of Mrs. Thatcher, came to power in 1979 with a strong majority and need not face re-election for nearly three more years. Northern Ireland policy, then, is likely to remain consistent through that period, resting on two principles: first, commitment to finding a political solution which will lead to some kind of devolved power-sharing arrangement; and secondly, a tough, uncompromising approach to terrorism, while at the same time gradually reducing the regular army presence in the conflict.

Although Stormont has been inactive for nearly a decade, political party activity has in no way ceased. In fact, it has flourished. Twelve Ulster M.P's sit at Westminster. Others are closely identified with the Opposition Forces. The main political groupings in Ulster are as follows:

a) Official Unionist Party - the traditional party of Protestant domination in the North. Governed unchallenged at Stormont, 1922-1972. Under leadership of Terence O'Neill, began to steer a moderate reformist course in the 1960's, but that threatened to split the party and O'Neill was forced to resign, making way for more conservative elements. Although not as extreme as Ian Paisley's

Democratic Unionist Party, the Unionists insist on retaining the constitutional link with Britain. Heavily influenced by Enoch Powell, their most articulate M.P., the Unionist Party boycotted the winter 1980 devolution talks, pressing the British government instead to reform local government--in short, seeking a solution to the minority problem within the existing constitutional framework. They remain sceptical of the Green Paper proposals of July 1980, their leader James Molyneux criticizing what he regarded as plans for a "rigged assembly" and two rival cabinets. The Unionist Party have five seats at Westminster. Two other Unionists and two independents are also in Parliament.

b) Democratic Unionist Party - extremely conservative Protestant party, formed as a splinter of the official Unionists in 1971 under the leadership of Reverend Ian Paisley, a fundamentalist minister. Paisley is an M.P. at Westminster and also received a large vote in elections for the European Parliament. He regards himself as the new leader of the Northern Ireland Protestants. Paisley and the DUP are opposed in principle to any form of power-sharing with the Catholic minority "now, and for all time." The party relies heavily on scare tactics and conspiracy theories to convey their distrust of British initiatives to their voters. Their stand on power-sharing brought the 1980 conference to a standstill. Recently, Paisley has taken to mustering opposition to a supposed Anglo-Irish conspiracy (hatched at the Thatcher-Haughey summit in December) to force the two parts of Ireland together. Paisley's sincere belief in "Papist" plots aside, his recent demagogic outbursts probably have more to do with local elections in May--wherein he hopes to improve the standings of the DUP in relation to the much larger Official Unionists. The DUP holds three seats in the British Parliament.

c) Social Democratic and Labour Party - formed in 1970, predominantly Catholic moderate socialist party, led by John Hume. Opposed to violence, but sympathetic both to the Catholic struggle for equal rights and Irish nationalism generally. Sees unity between North and South as the ultimate long-term solution. SDLP asks that the "Guarantee"--that Ulster will remain part of the U.K. so long as the majority wish it--be removed, to force the two communities into dialogue. SDLP insistence on the "Irish dimension," i.e., the question of unity, in the 1980 talks gave Paisley the excuse he needed to be obstructive, and thus contributed to their failure. The SDLP did not reject out of hand the Green Paper proposals and indicated, despite the absence of an "Irish dimension," that they would remain open to further talks.

d) Alliance Party - formed in 1970, the smallest of the legitimate political parties and potentially very promising. It is bipartisan even to a greater degree than SDLP and captured 14% of the moderate Protestant-Catholic vote in the last local government elections. In the winter 1980 talks the Alliance advocated power-sharing through executive committees with party leaders placed in office in proportion to party strengths. They opposed any institutionalized Irish dimension while accepting the importance of European Community, economic and other links with the Irish Republic. The Alliance Party faces a real test in the upcoming local elections--to retain and if possible expand its share of the vote.

There are other "political groupings" in Ulster, but as they are closely linked with extremist groups they will be included in "Opposition Forces."

2. Security Forces.

The security forces consist of the regular British Army, the locally raised part-time Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) and the police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Since 1969 the General Officer Commanding (GOC), currently Major-General Richard Lawson, has been the senior officer responsible for security force policy and operations. He works in close cooperation with the Chief Constable of the RUC, John Hermon, who commands the police force and who also sits with the GOC on the Operational Policy Committee, the senior decision-making body with respect to security matters. The committee also includes representatives from the intelligence services and army and police information branches. Since October 1979 a civilian "security coordinator" has chaired this committee. Army

Headquarters Northern Ireland, at Lisburn, organized the security force command structure, dividing Northern Ireland into three large brigade areas which correspond approximately to police regional and divisional boundaries. 3 Brigade, centered on Londonderry, is responsible for the western half of the province; 8 Brigade, with headquarters at Portadown, looks after the southern border region, including South Armagh; and 39 Brigade, based on Belfast, watches over the north and the east. Regular British Army, UDR and RUC units are stationed in each of the brigade areas.

A. British Army--numbering 10,000-11,000 men and women, consisting of ten "teeth" units, plus supporting elements. This is about half of the total number of troops present during the peak year of 1972. Six of these units (five infantry, one armoured) are "resident"--stationed in Ulster for two years, the soldiers accompanied by their families. The other four--infantry and other units--are "roulement," that is, short-term, based in the province for 4½ month tours. Most of the "roulement" troops are committed to the three "hard" areas: West Belfast, West Londonderry and South Armagh. There they are paired with a resident battalion to ensure continuity in the exchange of information and experience. Most of the units are army infantry battalions, but the Royal Marines have seen duty in Northern Ireland, as have troops of Special Air Service Regiment, elements of which are stationed there at present. The Army Air Corps provide helicopters for troop lift, patrols and photo-reconnaissance. The single armoured unit is equipped with wheeled armoured cars, mainly for convoy protection in rural areas, such as South Armagh.

When army units deploy to Ulster they leave their heavy weapons and mechanized equipment behind. The 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Gun is the heaviest weapon the army deploys in the province. Because of its range and firepower it is unsuitable for "peacekeeping" operations in urban areas and is used only rarely in rural areas, if at all. The soldier on patrol usually carries the 7.62mm Self-Loading Rifle (the same weapon as the Canadian FNC1), although some are now equipped with the lighter 5.56mm Armalite rifle, which is more suitable for this sort of operation.

Before deploying to Ulster, army units spend several weeks "working up." Although the army now contains a high proportion of veterans of Ulster service, pre-deployment preparation is essential to re-tune the soldiers' internal security skills and to prepare the soldiers, especially those who have not seen duty there, for the stress of service in Northern Ireland. The army has some training areas where the operational conditions of Northern Ireland can be simulated.

B. Ulster Defence Regiment--7,300 men and women in 11 battalions. Established in April 1970 to replace the disbanded Special Constabulary (the B-Specials) with a tightly controlled, disciplined non-partisan home defence unit under regular army command. The regiment now includes about 2,500 troops on full-time service, the remainder being part-time. Seven hundred of the regiment are women. The Brigadier commanding the UDR, battalion commanders and about 100 other positions are filled by officers and NCO's from the regular army. The regiment is equipped to light scales and is not trained or intended for operations outside of the Ulster theatre and environment. The eleven battalions are deployed throughout the province and in the quieter areas the UDR shares with the RUC the primary role in law enforcement. They also operate in close cooperation with regular army units, relieving them of many tasks such as static roadblocks and vehicle searches.

C. Royal Ulster Constabulary--6,700 regulars and 4,600 reservists, in 11 divisions across the province. Responsible for all normal law enforcement activities--criminal investigation, traffic, etc.--although in "hard" areas it defers to the regular army. RUC Special Branch, which works closely with CID, is responsible for collating all intelligence with respect to internal security. In Belfast the Special Patrol Group (SPG) combats sectarian murders through surveillance and saturation patrolling (in uniform or plain clothes). In rural areas, Divisional Mobile Support Units (DMSU) of 30-40 men/division, carry out tasks similar to that of the SPG. The RUC carries out mobile patrols in Shorland light-armoured land rovers. When on patrol, carrying out searches or mounting roadblocks, the policemen wear flak vests and carry light automatic weapons. The 1969 riots and the disarming of the RUC shortly thereafter demoralized the force. Almost totally Protestant, it was suspect in Catholic eyes, unwelcome in Catholic areas. Recruitment declined until 1973. Since then the force has been reorganized, rearmed and reintroduced to "beat" policing. Initially, the army had to escort the police on patrol, but the force now operates independently in much of the province, assisted when necessary by the UDR. The RUC is a relatively young force--fully one-third of its current establishment have joined since 1970--and they have suffered their full share of casualties during the insurgent campaign: 138 killed and 3,482 wounded up to 30 June 1980.

3. Opposition Forces.

The opposition forces consist of a variety of Irish nationalist and Protestant terrorist organizations, their associated political movements and their front organizations. The principal opposition forces are as follows:

A. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)--the principal terrorist organization operating in Northern Ireland. Formed in 1970 following a split in the IRA over tactics. The left wing wanted to continue the 1960's trend of social action. The traditionalists wanted a return to para-military action. They broke away and formed the PIRA. The Provisionals' para-military organization is headed by a Chief of Staff, said to be Gerry Adams, with the support of the Army Council. The Council controls a military-style staff organization, responsible for intelligence, supplies, finance and similar tasks. Up to 1977, the military wing maintained (largely for propaganda purposes) a pseudo-military structure of brigades, battalions and companies, although these titles bore no relation in terms of strength or organization to conventional military formations. In fact, operations were carried out by "Active Service Units," small teams, usually of less than six men. The organization, distributed geographically, rested originally on a solid base of popular support (tempered by intimidation) within the Catholic areas, Belfast and Londonderry in particular. But after the indiscriminate shooting and bombing of 1972 and the British Army's removal of the "No Go" areas, popular support declined. British security and social/economic initiatives, and memories of the relatively harsh regime of the PIRA in the "No Go" areas combined to shift public opinion. By the mid-1970's the Provisionals had moved their command and administrative base to the Republic. The security forces were able to penetrate the loose brigade and battalion structure in the North, arresting many of the remaining members. Defections further depleted the ranks.

In 1977-78 Adams and Ivor Bell reorganized the PIRA. Borrowing undoubtedly from the experience of more sophisticated terrorist groups (the Red Brigades, for example), they adopted a smaller cellular structure and introduced a more selective pattern of recruiting. At the same time, the system is designed to be flexible. In Belfast, for example, PIRA cells are not permanent. There the PIRA draws on a pool of 16-18 men, creating a new cell of 5-10 men for each operation. The cell is briefed on its task, no names are mentioned and the cell members disperse after the operation. They may operate anywhere in the city, not being tied to any specific geographic area. The bombing organization, distinct from the gunmen, is small and tight, although the PIRA can draw on a large number of persons who will actually plant bombs. The gunmen and bombers tend to be aged 26-30, although there are many younger people in the organization as well. Most leave the movement around age 30 and a decreasing rate of reinvolvement of those released from the Maze Prison is forcing the PIRA to use its top men for recruiting. If a member of the Army Council is arrested and jailed, he usually loses his position and does not automatically resume it when released. Lower ranking members who are arrested are generally replaced by new recruits. The full range of training is not available to the young recruits, although some go the whole route. The PIRA in West Belfast is receiving some assistance from foreigners--Germans, Italians and Americans. The security forces currently estimate the strength of the PIRA at about 350 hard-core activists--the commanders, staffs, gunmen and bombers--supported by 2,000-3,000 sympathizers who will steal cars, collect funds and provide safe houses.

The PIRA has sufficient weapons for its members, although they consist of a mixed selection. The favoured weapons are the American M-16 automatic rifle (or its civilian counterpart, the Armalite) and the Remington Woodmaster, equipped with telescopic sights for sniping. Some Soviet weapons, including automatic rifles, RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers, grenades and explosives have been used by the PIRA. Mostly, they rely on whatever weapons they can find, steal or purchase on the international arms market--this includes shotguns, sporting rifles, Sten, Sterling, and Thompson submachine guns. The security forces have even captured home-made firearms. Several M-60 medium machine guns stolen from an armoury in the United States turned up in the province, but apart from their propaganda value, they were of little use to the PIRA and all have been recaptured. The real talent of the PIRA lies in its bomb-making. They have come a long way from the days of packages of dynamite or cars filled with ANFO (a mixture of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and fuel oil).

In the bomb factories in the South, experts trained at Soviet- or Cuban-run courses in Libya now prepare devices with sophisticated tamper-proof radio-controlled detonators. This is the sort of bomb that killed Lord Mountbatten and the soldiers at Warrenpoint. These factories also produce home-built mortars and ammunition for them. Another PIRA explosives specialty is the incendiary device, the most clever type being disguised as a tape cassette.

In both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic the PIRA is an illegal organization, but its political wing, Provisional Sinn Fein, operates as a legal political party with its headquarters in Dublin. Ruairi O Bradaigh (Rory O'Brady) is the President of Provisional Sinn Fein. Gerry Adams is the Vice-president. The political and military wings are clearly very closely integrated, some members like Adams belonging to both wings. The Provisional Sinn Fein has regional committees and local branches covering all the counties of North and South. There is also a women's section (Cumann na Bann) and a youth section (Fianna na Eireann).

The PIRA has an annual budget estimated at £2-3 million. This pays for weapons, subsistence for members living "underground," support for families whose relatives are imprisoned, and for infrastructure support (safe houses, transport and supplies). Both the PIRA and Sinn Fein play a role in finance. Bank robberies by the PIRA are now the primary source of funds and these are undertaken increasingly in the Republic. In 1979, for example, 434 robberies netted £568,000. Up to 8 August 1980, 186 robberies had yielded £104,000. Sinn Fein prefers to work through front organizations, under the guise that the funds donated are solely for the relief of distressed families of IRA prisoners. The main Provisional welfare organization is the Dublin-based An Cumann Cabhrach. In 1975 it claimed to be paying out £500,000 annually to IRA prisoners' families--by 1978 this had dropped to £200,000. In Northern Ireland this assistance is channelled through the Green Cross committee in Belfast and similar groups elsewhere. Green Cross also acts as a channel for funds extracted by protection rackets, the Falls Taxi Association, a PIRA front, being case in point. About one-third of the FTA's funds are donated to Green Cross.

Through most of the decade the United States was an important source of funds. In 1970, three veterans of the old IRA (of the 1919-21 era) founded the Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC, also known as Noraid). It raises funds from donations and social functions. Between 1971 and 1978 it sent more than $1,472,000 to its "foreign principal" in the Irish Republic. Although Noraid usually maintains that its funds are used for welfare purposes, they are equivocal about the actual disbursements, making it clear that they have no objection to funds being used to buy weapons. In 1976, in fact, there was a clear discrepancy between declared Noraid remittances and amounts distributed by relief organizations. Noraid and its members have been implicated in gun-running cases and known PIRA members have served as Noraid trustees. Recently, however, owing probably to pressure from the Irish and American governments, American contributions are said to have dropped substantially.

The PIRA's armed struggle and its fund-raising campaign are supported by a well-oiled propaganda organization, the Irish Republican Publicity Bureau (both the Provisionals and the Officials use the same title). The Bureau, based in Dublin, has a full-time staff, with subordinate directors in Belfast, Londonderry and elsewhere in the North. Statements by the Provisional Army Council are always signed "P. O'Neill," a cover name. In fact the Provisionals' Press Officer is Sean Brady, brother of Rory. The PIRA's principal propaganda outlet is the weekly An Phoblacht/Republican News. Their propaganda is also pushed by numerous sympathetic organizations, which give an air of respectability to their campaign, as well as creating the impression that it is part of a "broad front" with widespread popular support. This is, of course, a classic revolutionary tactic. Various supporting groups include the following:

1) Front Organizations
    a) Republican Clubs;
    b) Tenant's Associations;
    c) Defence Associations--for example, the Belfast Central Citizens Defence Committee is a church-inspired organization covering 13 Catholic areas in Belfast and heavily involved in promoting IRA interests;
    d) Action Committees--examples: Minority Rights Association, Committee for Truth (a "brutality" allegations outlet), Association of Irish Priests;
    e) Catholic Ex-Servicemen's Association--leadership heavily penetrated by IRA;
    f) local "ad hoc" committees.

2) Other Sympathetic Organizations
    a) Irish Civil Rights Association;
    b) International Marxist Group;
    c) Committee for Social Justice;
    d) National Committee for Civil Liberties;
    e) Committee for Social Justice;
    f) Irish National Caucus--an American congressional lobby founded in 1974. Leadership outspoken in support of PIRA. Lobbied successfully in 1979 to prevent sale of American small arms to RUC.

Links with International Terrorist Organizations:

Since 1971 the PIRA has developed links with the international terrorist network (some IRA trained at Palestinian camps before the 1970 split into Provisional and Official). The PIRA was represented at the first international conference of terrorist organizations, held in Florence, Italy in 1971 under the auspices of Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, radical Italian millionaire. PIRA also attended follow-up meetings with Palestinians and other groups such as the Basque ETA and Breton nationalists. During the course of these meetings arrangements were made to ship arms to the Provisionals and for PIRA members to receive guerrilla training in Lebanon and South Yemen. Three large shipments of Soviet-made weapons were intercepted in transit by European and Irish security forces, but smaller shipments got through. PIRA bomb-makers, including those responsible for the Mountbatten/Warrenpoint operations, are believed to have been trained by KGB or Cuban DGI instructors at camps in Libya. In addition, some European radical groups, including the following organizations, lend agitprop support to the PIRA:

a) West German-Ireland Solidarity Committee--it is possible that this group has provided support (transport, safe houses) for PIRA terrorists carrying out operations against British forces in Germany;

b) Comité Irlande--French radical group, whose principal function is to arrange pro-Republican meetings and tours in France;

c) Ierland Komite Nederland--carries out demonstrations in support of the Provisionals.

The other terrorist organizations in Northern Ireland do not figure as prominently in the violence, although Protestant para-military groups are always willing to match murder for murder in sectarian killings. Very little is known about some groups. Details are as follows:

B. Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA)--Irish nationalist, Marxist-Leninist organization, the lineal descendent of the old IRA. After the unsuccessful border campaign (1956-62) the IRA lost a great deal of its violent impetus. The leaders at the time, increasingly influenced by Marxist members, decided to move into the field of social action, building a Marxist-Leninist grass-roots political organization, eventually to unite and transform North and South into a single socialist state. The IRA was caught unprepared by the violence in 1969 and a debate on the real role of the IRA ensued. This led to the split in January 1970 which led to the creation of the Provisional IRA--the traditionalists who believe the IRA's role is protection of the Catholic community and reunification of the two Irelands by force. The OIRA was drawn into the violence, but since 1972 has concentrated on political activity and has used terrorism infrequently. It has also clashed with the PIRA and other groups. In both Ulster and the Republic the OIRA are regarded as a political rather than a political/military threat.

There are no figures available on OIRA membership and although it claims to remain an armed organization, it is the political wing which is the more important and better organized. The Officials' political wing is known as Sinn Fein The Workers Party (SFWP). Based in Dublin, it operates as a legal political party which fields candidates (unsuccessfully) in elections in the South. A party executive committee, comprising the President, 16 members elected at the annual convention and 13 area representatives, governs SFWP. The President is Tomas MacGiolla who heads the party in the Republic and the Vice-President is Seamus Lynch, Chairman of Republican Clubs The Workers Party, in the North. While the clubs are integral to SFWP, the organizations are separate because of the national boundary. Like Provisional Sinn Fein, SFWP's women's section is known as Cumann na Bann. The youth section is the Irish Democratic Youth Movement. The issue of armed struggle has caused divisions in the party. In 1974 a faction favouring a return to violence broke away to form the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP), of which more will be said later. In 1977 MacGiolla renounced all links with the OIRA, declaring that the SFWP was totally opposed to terrorist and para-military groups. As OIRA has been inactive throughout the period since, it seems fair to conclude that without SFWP support it is a spent force. Nonetheless, it still maintains a propaganda arm; like the PIRA's it is called the Irish Republican Publicity Bureau and is organized on similar lines. The OIRA publishes a monthly newsletter, United Irishman. The OIRA also has front organizations, including its own Republican Clubs, as well as Tenant's Associations. Some fronts work for both the Officials and the Provisionals. Prominent organizations sympathetic to the OIRA include:

1) Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA)--founded in the mid-1960's as an independent bipartisan group, now heavily penetrated by the OIRA and the Irish Communist Party. Amongst its more active members is Sean McBride, former IRA Chief of Staff, now prominent in Amnesty International;
2) Association for Legal Justice--the principal agency for coordinating the campaign alleging brutality during internment and interrogation. They have worked with NICRA in a campaign to discredit the security forces.

Official Sinn Fein Republican Clubs established in the United States made little impression because of their openly "socialist" objectives and have clearly been eclipsed by Provisional fronts.

C. Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)--Irish nationalist, Marxist-Leninist (Trotskyite?) group. Formed in 1975 after the split in official Sinn Fein that led to creation of the IRSP resulted in violence. Attacks by the OIRA and the security forces decimated the ranks of the early INLA but they rebuilt gradually to current state, where it has perhaps 50 members. Based in Dublin, it recruited dropouts from the PIRA and appears to have greater appeal than the confused ideology of the PIRA. Although it cannot mount a sustained campaign of its own, it has claimed responsibility for persistent attacks on the security forces in Northern Ireland. It has also been active outside Ulster, carrying out a major robbery (£½ million) in the Republic in June 1978, as well as claiming responsibility for the assassination of British M.P. Airey Neave in March 1979. It may also have carried out the assassination of the British ambassador to the Netherlands in 1979 and the attacks on British servicemen in West Germany in 1980.

IRSP, INLA's political wing, is also small and faction-ridden. It has tried unsuccessfully to ally itself with the Provisionals and some small ultra-left wing and Trotskyite groups. In 1976 Bernadette Devlin McAliskey led 10 members out of the party over ideological issues and formed the Irish Socialist Party in 1977. The IRSP was weakened further when its leader, Seamus Costello, was assassinated in Dublin the same year.

IRSP does not pose a credible political threat but the INLA maintains a significant presence in certain areas of Belfast and Londonderry.

D. Protestant para-military groups--the Ulster Defence Association, formed in 1971, acts as a kind of "umbrella" political/military front for a variety of small groups--rather in the same manner as the PLO is an umbrella for a large number of Palestinian organizations. It is a Protestant loyalist movement, dedicated to preserving the constitutional tie to Great Britain. No figures on membership are available, but with a much larger population to draw upon it does not appear to lack for members. Strength of the military branches may run to several hundred, or perhaps even into the thousands. They have attacked the security forces from time to time, but concentrate on sectarian "tit for tat" murders--reprisals for PIRA actions. Principal sub-groups are:

1) Ulster Volunteer Force--formed in 1966, and most active 1974-75;
2) Ulster Freedom Fighters;
3) Red Hand Commandos--this group may have been responsible for the attempted murder of Bernadette Devlin McAliskey earlier this year.

The UDA's real strength is political, not military. It demonstrated that strength in 1974 when it threw its support behind the Protestant workers strike which brought about the collapse of the power-sharing agreement. Radical Protestant leaders such as Ian Paisley are prepared to use the threat of "unleashing" the Protestant paramilitary groups on the Catholics as a credible political and military bargaining tool whenever the British government even hints at some form of compromise on the question of unification with the South.

Although some members of the Protestant groups have been trained in the Middle East--even at the same camps as the IRA--they have not played a prominent role in terrorism since the middle of the decade. On the whole they are poorly armed by comparison with the PIRA, lacking as they do an organized sympathetic community in the south or overseas--although Canadian security forces have uncovered several illegal arms purchases for the Protestants. They acquire their arms locally, either by theft from the security forces or by local manufacture (home-made). The American M1 carbine, .303 Lee Enfield, 7.62 mm SLR, Sterling and Sten SMG's are the favoured weapons.

Factors Affecting the Conflict

1. Sources of Conflict.

The principal source of conflict lies in the strict isolation of the two communities (Protestant and Catholic) and the shared perception that each is a minority threatened by the other. Settlement patterns established in Belfast and Londonderry during the industrial revolution have become tribal territories frozen in time. Thus, the sense of historical enmity which pre-dates even the period of industrialization has been given a kind of territorial, ethno-cultural definition. There was little, if any, crossing of cultural boundaries. The problem was exacerbated in Belfast especially where small blocks of one group were surrounded by large blocks of the other (for example, the Protestant Shankill in predominantly Catholic West Belfast and the Catholic Ballymacarett in the Protestant East). Children growing up over many generations in these ghettos have gone to separate schools, learned separate histories of the country, played different games, attended different clubs and, of course, separate churches--which offered philosophical explanations, justification and reinforcement of perceptions and prejudices already ingrained by history, family and education. The two communities wallow in ignorance of each other.

Ignorance is fuelled further by fear. The Catholics see themselves, with some justification, as a minority in the North, victimized by almost every kind of discrimination. Domination by the Protestants since 1922 has made them suspicious of any kind of government institution--the bureaucracy, the courts, the police--all of which were controlled by the majority and seemed designed to persecute the minority. By the time the riots broke out in 1969, for example, some parts of Catholic West Belfast had not seen a uniformed policeman on patrol for years: the community had refused to allow them to function. This sense of persecution, as much as any residual longing for a united Ireland, made it easy for the Catholics to give their allegiance to rival institutions--the tenants associations, Republican clubs and the IRA. The appeal of the latter, with all that such appeal implies for the future of Ulster, is what frightens the Protestants.

The Protestants also see themselves as a minority, in relation to the whole of Ireland which, if united, would be predominantly Catholic. As they see it, a united Ireland would be a threat not only to their religion and their connection with Britain, but would also undermine their social position. History and the Church tell the Protestants that they defeated the Catholics on "the Glorious 12th of July" and they have ruled Ulster since. To the extent that Protestants have dominated the managerial positions in business and industry as well as the bureaucracy and other government services that is true and it is a position that Protestants do not want to change. But, of course, it is based partially on illusion, for the Protestant working class is undoubtedly larger than the Catholic one, and is just as low on the socio-economic scale (the unemployed are equally to be found in both communities). The Protestant defence mechanism is thus a combined superiority/inferiority complex--a sense of having the "God-given" right to rule overladen with a fear of being overwhelmed by the "Papists" from the South. This defence mechanism manifests itself in two ways: first, symbolic--the "marching season" in which Protestant organizations (the Orange Order, the Apprentice Boys) flaunt their sense of superiority by means of provocative marches, rallies and taunts against the Catholics; and secondly, functional--political, social, economic discrimination against the Catholics, undertaken out of fear that to give in even slightly on any matter affecting social position would be to open the door to assimilation. Hence the Protestant rallying cry, "Not an inch."

To the educated cosmopolitan outsider these attitudes may appear anachronistic in the 1980's, as indeed they are. But that does not make them any less real. The isolation of the two communities feeds and reinforces the prejudices--both sides are ideally prepared in a social sense to receive and accept the assumptions of their own propaganda because there is nothing, and no one, in either group willing or able to challenge the underlying assumptions. Children removed from the "hothouse" atmosphere of the respective ghettos will make friends easily across the cultural barriers. But once returned to their native turf, family and peer group pressure and other social influences bring all the well-ingrained prejudices back to the surface.

These attitudes go a long way to explain the outburst of violence in 1969. After nearly 50 years of uninterrupted rule the leaders of the Unionist Party felt sufficiently confident about their position that they could undertake reforms to improve the lot of the Catholics. Taking this as their cue the Catholics sought to gain as much as possible from the moderating trend of the government and experienced a kind of "revolution of rising expectations." The loosening of the bonds of discrimination led to the formation of the civil rights movement. But as that gained strength the grass-roots Protestants began to panic. To that extent at least, the O'Neill government found itself ahead of public opinion in its own constituency. Pressure to slow down or stop the reform process was exerted in two directions: first, within the Unionist Party--this led eventually to the removal of O'Neill as leader; and secondly, against the Catholic Civil rights movement by means of counter-marches, demonstrations and violence. The violence escalated through 1968-69 until, in August, it boiled over into full-scale communal riots and Protestant raids into the Catholic areas. The police, untrained for riot control, unwelcome in the Catholic areas, caved in and the Army had to intervene to separate the warring factions.

2. Methods of Conflict.

A. The Security Forces--initially the Army--was brought in as a "peacekeeping" force, to keep the two sides apart while tempers cooled. But gradually, from mid-1970 through 1971 the Army was drawn into a skirmishing campaign with the PIRA, who had decided that if they killed enough soldiers they could force the British to give up Ulster. From August 1971 through March 1972, the British Government gave the Army its head in attempting to defeat the terrorists. But following Bloody Sunday, the creation of the "No Go" areas and the proroguing of Stormont in March, the government reined in the Army, putting distinct limits on its operations while the newly appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland launched a political offensive. When that collapsed in the face of the failed talks with the IRA and then "Bloody Friday," operations moved into a new phase opening with Operation "Motorman" in August 1972--the breaking up of the "No Go" areas. For the next five years the government tried to balance political initiatives with security measures and during this period the security forces concentrated on intelligence work, psychological warfare operations and rebuilding the RUC. In 1977 the security forces adopted the "Way Ahead" strategy, the central theme of which is "police primacy," that is, the RUC takes over the primary responsibility for law enforcement while the Army adopts a supporting role. Another feature of the "Way Ahead" strategy is the gradual disengagement of the regular Army. Some 3,000 troops were withdrawn between 1977 and 1980 and the rate of disengagement has recently been accelerated.

Since the 1930's the British Army has developed, through a combination of experience (mistakes and lessons, often made and learned several times over) and scholarly analysis, a doctrine of counter-insurgency. The experience of Northern Ireland has both tested it and refined it further. Some of the key aspects are:

1) Psychological Warfare Operations--these began in an _ad hoc_ way in November 1969, within months of the Army's deployment in Ulster--a "hearts and minds" offensive which included:
   a) community projects;
   b) bisectarian youth clubs;

c) dances, hiking trips, sports facilities for young people;

d) a "Meals on Wheels" service for the elderly.

From October 1970 the Army used "civil representatives" (civil servants) to coordinate civil-military activities and to try to win over the population in "hard" areas. The civil reps acted as trouble-shooters, dealing with a wide range of problems from youth and welfare work to damage claims following violence. With representatives from the Army, the RUC and local councils, they sat on coordinating committees which were open to all and would hear complaints and organize action to resolve them. The Army adopted a basic policy of openness with the press, making every facility open to them, providing information, allowing them to come on patrols and operations, and encouraging individual soldiers to explain their job to the press--the Army recognized that on television the private soldier is sometimes more credible than the GOC. Following the propaganda disaster that was internment (very badly handled from a psyops viewpoint) the Army established an information policy cell, a "PR Think Tank" which studied trends in reporting and tried to keep one step ahead in the propaganda war. As this evolved over time into the full-scale Army Information Service (AIS) now operating at Army Headquarters Northern Ireland, it was drawn into the counter-propaganda role, even to the extent of using "Black Propaganda" (from disguised sources). Mistakes and errors of judgement, plus effective IRA propaganda, tarnished the AIS for some time with the reputation of being the "Lisburn Lie Machine." It seems to have lived that down by concentrating on developing credibility. The current trend is to hand over the PR/information task increasingly to the RUC as the Army withdraws. But the RUC are hardly alone, as the British Government can also draw on the services of the Central Office of Information and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to present the government's view of the Northern Ireland situation. The BBC, although independent in its outlook and inclined in the early years to be critical of the government and security forces, now takes a less sympathetic view of the IRA and its supporters. The current government policy is to "cool" the situation by playing down the IRA and reducing its political stature.

2) Intelligence Operations--when the Army took over the policing job from the RUC it discovered that the RUC's intelligence capabilities were limited and its information on the Catholic community largely out-of-date. Intelligence-gathering became, and remains, the principal task--starting in 1969 the Army rebuilt the intelligence apparatus from scratch. The Army's contribution to the intelligence war has included the following:

   a) appointment of an intelligence "supremo" from DI5 (Security Service) to the Northern Ireland Office from 1972. His deputy was from DI6 (Secret Intelligence Service) and this arrangement caused some problems in the flow and exchange of information because each had his preferred channels and trusted sources. The drafting of more SAS men in to run agents in the field brought some order to the chaotic situation;

b) secondment of Army Intelligence personnel to the RUC Special Branch. Known as the Special Military Intelligence Unit, this included officers from the Special Air Service (SAS);

c) local censuses to build up a street-by-street register of the population, and a card index of known or suspected terrorists, their families and friends, cross-referenced to reports and intelligence summaries, so that a complete dossier, including photographs, can be put together on any suspect person;

d) constant patrolling, on foot, in vehicles and in helicopters, to keep certain areas under surveillance, to familiarize troops with their area of responsibility and to pick up background information;

e) snap searches, particularly vehicle checkpoints established at short notice;

f) interrogation techniques;

g) covert operations--specially trained plainclothes patrols; SAS squadrons; infiltration, informers and defectors (for example, the "counter-gang" of "turned" IRA members, known as the Special Detachment of the Military Reconnaissance Force);

h) communications intelligence--wiretapping, mail intercepts, capturing of documents and couriers.

Current policy emphasises "low profile" and covert intelligence operations--plainclothes surveillance, camouflaged observation posts, covert photography, fewer foot patrols and more in unmarked vehicles. The SAS has been in the vanguard of the change to covert action, but SAS-trained soldiers from conventional units are now carrying out an increasing share of the undercover operations. Regardless of the source by which it is collected, intelligence is now pooled centrally at the RUC Special Branch headquarters at Castlereagh, where Army and police decide jointly how to exploit it. As in other aspects of security force operations, police primacy is being emphasized in intelligence work.

3) Cross-Border Cooperation--this has been subject to political whim in the Republic and has not always been forthcoming. Currently, cooperation is at a high level. The RUC and the Irish Police, the Gardai, have appointed border commissioners who meet regularly, and the two Chief Constables meet monthly. The Gardai maintain five squads along the border, two of which are guaranteed to be there at any one time. The RUC and the Gardai keep in touch by radio. British Army helicopters are allowed to overfly the border to a depth of five miles and to radio direct to the Gardai or the Irish Army if they are in "hot pursuit" of suspected or actual terrorists. Furthermore, both governments are enforcing "extra-territorial jurisdiction," which means that persons suspected of committing crimes in the North or the South may be tried in either area.

These are the principal methods by which the security forces combat terrorism. They have not been without their problems, some of which will be discussed later.

B. Opposition Forces--The Provisional IRA's methods, like those of the British Army, have evolved during the past decade. Initially the IRA was prepared to act solely in defense of the Catholic areas, using violence to keep Protestant gangs out. In fact, during the immediate aftermath of the 1969 riots the IRA cooperated with the British Army in helping to keep the peace and organizing citizens groups to clean up riot damage. But after the split between Officials and Provisionals the relationship began to deteriorate. The PIRA, wishing to establish its claim to the allegiance of the Catholic population, especially over the claims of the Officials, sought to undermine the harmonious relationship that had developed between the soldiers and the residents of the Catholic ghettos. They built up their network in the Catholic areas, enforced their own views through a combination of propaganda and intimidation, and then tried (successfully) to provoke violent confrontations between the Army and the Catholics--demonstrations, riots, shooting of soldiers--that would bring down counter-measures which could be interpreted as oppression. Although drawn into a shooting war probably before they were fully prepared, they succeeded in achieving the desired conditions by mid-1971. Following internment, the insurrection escalated. Violence increased to unprecedented levels in 1972: 1,382 bombings and 10,630 shootings (by contrast the 1970 figures were 153 and 213 respectively). The purpose of this campaign was said by the IRA to be two-fold:

a) to stretch the British Army to the limits of its resources, thereby keeping Army pressure off the Catholic areas;

b) to weaken the economy by sabotage operations against government and commercial property, forcing the British taxpayer to pick up the bill for damage.

The targets were Protestants, their property and commercial establishments, government services and, when they presented tempting opportunities, members of the security forces.
But the British Army stemmed the rising tide of violence by forcing the PIRA out of the Catholic areas (Operation Motorman). After 1972 the level of terrorism fell dramatically (1973--978 bombings, 5,018 shootings; first half of 1980--172 bombings, 342 shootings--these rates appear to have continued to decline in the second half of 1980 although hard data is not yet available). The increasing pressure on the PIRA in the North caused it to shift its strategy and its targets. From 1973 through 1977 the PIRA carried out a large number of bombings and shootings in Britain, in an unsuccessful attempt to panic the British public into demanding a withdrawal of troops from Ulster. Military establishments were initially the primary targets, but there were many indiscriminate bombings of pubs and restaurants and transportation systems (bus and railway stations and the London underground). Since 1977 PIRA attacks in Britain have been intermittent, targetted against commercial establishments (using incendiary devices) and government figures (by means of letter bombs). PIRA activity also increased from 1975 in the Republic. There, terrorist activity has consisted mainly of bank robberies (which netted terrorists £5 million in 1979 alone), but this has brought them into conflict with the Gardai. Earlier this month the Irish Government, whose anti-terrorist laws are far more strict than those in the North, sentenced a convicted PIRA member to death for murdering a policeman. As noted earlier

in the study, Irish terrorist activities against British targets in Europe (mainly the British Army of the Rhine) constitute a relatively new trend and it is not always clear whether the PIRA or the INLA is responsible for these activities. The INLA claimed responsibility for these activities. The INLA claimed responsibility for the assassination of Airey Neave; it may also have carried out the murder of the British ambassador to the Netherlands.

The current pattern of PIRA activity inside Northern Ireland consists mainly of bomb and incendiary attacks on commercial establishments and attacks on members of the security forces, particularly prison guards and members of the UDR and RUC Reserve. On the propaganda side, the main vehicles have been the following:

a) allegations of torture and brutality--highlighting RUC interrogation techniques, forcing the government to review them critically and to issue new guidelines for more moderate interrogation techniques;

b) the "Smash the H-Blocks" campaign--intended to put pressure on the British Government to dismantle the high-security Maze Prison;

c) demands for political prisoner status.

Of the three, the last is probably the most important to the PIRA. The ending of "Special Status" for IRA prisoners in 1976 was a severe blow to imprisoned members of the organization because it removed all hope of amnesty or early release through political negotiation. In March 1976 they began what became known as the "Blanket Protest"--the prisoners wrapped themselves in blankets, refused to wear prison clothing and fouled their cells with excrement. This campaign was accompanied by demonstrations, statements by front spokesmen and articles by sympathetic journalists, and included a petition to the European Commission on Human Rights. When the Commission ruled against the PIRA in June 1980, the PIRA decided to escalate the pressure. In October 1980, seven imprisoned PIRA terrorists went on a hunger strike that lasted nearly two months. The strike was called off before anyone died without the government conceding any form of special status. This was a clear propaganda defeat for the PIRA. In an effort to revive their credibility one prisoner initiated a hunger strike at the beginning of March 1981, but thus far it has attracted little attention or support, even amongst those normally sympathetic.

3. Strengths and Weaknesses.

A. The Security Forces--The most important asset the security forces have at present is the close cooperation between the Army and the police. This may be attributed to three factors: first, the excellent personal relationship between the current GOC and Chief Constable; secondly, the appointment in 1979 of a security coordinator who was able to make the security committees effective, balancing off the demands and expectations of the Army and the police; and finally, the experience of years of working together--procedures and routines are established, cooperation is not something new which has to be relearned with the arrival of a new unit on rotation. Clearly, the pairing of resident and "roulement" units and the integration of RUC and UDR in brigade areas facilitates such cooperation.

Other advantages which currently accrue to the security forces are the increased level of cross-border cooperation, experience and professionalism in all units (especially in the field of covert operations), the steady increase in recruitment for the RUC, and the tendency of the population to tire of the violence. This latter may be the most hopeful sign of all. It is most noticeable in Londonderry where the security force success in reducing the level of violence has been matched by a revival of civic pride. The city council, on which all parties are represented (centrally and in committees) is very able and the position of Mayor rotates between Catholic and Protestant. Members do not always agree in meetings, but once a decision is taken, they work together. The city is actively seeking to attract tourists and this has spurred a great deal of urban renewal--slum clearance, parks, new housing. Generally, and not just in Londonderry, community attitudes toward the RUC have improved and the RUC's increasingly high profile ensures public confidence (even if the most effective work is done covertly). The moderating public attitudes have permitted the Army to reduce its presence, which is desirable from a political and psychological viewpoint in any case.

It would be a mistake to overplay this change of heart. It is fragile and any number of factors exist which could wreck it. As noted earlier, it remains very difficult to break the cultural barriers which isolate the communities from each other. Moreover, the Catholic population as a whole retains considerable suspicion of British intentions and methods. This, and the new cellular structure of the PIRA, hampers intelligence work. Consequently, although the intelligence system is working more smoothly, the PIRA is much harder to crack. This is the principal weakness in the security forces' position and it leaves the iniative for operations very much in the hands of the PIRA. They can still plan and carry out operations in relative secrecy, secure from security force penetration.

B. The PIRA--Security apart, the PIRA have several advantages at present. They can sustain a protracted campaign: they have no trouble recruiting and have sufficient weapons. They are now well practised in terrorism. Although the lower ranks contain young amateurs, those who survive and rise through the ranks become sophisticated professionals. Their bomb-makers are expert, and the level of training is greatly improved over that of the earlier years. They are receiving external support and there are still many in the Catholic neighbourhoods who will offer refuge or refuse to cooperate with security force searchers. They still have a degree of sanctuary in the South.

On the debit side, all is not going well for the PIRA. The drying up of overseas funding has forced the movement into increased reliance on criminal activities to finance their terrorist activities, bringing new problems upon the PIRA: penetration of the ranks by those motivated purely by desire for personal gain; embezzlement of funds raised from illegal activities such as protection rackets; and violent confrontation with the Gardai in the South. The rising crime rate in the Republic has caused the Irish Government to strengthen the police force, and the murder of policemen has turned some segments of public opinion away from support of IRA activities. The South, then, is now a less secure sanctuary than it was a few years ago. Reorganization has not delivered all that was promised--the tight security required to prevent penetration by British intelligence agents hampers communication between cells and, by implication, planning, direction and actual conduct of terrorist operations. The small, tight structure may be more secure, but it cannot sustain a level of violence high enough to render Northern Ireland ungovernable and thus force the British Government to relinquish control of the province. The indicators of changing attitudes towards violence in the North make it questionable, in any case, whether the population would tolerate a higher level of PIRA activity.

4. Outside Influences.

Assistance from Middle East or European revolutionary groups is not presently sufficiently significant to influence the outcome of the struggle. The establishment of a PLO office in Dublin, announced in March, could change that assessment, but not immediately. The Irish problem does not, for the most part, fall into the area of competition between the super powers, although the Soviet Union reportedly established a GRU intelligence team under Aeroflot cover at Shannon Airport a few years ago. Nothing is known of their activities or connections with extremist groups. The United States Government has consistently opposed support for the terrorists. Such support as does come from America flows, as noted earlier, from private sources without government approval. Nor has the United Nations become a forum for debate of the Ulster question and condemnation of the British. Thus, the only significant external influence on the conflict inside Northern Ireland is the Irish Republic itself. Apprehension was expressed at the succession in late 1979 of Mr. Charles Haughey to the Prime Ministership of the Republic. His predecessor, Mr. Jack Lynch, had taken a tough line on terrorism, but Haughey was known as an ardent nationalist. He had been implicated (although acquitted by trial) in a plot involving gun-running to the IRA in 1970. Thus far, fears seem to have been premature. Haughey has shown himself to be sensitive to the delicate problem and willing to discuss peaceful solutions with the British Government. In July 1980 he emulated Mr. Lynch by speaking out against American support of the PIRA. He has continued the policy of cross-border cooperation and reinforced it: in September the Irish justice minister announced that the Irish police would be expanded, upgunned and modernized with helicopters, spotter aircraft and a new communications system. Earlier this month a convicted IRA member was sentenced to death for murder of a policeman.

This cooperation seems likely to continue in the foreseeable future, so long as Haughey perceives that it is in the Republic's, as well as his own, interest that it should do so. In his first year Haughey weathered a faltering economy, divisions within his own party (Fianna Fail) and cabinet, embarrassing revelations concerning his role in the gun-running case, and a rising crime rate owing to the spillover of terrorism from the North. He now leads a stronger party into a spring election, his own position considerably more secure with the electorate. Irish cooperation on the Ulster question has always been subject to British quid pro quo and recent initiatives must be seen in that light. Cautiously optimistic statements that followed the Haughey-Thatcher summit in December undoubtedly enabled him to reassure the nationalist flank of his party that progress had been made on the question of unity. Improvements in the police will not only help to bring down the crime rate in the South, but could secure some unspecified British support on the economic front. So long as both Britain and Ireland are willing and able to engage in this balancing act, the Republic will not be the safe haven required by the PIRA.

Trends

The conflict in Northern Ireland will continue into the foreseeable future, but probably with a declining level of violence marred by occasional peaks of terrorist activity. As terrorist operations become more hazardous in the North--owing to increased effectiveness of security force operations--activity is likely to increase in the South, at least until a modernized Gardai can get on top of it--a process which may take several years. Targets in the North will continue to be mainly commercial establishments and the security forces, although sectarian killings in reprisal for Protestant murders will probably continue as well. To maintain their credibility the PIRA may feel compelled to mount from time to time "spectacular" operations along the lines of the Mountbatten/ Warrenpoint incidents. The tenth anniversary of internment, which will fall on August 9th this year, could provide an appropriate occasion. The principal warning will be a propaganda offensive in advance of the event designed to disarm would-be critics by justifying action before it occurs.

The British Government is likely to continue its "Ulsterization" policy--gradual disengagement of the regular British Army and increased emphasis on police intelligence work. Progress on the political front, if possible at all, will continue at a very slow pace. A referendum on the future of Ulster, touted by the media last year as the possible next step, has not been mentioned recently. Current British policy seems to be to move cautiously and to say as little as possible. Unless Protestant fears, stirred up by the likes of Paisley, can be assuaged the government will have no alternative but to continue that policy.

Outlook

Nowhere is Clausewitz' axiom that war is a continuation of politics by other means more true than in insurgent conflicts. Northern Ireland is a case in point: violence and politics are inextricably linked, the one feeding on the other. No military solution (short of some kind of Carthaginian peace) can succeed without a concurrent political solution. But the social problems, prejudices and polarization make such an event unlikely, at least in the short term. The war seems to have reached a deadly stalemate: the PIRA cannot sustain a level of violence high enough to remove the British without risking their own destruction (by the security forces or Protestant paramilitary groups). The security forces cannot whittle down the PIRA further by existing methods without overstepping the bounds of legitimacy and legality. Has political violence, then, become institutionalized?

There is no consensus on this question. Journalists are inclined to feel that it has become institutionalized. They point to the PIRA's ability to recruit and argue that the continued polarization and the confrontation between the PIRA and the security forces produce the social conditions necessary to sustain violence indefinitely. In short, the conflict has bred, and will continue to breed, generations of terrorists. The security forces argue that, although there has been a degree of institutionalization, it is neither absolute nor irreversible. They present statistics showing a declining rate of terrorism and point to Londonderry as an example of what they see as a broader trend towards "normalization." But they concede that even moving people out of slums and relocating them in new housing estates does not change long-established attitudes. Terrorism, they say, has become a form of endemic violent crime because some have a vested interest in it: violence gives power and prestige and those who have learned to wield it will not surrender power voluntarily.

Statistics, of course, can be made to prove anything, but in the case of Northern Ireland they may be instructive. Ulster's crime rate has more than doubled since the "troubles" began in 1969, but terrorist incidents constitute a small proportion of the crime. In 1979, for example, 54,262 offences were committed in Northern Ireland. Of these, terrorist incidents (bombing and shooting) totalled 1,150. Six thousand, five hundred and ninety-three persons were found guilty of indictable offences (murder, assault, burglary, etc.); 1,259, or about 19%, were juveniles, of whom all but 51 (found guilty of offences against the person) were convicted for theft or burglary. This rate of involvement in indictable offences represents a 27.5% increase over the ten year period since the outbreak of the troubles or an average yearly increase of 2.75%. Both in 1969 and 1979 unindictable offences accounted for about 52% of juvenile crime.

The results of studies on juvenile crime and delinquency in Northern Ireland help to put these statistics in perspective. Although Northern Ireland has experienced an average annual growth rate in crime of about 10% and the numbers of those convicted of indictable offences has increased substantially, the political component of violent crime remains very small. Political crime represents only a small percentage of the entire spectrum of juvenile crime. Furthermore, evidence collected in studies indicates that those coming to the courts on terrorist charges are not essentially different from those who might have transgressed the law in other ways in more peaceful times. Nor are they substantially different from juvenile criminals found in, for example, inner London. Certainly these conclusions are open to debate and challenge, but the evidence seems to suggest that the fears of a boom in juvenile political violence, gravely predicted by many at the outset of the troubles, have been overstated. The most telling point is the size of the PIRA itself. It can still draw recruits in sufficient numbers to keep the organization stable. But at no time was it able to expand to the point where it became a kind of "peoples army." The Catholic youth of Ulster did not move en masse to join the PIRA and current trends do not indicate any immediate change in their behavior. As with the population as a whole there is good reason to believe that the young people, whose participation is essential for the continual regeneration of terrorism, are tired of violence and are less inclined to follow their fathers and brothers into the ranks of the terrorists. Clearly, in the face of the reality of political violence, the myth of rebellion has lost at least some of its appeal.

On this basis it seems fair to conclude that political violence has not become institutionalized in Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, it is worth introducing a cautionary note: the social conditions which spawned this latest outbreak of Irish "troubles" remain essentially unchanged. So long as they do the potential for political violence will remain as well. Lack of progress towards a political solution of the problem, or a worsening of social conditions, could reverse the current trend towards declining levels of terrorism. In the meantime, the security forces must come to grips with a serious rise in non-political crime, which is likely to continue so long as the conditions which contribute to political violence prevail.

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Appendix A

The 1981 Hunger Strike Campaign

The hunger strike of convicted PIRA gunman Bobby Sands which began in March 1981 (see page 5-39) was carried through to a conclusion on 5 May with Sands' death A second PIRA gunman, Francis Hughes, died a week later. The PIRA indicated that this campaign would continue, with no fewer than four hunger strikers participating at any one time, until political status is granted.

The Sands strike attracted considerable media attention in April and May, as well as support from the Catholic population of Northern Ireland. Neither the media exposure nor the popular support were entirely spontaneous; on Sunday 26 April the PIRA Chief of Publicity boasted on CBC's "Sunday Morning" how his branch had orchestrated the campaign. He stated that they had learned from the mistakes of the previous campaign, which had attracted much less support and had been called off before achieving its aims. Of particular importance this time, he said, was the election of Sands to the British parliament (10 April), an event which gave momentum to the hunger strike and focused world attention on the political status issue. Street action and sporadic violence accompanied the final three weeks of the strike, contributing to an atmosphere of tension. The PIRA raised the temperature further by predicting widespread violence if Sands died, threats which in turn brought warning of reprisals from the Protestant community. Journalists, especially television reporters, concluded that Ulster was on the verge of civil war, thereby indirectly reinforcing PIRA propaganda.

In the event the initial violence fell far short of predictions. In fact, as Sands approached death the PIRA began to backpedal on its threats. There were undoubtedly several reasons for this: first, the PIRA gained a great deal of sympathetic public exposure from the hunger strike - which was ostensibly a "non-violent" tactic - so, to resort to indiscriminate violence after Sands death would undermine the credibility of their campaign. Secondly, to initiate a sustained high level of violence might endanger the PIRA itself, exposing more of its members to the risk of becoming casualties or prisoners; too high a level of violence would have produced Protestant reprisals which, directed without discrimination at both the PIRA and the Catholic population, might undermine the renewed base of support that the PIRA had mobilized in the Catholic areas. This last point bears emphasis, as it has been some time since the PIRA was able to draw large crowds out onto the streets to support its political aims and to confront the security forces. Finally, it is also possible that the PIRA did not want to be seen as having overplayed its hand. If it could not deliver on its promise to make the British pay, its credibility would suffer.

Throughout the hunger strike the British Government remained firm in its determination not to give in to the prisoners' demands. To do so would have been to grant de facto recognition to the PIRA and would have undermined the great deterrent effect of the long prison sentence. The British may have taken some heart from the example of the West German Government, which allowed an imprisoned member of the Baader-Meinhof group, Sigurd Debus, to starve himself to death on 16 April. Nonetheless, the British Government lost the initiative in the "propaganda battle" by failing to explain clearly and constantly why it was refusing to give in, in short, why the issue was so important.

The PIRA vows to continue the hunger-strike campaign until the British government grants political prisoner status. Although if it continues it will put the British under a degree of international pressure, scrutiny or censure, it is really a "make or break" campaign for the PIRA. If it does not win on the issue, it will have nothing to offer but more bullets and bombs, weapons which, in the long term, are likely to undermine the carefully-nurtured support of the Catholics. Consequently, it is very important for the PIRA that the campaign succeed and equally important for the British that it should not. Moreover, the PIRA may face a number of problems in attempting to sustain the hunger strike: first, there is the question of timing - cursory observation would seem to suggest that Hughes died too soon after Sands. The PIRA did not have time to gear up a sympathy campaign for him; in any case, they might have had some difficulty transferring the mantle of martyrdom from Sands to Hughes, the latter being a convicted murderer. It may be hard for the PIRA to orchestrate the deaths of future hunger strikers in such a way as to gain maximum propaganda advantage from each. This leads directly to the second point: the morale of the prisoners themselves and their willingness to "line up" to die. It is one thing to be the first in line, with all the attendant publicity; it is quite another to die as a matter of routine with less and less attention as time goes on. This would also be hard on the families of the prisoners who, as time passed without result, might become increasingly reluctant to have their sons die for a hopeless cause. That, in turn, might act as a deterrent to recruiting: unless the strike achieves its objective soon, parents might put pressure on their sons not to join the PIRA. Finally, there is the question of the Fermanagh parliamentary seat. It was the factor that got Sands the world attention the PIRA sought.

There is no indication at present whether the PIRA intends to contest the seat in the next by-election with another hunger striker. In view of Sands' success it would certainly be logical for them to try. There is a risk now that the PIRA candidate might be defeated by a more moderate (eg. SDLP) candidate campaigning on a platform of peace and conciliation. If that were to occur, a very powerful propaganda weapon would be denied to the PIRA.

STUDY NO 6: CUBA

Aim

To examine the sources of opposition inside Cuba and within the exile Cuban community in the United States with a view to assessing possible challenges to the existing regime in Cuba, their forms and prospects. The study advances from the assumptions that the USSR will continue for the time being to provide diplomatic and economic support for Castro's regime, and that no fundamental change in the relationship between the USA and Cuba will occur. Only in passing does this study deal with the intelligence and other activities of Cuban agents outside Cuba.

Data

Status: The Republic of Cuba is a communist state, a member of the United Nations, Comecon and the Organization of American States (suspended).

Population: 9,824,000 (1977). Most Cubans are of Spanish, African or mixed Spanish-African ancestry. Persons of mixed black-white heritage are usually called mestizos in Cuba. The term criollo was once used to identify persons who were born in Cuba; more recently the word has been used in reference to the white Cuban leadership, which has formulated the criollo nationalist ideology. There is a Chinese minority of less than one percent.

Main Cities:	Havana (capital)	1,751,000 (1970)
	Santiago de Cuba	278,000
	Camaguey	198,000
	Holguin	132,000
	Santa Clara	130,000
	Guantanamo	129,000

Estimated GNP: $12.5 billion (1978)

Economic: The centrally planned economy is mainly dependent on exports of sugar, supplemented by nickel and copper. Nickel production was planned to reach 100,000 tonnes by 1980. Fishing is being expanded, and industry developed. Aid from the Soviet Union is substantial. Under long-term contracts the Soviets sell Cuba oil at less than half the world price and buy sugar for more than the free market price, an arrangement that costs Moscow about 3 billion dollars a year. Cuba nevertheless disposes of an important quota of its main exports as it pleases, thus allowing the acquisition of convertible currency.

Language: Spanish, with a distinctive Cuban accent. Some African language - Yoruba, Fon and Efik - is still used in religious ritual.

Religion: 85% Roman Catholic, the Church being apolitical.

Geography: The main island of Cuba, the smaller Isla de Pinos and about 1,600 lesser keys and islets, are situated strategically at the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico, between the Atlantic Ocean to the north and the Caribbean Sea to the South. Cuba is 145 km south of Key West, Florida. It comprises 114,524 sq km and stretches about 1200 km from east to west. Its width varies from 35 to 200 km. Mountains and hills account for 40 percent of the countryside - in the east, the Sierra Maestra (to 2000 metres); centrally, the Sierra de Trinidad; and in the west, the Sierra de los Organos, lower and less wild. Although in the tropics, Cuba is cooled by trade winds. Summer temperatures average 27°C; winter low, 21°C. There are two seasons - dry from November to April and wet May through October.

Historical Background

Cuba was a Spanish Colony from 1511 until 1762, and again from 1763 till 1898, when the Spanish-American War ended in US victory. Under the Treaty of Paris, Cuba became an independent republic and Spain ceded Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam to the US. The United States in a later treaty gained territory at Guantanamo Bay for US naval use. During the last century of Spanish rule there had been criollo resistance involving guerrilla warfare, and the tradition of revolutionary violence was well established by the start of the 20th century.

As an independent republic, Cuba was ruled by a succession of presidents and administrations of doubtful legitimacy and weak abilities. Gerardo Machado became president in 1925 and continued his rule by terror until, in 1933, his army commanders abandoned him. After a brief interregnum, a group of army sergeants at Camp Colombia seized the initiative under Sergeant Fulgencio Batista y Zaldirar. Joined by the radical Professor Ramon Grau

San Martin, the sergeants took command of the army and manipulated the government. From 1934 Batista, now calling himself colonel, was the outstanding political figure in Cuba. He was president during most of World War II and returned to power through a bloodless coup d'etat in 1952. He fled into exile January 1, 1959.

Fidel Castro Ruz was born August 13, 1926, son of a successful self-made plantation owner. Educated in Jesuit schools and the University of Havana, Castro graduated with a doctorate in law in 1950. While still a student, he took part in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Dominican Republic's Trujillo dictatorship, and was involved in student uprisings in Bogota, Columbia. He was seen as a liberal, and was several times in conflict with communists. He tried to enter constitutional politics in 1952, as a Partido Ortodoxo parliamentary candidate, but these elections were aborted by Batista's coup. Castro then joined in the formation of a group of young rebels who, on July 26, 1953, attacked the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba. Half were killed and the remainder imprisoned. At his trial, Castro laid the groundwork for future revolutionary leadership by delivering an impassioned speech ending with the words "History will absolve me". He was sentenced to 15 years.

It was characteristic of the Batista regime that this speech was allowed to be made, and that less than two years later the rebels, including Fidel Castro and his younger brother, Raul, were released under a general amnesty. Batista ruled through a mixture of terror and concession which exposed the basic weakness of the man and his regime. If the Moncada attack was the rebels' 1916 Easter Rising, then the war of independence followed after a time lapse almost identical to the Irish model.

In their base in Mexico City, the Castros and a new ally, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, formed the 26th July Movement. With 79 fellow rebels they landed in Cuba on December 2, 1956, to begin the guerrilla campaign that would end victoriously just over two years later with the fall of Batista's regime. Critics suggest that the leading role of the Castro group has been expanded for propaganda purposes, and that the importance of urban resistance in the struggle has consequently been downplayed. Rather naturally, the heroic quality of the revolution has been mythologized, the heroes being the brothers Castro, Guevara and those closest to them.

After a series of reorganizations, Fidel Castro became in February, 1959, the revolutionary government's premier, with Raul as commander of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). With the arrest of one of his close colleagues in the revolutionary struggle, Major Huber Matos, in October 1959, Fidel signalled his intention to abandon the anticommunist elements within his regime, making way for an exclusive alliance between his fidelistas and the PSP - the communist party. He also jettisoned the middle class, appealing only to the peasantry and the urban lower class. Through state ownership he denied the private sector and foreign interests any power in the new Cuba. Manuel Urrutia was another casualty of this period. Made president of Cuba at the overthrow of Batista, Urrutia dared to criticise the Soviet Union on television and had to go into hiding. Some of the romantic image rubbed off the regime as kangaroo courts sentenced many hundreds of opponents to death, and expropriation of US property caused early deterioration in relations between the two countries. The US broke relations with Cuba on January 3, 1961. In the same year Castro announced that Cuba was henceforth to be a socialist country - "a people's democracy, or the dictatorship of the proletariat". "I am a Marxist-Leninist", he declared, "and will be until the day I die". Close links were forged with the Soviet Union. The Organization of American States, reacting to Castro's assertion that he planned to export communism throughout Latin America, excluded Cuba in February 1962.

The seeds of anti-Castro dissidence were sown in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. First there were Cubans whose attachment to the old regime, to American capital and to professional class or bourgeois values caused them to leave the island as soon as it was clear which side was going to win. Many might have become victims of revolutionary justice had they stayed. Then there were more Cubans, many of humbler position, whose lives were not in danger, but who decided to emigrate rather than live under a regime which they saw as oppressive, economically hopeless, and increasingly alien in its ideological persuasion. Within the 26th July Movement - the fidelistas - there were some senior defectors on these accounts. The exodus of the disaffected has continued over 21 years, with America the principal haven. Altogether, over 8 percent of the island's population has gone into exile, with around 800,000 settling in the US. Amongst the latter, a whole series of anti-Castro groups has developed.

Among those who remained on the island, active dissidents have formed a small minority. Nevertheless, in 1959 and 1960 certain United States agencies, notably the CIA, evidently saw in these small elements the makings of a successful counter-revolution, just as they believed that the anti-Castro factions in the United States could provide the necessary military component of such an undertaking. The Agency persuaded the US government to back an invasion of emigrés, which was attempted on April 17, 1961. This "Bay of Pigs" operation - named after the area of assault - was a fiasco. Of the 1,400 man exile force which landed, 1,200 were prisoners and the remainder dead 72 hours after the first man waded ashore. But the worst effects (from an anti-Castro viewpoint) of this ill-fated blunder became apparent nearer home. One survivor, who had first opposed Batista and later Castro, has written:

> "The invasion caught us by surprise. There was a total lack of information and the underground were not consulted or notified. The government immediately proceeded to detain anyone suspected of being opponents of the regime. Only those able to go into hiding escaped arrest. There is no way of knowing how many were seized, but we believe that in Havana alone there were over 40,000. There must have been at least half a million nationally...It was the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution who conducted most of the house by house raids. No one can escape their vigilance. These block and neighbourhood stoolpigeons are a permanent danger..."
>
> (quoted Sam Dolgoff, The Cuban Revolution: A Critical Perspective (Montreal, 1976), p. 115.)

In a single stroke, the United States-sponsored invasion had destroyed most of the domestic Cuban opposition, discredited the exile movements, and exposed America to criticism of interfering in the internal affairs of another nation. Later, news of an assassination contract aimed at Fidel Castro would help demolish the reputation of the CIA. One historian has concluded:

> "The 'liberation' of Cuba wholly from the outside appealed mainly to those who were farthest removed from the Cuban people and had least faith in them...The true liberation of Cuba could not be achieved behind the backs of, and without the active participation of, the Cuban people in Cuba..."
> (Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities (New York, 1962).)

A more subtle internal challenge to Castro's rule came from the "old" communists. When Castro announced his conversion to Marxist-Leninism, it was a move made on his own terms towards a form of communism of his own making, under his unquestioned control. In the aftermath of revolutionary victory, the 26th July Movement had made an alliance with the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) - the Moscow-aligned orthodox communists. The *fidelistas* had little time for these ideologues, whose contribution to the war had been virtually nil, but the PSP possessed a party organization which seemed a necessary revolutionary asset. But when Anibal Escalante, the PSP leader, became a danger, he was denounced by Castro in a 3 1/2 hour television performance and persuaded to accept a free ride to Eastern Europe. This cleared the way for fusion between the 26th July Movement and PSP in mid-1961 (together with a student group called the *Directorio Revolucionario*) to form the *Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas* (ORI). Two years later Castro dissolved the ORI and put in its place the *Partido Unido de la Revolucion Socialista* (PURS), with a *fidelista*-dominated secretariat.

Further attrition of "old" communist influence occurred in March 1964. A PSP member, Marcos Rodriguez, was sentenced to death for having acted as a Batista informer. Joaquin Ordoqui, a senior "old" communist on the PURS secretariat was expelled for his role in concealing the Rodriguez affair. In October 1965 yet another change occurred. PURS gave way to the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), in which the *fidelistas* had complete control. Yet, such is the resilience of Moscow-trained organizers, that the orthodox challenge continued. Returned from temporary exile, Anibal Escalante formed a "microfaction" of old PSP cronies, and established contacts with Soviet bloc embassy officials, journalists and others. They were arrested and in 1968 tried on charges which included conspiracy to oust the Fidel leadership in favour of orthodox communists. The trial was perhaps also a warning to Moscow against excessive manipulation. Since 1968 the *fidelista* control of the PCC does not appear to have been challenged. The Soviet Union subsequently achieved the level of control necessary through economic leverage, and seems to accept Castro-communism as the best it can achieve in Cuba at the present time. Moscow had a small revenge, however. The Cuban intelligence chief, Manuel Pineiro, who had discovered the PSP - Soviet link that led to Escalante's downfall was subsequently dismissed, when the Soviets took control of intelligence operations.

The missile crisis of 1962 had brought Cuba into the forefront of world affairs, but in fact its leaders were only peripherally involved. If it is true that the MRBMs were introduced, and then withdrawn, each time without prior Soviet-Cuban consultation, the whole affair may have strained relations and made the Cuban leadership wary of being used. Being "used" is not to Fidel's liking. Throughout his whole life, Castro has been the initiator of action. His revolutionary philosophy of the foco reflects this: so do his attempts to export revolution to Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean. Another illustration was his commitment in 1970 to achieve a 10 million ton sugar harvest. Although the actual result - 8.5 million tons - was a record, the failure at hugh cost in other sectors was Castro's first major domestic defeat, leading to demoralization among the masses. Nevertheless, five years later he was seizing the initiative again, this time in Africa.

The 1970s saw the institutionalization of the revolution and the creation of new and mutually supportive relations with the USSR, including membership of COMECON. Economic links were forged or strengthened with Japan, Canada and Western Europe, and OAS lifted sanctions. Informal talks opened with the United States in late 1974 and in March 1977 both countries established "interest sections" in their closed embassies. A concern over Africa which had begun in 1959, when the first Cuban intelligence operatives arrived in Algeria, blossomed in 1975 as Castro despatched troops to support the Marxist-Leninist faction in Angola. This contingent reached 14,000 by February 1976. Analysts believe that the initiative was Castro's - which would certainly match his character and record - but that success relied upon rapid Soviet assistance in the form of transportation and material. Angola was followed by Ethopia, and Cuban advisers were to be found in many African states, while involvement in Latin America diminished. "Africa", Castro stated in a 1977 address to the Libyan government of Colonel Gadafi, "is the weakest link in the imperialist chain today...There are excellent perspectives there for going directly from tribalism to socialism".

In April 1976 a new agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union increased economic and technical collaboration. Sugar export prices and crude oil imports were indexed, greatly to Cuban advantage, a nuclear power plant and a steel mill were promised. One of the unpublished clauses reportedly placed the overseas Cuban intelligence apparatus under Soviet command. At much the same time Cuba underwent further Sovietization of its ideology, structure and policy. PCC membership was increased from 100,000 in 1970 tc 202,800 in 1976. Three years later, Castro took a risky decision by allowing emigré Cubans to visit their relatives on the island. These visits brought home to resident Cubans their relatively depressed living-standards and were a destabilizing influence. One of the prime causes of Cuban instability and unrest prior to the revolution had been its excessive reliance on a single-crop economy, which was at the mercy of the United States market. Twenty-one years later, the excessive reliance remains, but is now directed eastwards.

1980 began with a spate of rumours of anti-Castro activities on the island, of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution being put on special alert, and of severe economic deprivation being the apparent cause. The crisis developed in the spring when 10,800 people rushed into the grounds of the Peruvian Embassy, complaining of a lack of freedom and a lack of all material needs. Castro, ever inventive in the face of a serious crisis, evidently decided it would be better to allow the release of steam rather than risk an explosion. He opened his ports for emigration, making sure that the exodus included as many "undesirables" as possible, including criminals from his jails, lunatics from hospitals, social misfits, and the politically unreliable. No doubt, for good measure, he also included a number of intelligence agents too. In all, some 125,000 refugees poured out, mostly to the United States, where the social impact was severe. Having had to accept damaging publicity in the initial phase of this operation, Castro was able to turn even this aspect to some advantage, since it was the Americans who called a halt and it was in the US that the problems were most visible. One experienced observer of the Cuban refugee scene stated that, whereas the earlier waves of exiles were a good cross-section of Cuban society, the 1980 group were "animals".

The new American Administration in 1981 shows a determination to discourage or confront Cuban assistance to revolutionary movements in the Western Hemisphere. It has not at the time of writing disclosed its future policy towards Cuba itself, or to Cuban involvement in Africa. At home, Castro has made another abrupt turn in economic policy, permitting a greater private sector market to develop, particularly in agricultural products, and cutting the price of some state-controlled consumer goods by as much as 50 percent, evidently in an attempt to satisfy consumer demand. The Soviet Union on February 26, 1981 pledged "complete Soviet support" in the face of an "anti-Cuban campaign" by Washington.

Chronology of Major Events Relating to Conflict in Cuba

1959

1 January: Castro victorious. Reign of terror begins.

July: President Urrutia goes into hiding. US property seized.

20 October: Huber Matos arrested, later sentenced to 20 years.

November: First Cuban "medical team" (DGI) reaches Algeria.

1960

May: U^2 crisis opens way to full Cuba-Soviet accord.

19 October: US embargo on exports to Cuba.

First main exodus of Cubans to USA.

1961

3 January: US breaks diplomatic relations with Cuba.

17-20 April: Bay of Pigs Invasion. Cuban resistance purged.

President Kennedy orders that all available US assets be used to overthrow Castro's regime. Seventy-two CIA agents infiltrate Cuba. First CIA plot to assassinate Castro abandoned when security compromised.

1 December: Castro announces his conversion to Marxist-Leninism.

1962

February: OAS suspends Cuba.

26 March: PSP leader denounced by Castro.

October: CIA agent in Cuba spots Soviet missiles, while engaged in "destabilization" operations. Missile crisis develops and Soviets withdraw.

US informs USSR that it will not intervene in Cuba. However attempts to destabilize through covert action involving the Cuban exiles continue. In Miami, 600-700 American staff officers and 2,000 Cubans are involved in this occupation. Second CIA plot to assassinate Castro abandoned.

1963

Second main exodus of Cubans to USA.

1964

March: Further attrition of PSP members in Castro's party.

1965

October: PCC established as sole political party in Cuba.

1966

Che Guevara attempts revolution in Bolivia, is killed in 1967.

1967

US signed anti-hijacking treaty with Cuba. In return, US agreed to cease destabilization operations and to control exile Cuban militants, even when operating from a third country. FBI even passed intelligence on such groups to DGI.

1968

January: Trial and imprisonment of PSP "microfaction".

Thirty-six bomb attacks by *El Poder Cubano* exile terrorists in USA, against foreign ships trading with Cuba, trade commissions, travel agencies, etc.

1969

DGI forms Venceremos Brigade.

4 June: Three Cuban exiles indicted by a federal grand jury in New Jersey on charges of conspiracy to bomb Cuban property in Montreal.

1970

8.535 million ton sugar harvest, but a failure in view of Fidel's commitment to 10 million.

1971

The Secret Cuban Government, another terror group, bombed the Cuban Health Exchange and a theatre in New York.

1972

Cuba admitted to COMECON.

4 April: Two plastic bombs exploded at the Cuban trade commission in Montreal, killing a Cuban security guard and damaging the building. Authorities arrested 7 Cuban officials and charged 6 with possessing weapons and hampering police investigation. In the US, 5 other bombings during the year.

1973

Five terrorist bombings in the USA, against Center for Cuban Studies, ships, bookstores.

1974

Three bombings in the USA, plus one in Puerto Rico, one in Jamaica, one in France and one in Mexico, all aimed at Cuban assets.

1975

OAS lifted economic sanctions on Cuba. Cuba begins military incursion into Angola. Twenty-one bombings in the USA, including many embassies of states trading with Cuba. Other attacks in Argentina, Mexico, Columbia.

1976

February: Cuban troops in Angola number 14,000.

12 February: Soviet ship fired on off Anguilla island.

5 April Cuban fisherman killed by machinegun fire from terrorists off Florida.

23 July: Cuban terrorists from FLNC attempt kidnap of Cuban consul in Mexico. Fail, but kill companion.

6 October: A Cubana airlines DC-8 jetliner carrying 73 persons crashed off Barbados, killing all occupants. Venezuelan authorities suspect sabotage (flight originated in Venezuela).

15 October: Fidel Castro cancels the 1973 anti-hijacking treaty with the US.

In 14 other attacks, mostly bombings, property was damaged in the USA, Jamaica, Barbados, Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Trinidad, Venezuela, Spain and Mexico.

1977

March: Cuba and the USA exchange "interest sections".

Eleven bombings occur in USA, Peru. FBI collaboration with DGI against exile Cuban groups is disclosed at grand jury investigation, causing demonstrations in Miami.

Early Summer: Cuba sends troops into Ethiopia.

1978

Dialogue initiated by exile "moderates" with Havana. First groups of political prisoners released by Cuba. In all, some 4,000 are released over a period.

7 August: Bomb exploded outside Puerto Rican National Ballet auditorium.

9 September: Cuban mission to UN bombed by Omega 7.

21 October: New York newspaper bombed by Omega 7.

29 December: Cuban mission to UN again bombed by Omega 7. Also Lincoln Center in New York.

Omega 7 terrorists made assassination attempts on "Committee of 75" members, moderates who sought dialogue with Castro.

1979

220,000 Cuban exiles visit Cuba. DGI steps up its activities in the US.

25 March: Omega 7 tried to disrupt visits by bombings at Kennedy airport and elsewhere.

18 May: Bomb outside Cuban "interest section" in Washington DC. Omega 7 responsible.

21 September: A former leader of Alpha 66 wounded in head by shots from passing car.

27 October: Omega 7 again bombed Cuban UN mission.

25 November: Omega 7 murdered Jose Negrin in Union City, for favouring closer US-Cuban relations.

3 December: Omega 7 forced Cubana de Aviacion to change plans for first regular charter service New York to Havana.

7 December: Another bomb outside Cuban UN mission.

11 December: Four police officers and four Soviet officials injured by bomb beside Soviet mission to the UN, planted by Omega 7.

1980

Widespread discontent reported from Cuba.

13 January: Omega 7 bomb a cigar factory in Miami.

30 January: A bomb in New Jersey.

25 March: Omega 7 place bomb in car of Cuban UN ambassador in New York. Plot failed.

Crisis develops into third main exodus of refugees to the US. Local resentment against the influx was cause of Omega 7 message, via the media, threatening violence against any who mistreat refugees, especially the Klu Klux Klan.

August: A rash of skyjackings occurs in the Florida area, caused by recent Cuban refugees wanting to return to Cuba.

September: Felix Garcia Rodriguez, Cuban attache to UN, murdered by Omega 7 in New York.

Fall: Cuba returned aircraft hijackers to face trial in the US, and freed several US citizens long imprisoned in Cuban jails.

Organizations Involved in Conflict

Political Groupings

The Cuban leadership as at 31 July 1980 is listed at Annex A. Only one party is permitted in Cuba - the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), but analysts detect three main factions within it:

1. The Fidelistas - Personally loyal to Fidel Castro, this group is made up of veterans of the guerrilla struggle. It tends to favour "permanent revolution", at home for purposes of mobilization and abroad to further Cuban influence and prestige. It is therefore intransigent towards the USA. Most Fidelistas are civilian members of the Politburo and government. It is no longer permitted to wear military garb except in a military capacity. As president, first party secretary and commander-in-chief, Fidel Castro is the leader not only of this faction, but of all.

2. The Raulistas - Long-time followers of Raul Castro, who are mostly in the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) and the Ministry of the Interior (MININT). These have similar backgrounds to the fidelistas, but have become professional military and security officers. Raul, who is first vice president and second party secretary is the leader.

3. The Technocrats - Composed of specialists in economic, technical and administrative fields, augmented by surviving "old" communists, this faction is seen as "pragmatic" or "moderate", but this may be because the other two groups

monopolize the stage. The leader is Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, vice president and politburo member.

Security Forces

The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) are composed of a professional cadre and conscripted manpower, the period of service being 3 years. Total strength is 206,000, of whom 180,000 are in the army, 10,000 in the navy and 16,000 in the air force. There are some 1500-2000 Soviet advisers, these being additional to the combat brigade whose alleged presence caused a furore in September, 1979.

The Army

Three armoured brigades; 15 infantry divisions (actually, brigade-size), some of them mechanized. These have over 600 tanks, mostly last-generation Soviet design, armoured carriers, Soviet artillery, including 45 FROG-4 surface-to-surface missiles, anti-tank missiles and shoulder-launched SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. Some 19,000 troops are deployed in Angola and another 16,500 in Ethopia. There are 90,000 reservists.

The Navy

Three submarines, 14 large patrol craft, 26 smaller patrol boats, 34 more craft and some 50 coast-defence missiles. Bases at Cienfuegos, Havana, Mariel, Punta Ballenatos and Canas.

The Air Force

One hundred sixty-eight combat aircraft, including various MiG-fighters, marks 17 through 23, totaling 167; 46 transports; 49 helicopters; and training machines. There are 24 surface-to-air missile battalions with

144 launchers.

During the 1960s FAR was deeply involved in national mobilization and its officer corps was given responsibility for all manner of industrial and agricultural projects. In the 1970 giant sugar harvest, the military cut 20% of the total. Lately, under closer Soviet training, FAR has become a more efficient military tool and has withdrawn from some of its other functions. However, certain political missions are retained, notably:

1. The "internalization" of the PCC so that the corporate autonomy of the military institutions is preserved. The elimination of party-military conflict is a part of this process;
2. The elimination of historical cleavages within FAR - conflict between commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and between professional and non-professional officers;
3. Political indoctrination of recruits, the weeding out of undesirables, the maintenance of political orthodoxy;
4. Development of leadership cadres for export into the civilian sectors, and particularly, into the top leadership of the politburo. This completes the circle begun at "1" above.

The overseas campaigns in Angola and Ethopia have consolidated FAR's position, and power seems assured. Nevertheless, analysts point to shortcomings. Desertions from Cuban detachments overseas have been worrying, particularly to the Soviets. The latter are critical of Cuban officers, whom they see as incapable above company level.

Ramiro Valdes Menendez is Minister of the Interior. His MININT controls internal security in Cuba. His principal henchman is General Manuel Abrahantes, who heads the Departmento Seguridad del Estado (DSE) - the secret police with its 10,000 State Security Troopers. The Direccion General de Intelligencia (DGI) - Cuba's CIA or DI6 - was once a part of MININT but is now separate. The term independent would hardly be appropriate since it is commanded by Vassiliy Petrovich Semenov, a KGB general, from a Havana headquarters. Surveillance of anti-Castro groups on the island is therefore the role of DSE, and in America and elsewhere abroad, the DGI.

Analysts have a high regard for the DGI as an intelligence organization. Its relentless agents are motivated by genuine Cuban revolutionary zeal, and benefit from Soviet training and support. Through hispanic , black and Chinese minorities, the DGI can penetrate all areas of North America, and have done so. "You can smell their cigars in all the corridors of the Capitol", this analyst was told, "and DGI agents are entertained in the US Senators' dining room". The KGB evidently shares Western regard for the DGI and has much reduced its own "illegal" activities in much of North America, leaving the field to the DGI.

Inside Cuba the structure of control goes far beyond the secret police and the State Security Troopers. The entire party organization is alert to signs of resistance and there exists a network of organizations extending down from the national to the provincial, regional and local levels, all responsive to fidelista leadership. The 202,000-strong PCC and the Communist Youth League (UJC) are the selective or vanguard organs; the 1976 constitution created municipal "People's Power

Organizations"; government-sponsored or controlled agencies include the media, the educational system, the 100,000-strong "People's Militia" the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC), the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), "popular tribunals", the armed forces, government ministries and, at the block level, the 3.2 million-strong Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR). Part of the product of this network is a captive population almost half of whom are actively engaged in spying on the remainder and on one another, and on unknown number of political prisoners, variously estimated between 25,000 and 80,000.

The Soviet Presence

Supporting and at the same time threatening Cuban security, the Soviet presence is a vital factor in the internal and external defence of Cuba. The most important presence is that of Semenov as effective head of the DGI. The Soviet financial commitment to Cuba, nearly $10 million per day, exceeds the total United States foreign aid to all Latin America. Considering the parlous condition of the USSR's economy, such a vast commitment must be seen as profitable, and it is in terms of destabilization of the Caribbean, support for "progressive" (and ultimately, pro-Soviet) rebels in Latin America, and espionage and subversion in North America that the profit must surely lie. In addition, the Soviets are reportedly developing their own naval facility at Cienfuegos, with its potential threat to the neighbouring sea lanes. In spite of an earlier setback, Cuba remains a wonderful potential missile base. It follows that the Soviet Union must have a strong stake in the survival of the communist regime in Cuba.

After their experience in Egypt, whence Soviet advisors were unceremoniously ejected when President Sadat decided he had suffered Soviet clientage long enough, and in Chile, where a Marxist leader was overthrown by the military, the Soviet leaders have presumably developed techniques to prevent repeat performances. In Cuba's case, as a Socialist state fully committed to Moscow-style communism, the Brezhnev Doctrine additionally disallows reversion to any other condition. These are difficult principles to apply so far from home, but they may explain the presence of the 2,500-3,000 strong Soviet brigade. This is stationed at San Miguel de los Banos, conveniently close to the military air bases of Rancho Bayeres, where the transports from the USSR land, and San Antonio de los Banos, where the MiG-23 fighters are located. Similar deployment of Soviet troops was made in 1979 in Afghanistan, which enabled the two Kabul airfields to be secured for the airlanding of airborne divisions. Plans for reinforcement by such means would presumably be explained to the Cuban leadership as being necessary in case of another Bay of Pigs invasion, United States military intervention, or civil war. However, the same Soviet intervention could preempt any move towards "Tropical Titoism", a "Havana Spring", or a coup by anti-Soviet elements within the elite.

Opposition Forces

Castro still faces internal opposition from two fronts - the discontented masses backed up by the anti-Castro and anti-communist groups on the island and in the United States; and the "old" communists backed by the Soviet Union.

According to a reasonably well documented report in the New York Times Magazine, resistance on the island, which grew to dangerous proportions early in 1980, is still considerable. This has two forms: the unstructured mass of disgruntled and exhausted citizens - presumably the half of the population who are not in the party or the CDR - who might welcome political change but have neither the will, the ability nor the organization to bring it about; and the small organized groups in touch with US-based leaders who are involved in active resistance. The social-democratic group Abdala claims to have established cells in Cuba during the late 1970s, their present strength in Havana Province alone being 400. Claims by resistance spokesmen indicate that some 30 boat operations have been mounted by US-based commando groups during the past two years, in conjunction with the Cuban cells. Using "souped-up" smuggling boats, commandos leave Florida, visit an arms cache on some Caribbean island, and then proceed to Cuba. Resistance members who have infiltrated the Cuban military or CDR form reception committees and conceal the boats, while the commandos conduct intelligence-gathering, propaganda or sabotage forays. The strategy is evidently to encourage dissent among the Cuban young (half the population is under 25 years) and recruit resistance members among the younger, dissatisfied veterans of the African wars, many of whom are disenchanted by a lack of jobs and poor housing conditions. Another, and surely better, method of reaching these targets is to use the family-reunion flights which continue to operate between the US and the island. Militant exiles using forged identification infiltrate this traffic and, once through immigration, contact resistance cells.

The propaganda content of these activities is aimed at various audiences, but the military are a prime target. According to low-ranking Cuban officers who have defected to the West, absence without leave is widespread and sometimes condoned, and young soldiers occasionally trade their weapons for black market foodstuffs or imported goods. Prior to the 1980 influx, State Department officials reported an unusually high proportion of draft-related visa applications, and refugees report hundreds of Cubans as serving sentences for desertion or draft evasion. Similar allegations could possibly be made about a score of armies, without any political overtones, and should not therefore be accorded too much importance in this study. Nevertheless, if true, they are of interest, since they indicate a lowering of revolutionary zeal. Besides the face-to-face contact by infiltrators, themes are carried to Cuba by an Abdala underground newspaper, printed on the island, and by Radio Abdala broadcasts across the northern provinces of Cuba.

Sabotage instructions and materials are also brought into Cuba by exile commandos, including manuals issued by Soldier of Fortune magazine. The Cuban press has acknowledged an upsurge in politically-motivated arson. In the fall of 1979, two match factories were set alight and two sugar mills were destroyed. In 1980, according to some sources, the train stations in Havana and Santiago de Cuba were bombed, as was the nightclub at the former Havana Hilton and a special school for children of high Cuban officials outside Havana. More subtle forms of sabotage include absenteeism and inadequate workmanship, in the style of occupied Europe in the early 1940s. According to Jamaica's Daily Gleaner, the Cuban "Workers Guard" has mounted 24 hour patrols for the past 14 months to prevent sabotage. In January 1981 another exile group, Alpha 66, announced that three of its saboteurs had been caught by Cuban police, which at least provides circumstantial evidence to support these reports of insular resistance activities.

If there is effective leadership of the resistance movement present on the island, it has gone unreported. All accounts point to leaders on the American mainland, and of these there is no shortage. It is difficult for observers to distinguish between the sincerely nationalist, anti-Castro movement, and the much more visible hooligan element. The first group is headed by such distinguished Cuban exiles as ex-president Manuel Urrutia Lleo, Huber Matos and Raul Chibas. These are all opponents of Castro, not to be confused with those exiles such as Bernardo Benes, who seek dialogue and reconciliation. According to Robert Moss of the Economist Foreign Report, Urrutia was in January 1981 contemplating the establishment of a Provisional Revolutionary Government (presumably in Queens, New York, where Urrutia lives) which would call on the FAR to overthrow Castro. It was argued that such an appeal might win some highly-placed support since, as a tribunal judge in pre-revolutionary Cuba, Urrutia had prevented the execution of several captured guerrillas and had a good reputation as a moderate liberal. Huber Matos, once Castro's faithful lieutenant, wishes to unify the Cuban exile community around the idea that Cuba needed drastic social changes but not a dictatorship. He does not think that the exiles can be a decisive factor in any future changes in Cuba, but he believes they can encourage an eventual vast revulsion of the Cubans against the political system they live under. Raul Chibas, who was a Miami-based fund-raiser for Castro during the revolution, sees the road to change in Cuba as a "democratization of the socialist state on the Dubcek model". Military invasion or guerrilla struggle, he thinks, would be madness, but an alliance between military dissidents and exiles could create the right conditions for change. The exiles' main contribution would be information to explain how Cuba has got into its present deplorable condition. Abdala's secretary general, Gustavo Marin, thinks that political change in Cuba is still perhaps 5-10 years off. These more responsible leaders are unfortunately a minority amongst the often terroristic groups which claim to be fighting for Cuba's freedom.

1. Abdala. Branches in Cuban communities throughout the US and abroad. Has expanded membership to include young professionals, recent refugees, and former members of the 26th July Movement - Castro's original organization. Unpopular amongst the terrorist groups because of its opposition to such methods. Active on the island, with full propaganda apparatus. Social democratic in political outlook, seeks change through Cuban domestic pressures. Abdala has publicly denounced the DGI-sponsored Venceremos brigade, composed of pro-Castro American youth.

2. Cuban Democratic Movement. Huber Matos' social democratic movement, having similar aims as Abdala.

3. Cuban Nationalist Movement (CNM). Espouses a philosophy similar to that of the late Spanish fascist thinker, José Antonio Primo de Rivera. Linked to Omega 7. Headquartered in Union City, New Jersey. Bears some responsibility for the 1976 murder of ex-Chilean ambassador, Orlando Letelier.

4. Alpha 66. A militant group but one that officially condones and conducts actions only within Cuba. However, it is linked with murders of "Committee of 75" members.

5. Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP). Formed in 1972. Its leadership allegedly consisted of former pro-Castro guerrillas and had connections inside Cuba. In 1973 it established a radio station in Costa Rica.

6. Cuban Revolutionary Board (JCR) Independent Labor Action (ASI). Inactive at present. JCR-ASI associates with Cuban Power and was a member of FIN.

7. United Cubans. Established in 1970 and reorganized in 1974, this unit sought recognition from the US government.

8. Cuban Neo-Revolutionary Action (ANRC). Organized in 1972, as propaganda outlet.

9. Omega 7. A small but efficient terrorist group that operates in the USA against Cuban officials and all who oppose its policy. Neofascist in character. Young Cuba has conducted bombings under Omega 7's name. Omega 7 is the most extreme element in this anti-Castro pattern. It has carried out more than 40 bombings of Cuban airline offices and diplomatic missions, etc. since 1976, and is linked to 10 murders since 1973. It murdered Felix Garcia Rodriguez, Cuban attache at the UN, in September 1980.

10. Cuban National Liberation Front (FLNC). Organized in 1973 as a coalition of Abdala, Alpha 66, Cuban Action, ASI, MIM and other factions. FLNC uses its name for bombings outside the US and aliases for attacks inside. It is keen on grafiti.

11. Secret Cuban Government (GCS). Organized in New York in 1972. The title is used by many other groups.

12. Insurrectional Movement for Revolutionary Recovery (MIRR). Formed in the 1960s, now extinct, along with its front Cuban Power, but has spawned Cuban Action, whose commandos - Los Angeles based - have attacked embassies and bookshops.

13. Cuban Nationalist Front (FNC). Formed within Abdala in 1974 by dissidents who wished to spread the campaign to the US. Abdala ejected this group.

14. National Integration Front (FIN). A 1970 group using cover names Young Cuba, Secret Cuban Government.

In 1971 proposed bombing the papal and other delegations in Washington, DC, but nothing occurred.

15. Revolutionary Directory (DR). Formed 1970 but the death of a DR member by one of his own bombs seems to have discouraged the others.

16. Antonio Maceo Brigade. A pro-Castro exile group.

17. Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs (Brigade 2506). Consists of veterans of the abortive invasion, but has recently begun to recruit youngsters. Finances other groups.

Other groups include Anti-Castro Commandos, Anti-Communist Commandos, Condor, Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations (CORU), Cuban Liberation Front, Scorpion (el Alacran), Secret Hand Organization, Secret Organization Zero, and others. Officials in Dade County, Florida, estimate one hundred groups exist there alone. According to the New York and Miami FBI officials, the DGI has successfully penetrated all these organizations. In a speech in Havana in December 1975, Fidel Castro stated: "the Ministry of the Interior has infiltrated virtually every counter-revolutionary outfit and, in many, its men have held some of the highest posts in the leadership". Even allowing for deliberate disinformation designed to create "mole scares", this boast may contain a fair element of truth. The total estimate of anti-Castro militants in Miami in the early 1960s was 20,000. This had dropped by the early 1970s to around 3,000.

However the tide has turned, and today the figure quoted is 5,000.

The situation is at its worst in Dade County, Florida. Cubans are forced to provide money to support terrorist activities, and group members more by drug trafficking and other crime. All claim the status of "patriots", soldiers in the cause, and refuse to accept criminal liability for their acts. They regard America simply as a battleground, not an ally, and have no compunction over killing policemen who stand in their way. Dade County experienced 55 major political bombings and 23 political murders or attempted murders between 1975-1980. When a terrorist is sentenced for a crime, between 15-20,000 Cubans can be expected to demonstrate in his favour. Targets have included a radio commentator who criticised terrorism (lost both his legs in a car bomb), a one-time senior Batista official who criticised one particular group (murdered), the owner of a boat business who failed in an attempt to bring exiles from Cuba (shot dead), and an advocate of better relations with the Castro regime (shot dead in front of his wife). The police receive no cooperation from the community, who regard the terrorists as heroes or, if unconvinced, nevertheless fear reprisals. All terrorists claim to have been introduced to political violence by the CIA. The CIA involvement with these thugs undoubtedly clouds the moral and legal issues, and provides them with a form of legitimacy, however bogus. Many of the 1980 arrivals, being fit for little else, have drifted into these groups.

These exiles, believing that the Castro regime is weak, are stepping up their activities. They run six paramilitary training camps, controlled by professionals. One has its own barracks and airstrip. Being on private land, bought out of the proceeds of extortion, they are relatively immune because of the US neutrality laws.

At the other end of the political spectrum, Castro has still to be concerned by the danger from Moscow. For all that he has complete control of the apparatus of state, that apparatus is held in place by Soviet means. The DGI is under Soviet command; the economy is sustained by Soviet assistance; the FAR is reliant upon Soviet arms and equipment and, overseas, on resupply; and the regime's political legitimacy relies heavily on Soviet international diplomatic and propaganda support. Thus, although for 21 years Castro has successfully prevented the extreme left from entering by the back door, he has in the last 10 years opened the front door to a complete take-over. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the old-guard communist who seems to be out in the cold so far as _fidelistas_ are concerned, may be in a far stronger position than the organizational charts allow. How far this situation will limit Fidel's freedom of action in any future crisis, and how far it may contribute to crises, we can only guess.

Factors Affecting the Conflict

Sources of Conflict

The main source of Cuban internal conflict is political, and in a sense, ideological: it concerns the form of government in that country. Overlaid upon this struggle is the bipolar confrontation between the United States and the USSR, the one anxious to tame, coerce or replace a stridently anti-American neighbour, the other drawn into a situation on the far side of the globe full of opportunity and danger. Whereas the Soviets have a clear ideology for export, the Americans have not. The latter's response, therefore, tends to be negative in character. Castro is not liked, but no concensus exists over the desirable form of a successor regime. And whilst most Americans and many Cuban exiles seem to oppose Castro because of his acquired communism, opposition at home arises out of frustration at a regime which has failed to deliver on its promises, especially in the economic field.

Methods of Conflict

Internal resistance groups reportedly commit acts of sabotage, spread disaffection, particularly within junior ranks of FAR, and issue propaganda denigrating Castro for making Cuba a Soviet possession, etc. The extent and success of this activity is impossible to establish without access to classified intelligence, and this analyst doubts if really reliable reports are available outside MININT. The broader resistance lies in a dissatisfied population. At present, this does not appear to express itself in any form that contributes to anti-Castro conflict, but it is a pressure.

Control of internal dissent is in the hands of MININT, whose apparatus has already been discussed, and all the other government-sponsored groups which have a role in national mobilization. At present, these seem equal to their task. MININT is backed by MINFAR, and by the

Soviets. Surveillance, denunciation, coercion, and mobilization are standard weapons in their armoury.

External resistance contributes to internal dissent by supporting sabotage, subversion and propaganda. The existence of a viable alternative government might pose a threat, but this is not yet visible. In its terrorist manifestations, external resistance is a nuisance but no more. Attacks on Soviet and other foreign representatives and properties probably help to legitimize the Castro regime, and to discredit the entire exile movement.

Control of external resistance is shared between the DGI and the FBI, a shotgun marriage arising out of the shortsighted policies of the terror groups. Since the latter pose a greater threat to American internal security than to Cuba's, there is no great need for the DGI to do more than observe, nor have they done so. There seems little doubt that if that organization was ever ordered to liquidate the terrorists they could make a significant impact.

America's readiness to accept Cuban refugees has made an important contribution to the consolidation of the Cuban revolution, by removing successive waves of potential counter-revolutionaries. The 1980 exodus produced two new elements: many of the exiles were chosen by the Cuban authorities as being liabilities; and the influx demonstrated a destabilizing potential on the American mainland. Castro now knows that he has stumbled on a new conflict method for use against the USA. Moreover, in this field, Castro would have as allies the terrorist exile groups, who would almost certainly bring pressure to bear on the US government to accept refugees without distinction or limit.

Between the orthodox left and the fidelistas, conflict forms are political, in the allocation of power; economic, through the Soviet subsidy; and military, through the Soviet military presence.

Strengths and Weaknesses

From the preceding section it is clear that military strength (other than Soviet) is not a critical factor in the equation, since conflict does not at present take this form, nor is it likely to. The important factor for Castro is that his revolution should consolidate its gains and continue to succeed. If this happens then he should have nothing serious to fear; if it fails, threats to the regime are liable to grow and become dangerous. Experience from Eastern Europe suggests that satellite regimes whose populations demand reform can be maintained in power only by the proximity of the Soviet army. Notwithstanding apparent plans for reinforcement in Cuba, the practicality of the Soviet Union holding Cuba by force, within close proximity to the American coast, must be questioned.

Fidel Castro has maintained power thus far because of his considerable personal popularity, and through a leadership style that sets him apart from the nonentities who govern most Soviet client states. In this analyst's opinion, he is the single most important strength of the present Cuban regime. Moreover, by holding the communists in a subordinate position, he has retained hold of Cuban nationalism as the main mobilizing force within his social revolution.

Yet the same traits of personality which make Castro so powerful an asset seem also to limit his practical achievements. Castro is a master of the arts of mobilizing, leading, forcing change and directing it; he is much less proficient at the more humdrum job of making the new order he has created work efficiently. The first tasks of the revolution - freeing Cuba of American economic domination and political influence - were achieved. So were the extensive transformations of Cuban socialism, especially in health, education and welfare programmes, which have recently received the stamp of approval of the UN's Economic Commission on Latin America. These are solid achievements, apt to be overlooked by critics, but after 21 years they appear insufficient in themselves to satisfy the needs of Cuba's people.

Cuba's economic performance slowed considerably in the second half of the 1970s if one discounts the effect of inflation. The annual average 1970-1974 was 12 percent: by 1979 it was 4 percent. Castro has acknowledged unemployment running into tens of thousands, yet the Lenin repair shop, the best in the country, runs at half speed through lack of trained technicians. In late 1978, city officials estimated that Havana workers spent an average of four to five hours daily commuting to and from work. In 1980, 70,000 tons of steel rods (20 percent of annual output) were stored outside without cover and in danger of oxidizing. In 1978, only 16,778 housing units out of the 30,000 planned were completed; in the same period an estimated 25,000 units were destroyed due to poor maintenance. Party officials have admitted absenteeism, low productivity, short workdays, increasing labour costs in relation to output, and "the existence of great opportunities for illegally appropriating money, food, and consumer goods." Specialists in the US have pointed to a centralized command economy producing macro errors, the absence of economic indicators and incentives, overriding personalistic rule governed by a "guerrilla mentality", and demoralization of the workforce as main causes.

In September 1980 Castro disclosed that cane rust disease had reduced sugar output by one million tons; agricultural and industrial yields were down by at least 30 percent. Tobacco fields suffered from blue mold disease, which destroyed 85 percent of the leaf output. By these setbacks Cuba lost about $1 billion in foreign exchange earnings. One wonders if Castro has ever referred back to his "History will absolve me" speech, in which he said "Cuba could easily provide for a population three times as great as it now has... The markets should be overflowing with produce, pantries should be full, all hands should be working". Fidel in 1980 also referred to negligence, privileges, irresponsibility, corruption, indiscipline and inefficiency. Fully fledged socialist economic planning, which was not attempted until the mid-1970s, may have been implemented in counterproductive ways. Indeed, critics of communism would say that this is invariably the case. Acknowledging the political implications of economic shortcomings, Castro in his National Assembly speech in September 1980 warned that:

> "we are not going to have a 'cultural revolution' but we have to propose that

> all these factors and elements...which irritate the people be radically suppressed."

Since the crisis of 1980 and the last mass exodus, efforts have been made to improve conditions. Sugar output is scheduled to increase gradually to reach 10 million tons in 1985; material incentives to workers are being introduced; in September 1980 agricultural workers received a 15 percent pay award; private transactions among individual producers and consumers are now allowed; consumer item prices were drastically reduced; the minimum wage went up by 10 percent. Whether these measures are sufficient to change the Cuban economy and satisfy an increasingly disillusioned public, remains to be seen. It is a measure of Castro's confidence that he can speak so frankly to his nation. Cuba's public style is much less tarnished by mendacity than any other communist state. Yet frankness poses problems too. In pluralistic societies the public identification of problems and a commitment to remedy them puts the speaker on the spot. Either he succeeds or he goes. Economic performance is Castro's principal vulnerability.

The export of revolution matches Castro's life-long commitment to action and it is difficult to imagine how he could repudiate this dominant streak in his personality. First in South America, then in Africa and the Caribbean, and now in Central America, the Castro style is evident. The latest involvements in El Salvador suggest that orthodox Marxism-Leninism has replaced the foco theory, but Africa may have a stronger personal appeal to Fidel. It is, however, one thing to conspire, to use covert action, and then to stand back and watch the bonfire. It is another to commit sizeable forces of Cuban conscripts to distant lands. These involvements may prove easier to incur than to escape. And once the Angolan or Ethiopianvictory had been assured, such forces find themselves in an essentially conservative role, regardless of the revolutionary rhetoric, with counter-insurgency as their task. Used initially as mobilizing action, military adventures, like the endless series of agricultural and industrial mobilization schemes that have characterized Castro's rule, are apt to turn to disillusionment when the reality fails to live up to the rhetoric. This situation has the potential to be a severe weakness for Castro. A military defeat would be a massive test. His best defence seems to be the lack of understanding among his adversaries, especially the Americans, of a basic insurrectionary technique - turning one's opponent's apparent strengths into weaknesses.

Castro himself is probably also Cuba's principal asset in the conflict with the left. No Soviet leader in his right mind would dare to conspire for his downfall, since the collapse might carry all with it. To have him sufficiently under control is the likely aim, and not an easy one either, but with economic dependence on the USSR, he is unlikely to stray too far. It may be in the question of Castro's eventual successor that the Soviets will seek to install their man. This period will undoubtedly be one of high instability, and any new leader who lacks public appeal and the legitimacy of 1950s revolutionary credentials may be vulnerable. In this sense, the communist and Russian connection may ultimately undermine the nationalist element in the revolution and open the door to a new order in Cuba. The Soviet connection is another strength that might be turned into a weakness by a sophisticated opponent.

So far as the responsible opposition forces are concerned, their only asset is time. Notwithstanding the age of some of the leaders, they exhibit strength of character and wisdom by recognising this fact, and by their estimate that a revolutionary situation in Cuba is 5-10 years in the future. This does not mean that time is inevitably on their side; if Castro can work another miracle he could consolidate his position. It does mean that, barring a miracle, time will erode the fidelistas, force a confrontation with the left, multiply the economic problems, and possibly bring about a situation where the governing elite cannot continue along the same path, and where the people are prepared to take Cuba's future into their own hands.

As for the terrorists, their strengths lie in ruthlessness and in the protection offered by the exile community. These strengths appear to inflict little damage on the Castro regime, and serve mainly to embarrass America politically.

Outside Influences

Castro's ambitions on the world stage, particularly as leader of the Third World, bring the entire international community into Cuba's internal future. There is nothing original in a leader who cannot solve domestic problems plunging into external adventures as a means of distracting the public. In Cuba's case, however, the commitment to continental revolution has far deeper roots. "The duty of every revolutionary", said Castro in 1962, "is to make a revolution". There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of this philosophy. The outcome may be a commitment from which there is now no easy escape. The demands on Cuba's economy, and on revolutionary zeal, are unlikely to slacken, and the continued diversion of scarce resources may become a serious domestic issue. Overseas involvement also prevents reconciliation with the United States.

The Soviet involvement provides economic stability and a powerful friend in world forums. Direct US intervention is deterred by the prospect of actual conflict with Soviet forces and its escalatory potential. It makes Cuba a hot issue but is also a second reason why closer relations with the US are unlikely. Further sovietization of Cuban affairs could create the conditions of unrest that are visible in nearly every satellite state. Cuba's need to support the USSR publicly has proved costly in terms of Third World ambitions, especially after Afghanistan. Indeed, close alliance brings into question Cuba's credentials as a non-aligned nation.

The United States, still seen by the Castro regime as the principal enemy, will always be the dominant outside influence on account of geographical proximity. Ideological commitment cannot alter this fact. Revolutionaries need enemies as symbols of hate, who can be blamed for all the shortcomings of the regime. The fact that Castro evidently still needs such a target is indicative of long-lasting shortcomings, but the commitment to continental revolution together with likely Soviet pressures to make more trouble for the United States in the Third World, Puerto Rico and in America itself may aggravate the relationship. Improved US relations seem to be ruled out by unalterable factors, and consequently the economic assistance that Cuba needs is unlikely to be forthcoming.

Trends

The trend is towards continued friction between the United States and Cuba, continued Cuban involvement in Third World revolution, and strengthening Soviet ties. Internally, the trend temporarily is away from too orthodox a command economy, but the overriding trend is towards sovietization of all aspects of society with a rather contradictory greater emphasis on satisfying consumer demand. Trends in opposition forces seem to be towards the gradual mobilization of the younger Cuban generation against the existing regime and its Soviet ally, but it is too soon to say whether this is a reality or only a trend in rebel philosophy. The terrorists appear likely to continue their long-established patterns of violence.

Outlook

If there is to be a new revolution in Cuba its style is likely to be that of Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s, Iran of 1978-1979, or Poland today.

The popular masses would feel that the old regime had failed, and had been there too long, and was in need of root and branch revision or complete replacement. Possibly, as in the Prague example, leaders for such a movement might arise from within the ruling party. Or they might mobilize the masses from sanctuary overseas, like Khomeini. Or, as in Poland, they may rise up from the factories or farms. In no case will they be able to challenge the government forces through a protracted guerrilla war. They will have to find ways of making the government's military power irrelevant, even a liability, and of course FAR itself might be the base for such an uprising. If ever they succeeded in bringing Soviet forces into bloody conflict with Cubans, they would be well on their way to victory, however shattering the tactical defeat. This analyst agrees with statements attributed to Cuban exile leaders that such a revolutionary situation is probably 5-10 years away, although an unexpected event could precipitate an earlier crisis.

Necessary preconditions seem to include:

1. Loss of faith in Castro, or loss of Castro as leader;
2. The mantle of Cuban nationalism passing out of the hands of the regime into those of the opposition forces;
3. Economic failure, pointing to instability and a need for change;
4. The growth of widespread opposition committed to political change;
5. Effective revolutionary leadership;
6. Identification of the Soviet Union rather than the US as Cuba's enemy.

Responsible Cuban exiles may provide leadership. In any case they could act as links between the insular opposition and the US government and emigre community. The US government might have to find ways of appealing to the Cuban people over the heads of the Castro government, and it is vital that in neither its statements nor its actions the US should appear as the enemy of the Cuban people. Although the eye of the revolutionary hurricane must be on the island, the exile community can play an important role in mobilizing international support, providing propaganda and other help. Theodore Draper has remarked

"Castro's democratic opponents have the right and the duty to obtain arms where they can, as Castro did and as other revolutionary movements have done. The United States can help, but a democratic Cuban opposition worthy of the name will accept arms or other assistance only on its own terms".

But there is a potential problem here, which may limit the usefulness of this constituency. The insular opposition is unlikely to struggle for Batista values or a reimposition of US economic dominion, nor is it likely to welcome the return of neofascists and thugs who share none of their (social democratic) values. The United States may find this difficult to understand, and a final necessary precondition for rebellion is that the US should expect, and respect, a new Cuba unaligned in the bipolar struggle, possibly Marxian and probably socialist, but free of Soviet control.

If the United States is looking for roles to play in preparing the ground for an anti-Castro movement, it might see what can be done to bring about a defeat of Cuban troops abroad at the hands of indigenous peoples (certainly not South Africans, or French paras, or American marines), and it might make plans to deter or prevent Soviet military reinforcement of Cuba in a crisis.

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Cuban Leadership	PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE (108 Members)		GOVERNMENT		
	Political Bureau (13 Members)	Secretariat (11 Members)	National Assembly of the People's Government (481 Delegates)	Council of State (30 Members)	Council of Ministers (47 Members)
Fidel Castro Ruz	First Secretary	First Secretary	Member	President	President
Raul Castro Ruz	Second Secretary	Second Secretary	Member	First Vice President	First Vice President
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez Rodriguez	Member	Member	Member	Vice President	Vice President
Blas Roca Calderio	Member	Member	President	Vice President	
Jose R. Machado Ventura	Member	Member	Member	Member	
Pedro Miret Prieto	Member	Member	Member	Member	
Arnaldo Milian Castro	Member	Member	Member	Member	Vice President
Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado	Member		Member	Member	Vice President
Juan Almeida Bosque	Member		Member	Vice President	
Ramiro Valdes Menendez	Member		Member	Vice President	Vice President (Interior)
Guillermo Garcia Frias	Member		Member	Vice President	Vice President
Armando Hart Davalos	Member		Member	Member	Member (Culture)
Sergio del Valle Jimenez	Member		Member	Member	Member
Jorge Risquet Valdes		Member	Member		
Antonio Perez Herrero		Member	Member		
Julio Camacho Aguilera		Member	Member		
Lionel Soto Prieto		Member	Member		
Humberto Perez Gonzalez*			Member		Vice President
Jose Ramon Fernandez Alvarez*			Member		Vice President
Raul Roa Garcia*			Vice President	Member	
Diocles Torralba Gonzalez*			Member	Member	Vice President
Joel Domenech Benitez*			Member	Member	Vice President
Flavio Bravo Pardo*			Member	Member	Vice President
Osmani Cienfuegos Gorriaran*			Member	Member	Vice President & Minister Secretary
Jose Miyar Barruecos			Member	Minister Secretary	
Isidoro Malmierca Peoli*			Member		Member (Foreign Affairs)

*Central Committee Members

Source: National Foreign Assessment Center, Information received as of 31 July 1980.

CONCLUSIONS

The introduction to these studies stresses the separate and individual nature of each struggle, and detailed analyses have reinforced this view. Each conflict has its own historical roots, even though the trends through which the world has been passing, of western imperial decay, ideological aggressiveness, nationalism, and the bi-polar struggle may to greater or lesser extent colour all. Moreover, a six-nation sample is too small to provide a model for global trends. At best, it can offer pointers, and these are discussed below.

Each conflict is political, in that the opposition wishes to change the power structure in their favour. The sources of conflict differ considerably, yet all but one involve some form of nationalism. Ideology is perhaps the main source in Italy, and is present in three or four other cases. Religion helps shore up South African white nationalists, and it is important in Ireland and in the Afghan war. It might be fair to say that none of the opposition groups can hope to succeed unless it can claim to be the legitimate defender of nationalism, which the Italian terrorists certainly cannot. But even though a nationalist stance seems a desirable revolutionary asset, it does not by itself ensure success.

Study of the methods of conflict, and their strengths and weaknesses, indicates that the most prevalent, terrorism, is perhaps the least potent. When it is described as the weapon of the weak, it ought to be added that it is also a reflection of that weakness. Its nuisance value is very great, and as "propaganda of the deed" it is effective in gaining attention, but neither necessarily leads much further. The Northern Ireland conflict was a severe threat to United Kingdom hegemony in its early years, when much of the Catholic population was mobilized against the government. Today the purely terroristic campaign seems to lack political utility. In Italy also, terrorism, though dangerously destabilizing, has not lived up to its perpetrators' expectations, and the same may be said of Puerto Rico and the anti-Castro Cubans.

Propaganda in all its forms, including certain acts of terror, is common to all the conflicts studied, and its importance in low-intensity conflict - where political mobilization is necessary - need not be argued at greater length. It enables the conflict to widen and engulf the masses, and it brings support from the international community. More than any other single factor, strong propaganda can be the decisive weapon. The fact that the Soviets are beating the Afghanis and their Islamic and western friends in this field bodes ill for the future of that resistance; propaganda exploitation of Italian and Northern Ireland violence is probably more important than the violence itself, but the base is too narrow for real success. Anti-apartheid propaganda is certainly a pivotal element in South Africa's future. Neither the Puerto Rican separatists nor the anti-Castro Cubans appear capable of generating strong propaganda, but this could change. If it does change, the whole outlook for those conflicts may alter.

It is actions by a mobilized mass that seem best able to pose severe low-intensity threats to governments. Peering outside our six studies, events in Poland illustrate this point most dramatically. Black resistance in South Africa is probably irresistible in the longer term, simply because the mobilized mass will prove irresistible. Terror at one extreme and political dialogue at the other may supplement politization, but the central challenge will be from the people. By our assessment, there will be no serious challenge to the Cuban regime unless and until an appropriate locus of opposition is found among the population. Mass resistance is the Afghans' strongest card, but failures of leadership may allow it to be wasted.

The masses have several weapons - civil disobedience, massive demonstrations drawing repressive action, withdrawal of labour and low-level economic sabotage, boycotts, tax and other refusals, creation of rival organizations so big that they cannot safely be challenged - none of which can easily be overcome by military force. Through such action, the physical power of government can be made less relevant to the outcome. Iran was a good example. If the mass can penetrate the armed forces and the ruling party, so much the better.

International leverage is another important ingredient of low-intensity warfare. Internal struggles must be made international issues, so that the regime's legitimacy is brought into question by the world community. The USSR has succeeded, through the absence of any opposition worth the name by the west, in conferring a measure of legitimacy upon the Kabul government and on its own rule in Afghanistan, under conditions where, in a properly fought battle, they should have had almost no hope. The Italian terrorists have enjoyed very little international support, and nor have the anti-Castro Cubans. The IRA, FALN and black South Africans rely heavily on this support. In the two first cases, all hope might be extinguished were it completely withdrawn.

One important trend, therefore, that emerges from these studies is that low-intensity conflict relies as heavily today as in the period of anti-colonial struggle on the backing of the masses and on the mobilization of international opinion. The elitist theories of small group action do not seem to stand the test. This is not to discount the destabilizing potential of widespread terrorism, sponsored by some foreign power, which lies outside the terms of this report. In none of the six cases was any foreign violent involvement on the side of the rebels of great importance: when this occurs, as it did in Angola, a new set of factors come to the fore which are not within the scope of this study.

Another identifiable trend is the demonstrated ability of governments to absorb relatively high levels of political violence without being diverted from their chosen course of action. Even a relatively weak and inefficient liberal democracy, Italy, has been able to withstand professional terrorism drawn from a sizeable constituency without becoming a police state. It is a trend from which the liberal democracies may take heart.

The six case studies reveal the close links between politics and violence characteristic of this spectrum of conflict. This factor should not be ignored by governments as they attempt to come to terms with low-intensity conflict in the coming decade, whether it is in Latin America or Southern Africa. The political dimension should warn governments not to respond solely to the violent aspect, but to treat the disease rather than the symptoms. When the conflict is non-violent, as in Poland at present, constraints are placed on the use of armed force. Coercion, possibly on a massive scale, may yet be applied in Poland, but it will not be the final arbiter of what is essentially a political and economic crisis.

That war is a continuation of politics by other means is an accepted truism. In low-intensity conflict, the two forms - violence and politics - overlap, forming a kind of coercive diplomacy. This seems likely to be the most conspicious conflict form in the 1980s, and a greater measure of understanding on the part of the west seems necessary.

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

KEY WORDS

Low intensity conflict
Terrorism
Insurgency
Case studies
Italy
South Africa
Puerto Rico
Afghanistan
Northern Ireland
Cuba

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1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY
Department of National Defence
Operational Research and Analysis Est.

2a. DOCUMENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

2b. GROUP

3. DOCUMENT TITLE
Trends in Low Intensity Conflict

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

5. AUTHOR(S) (Last name, first name, middle initial)
Charters, David
Graham, Dominick
Tugwell, Maurice

6. DOCUMENT DATE
August 1981

7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES
317

7b. NO. OF REFS
0

8a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO.
96128

9a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER(S)
ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 16

8b. CONTRACT NO.
14SU.0141003

9b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO.(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this document)

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
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11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12. SPONSORING ACTIVITY
ORAE

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This study seeks to assess trends in low intensity conflict by reference to six case studies involving countries which are currently experiencing some form of political violence at a sub-state, rather than an inter-state, level. The cases analyzed were Italy, South Africa, Puerto Rico, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, and Cuba. Among the selection criteria for the case studies were included regional distribution, conflict forms, political and social environments, rural and urban settings, insurgent motivations, and conflict status. The study includes a historical review of the principal conflict forms that have emerged since 1945. A concluding section assesses those trends that recur among most or all of the cases (while recognizing the separate and individual nature of each struggle) with a view to projecting the likely patterns of low intensity conflict.